This sort of misses the forest for the trees, although neat application. Ballmer's argument is essentially about tail risk. Expected value is absolutely not a good way to make bets if you value survival, because you only get one shot. Same reason you wouldn't go all in every time you get a poker hand that's "expected" to win. Because you'll (very probably) be bankrupt in a few hands. Sure the mean is +$0.07 or whatev…
> Expected value is absolutely not a good way to make bets if you value survival Yes! The St. Petersburg "Paradox" shows that we intuitively know that. I put "paradox" in quotes because I don't think it's a paradox, it's just a sane reaction. (Sam Bankman-Fried was a big fan of EV and famously declared that he would toss a coin where heads would double the "value" (?) of the world but tails would destroy it.) In shor…
There are standard arguments (e.g. the Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem) that an agent with rational preferences, with remarkably weak definitions of the word “rational”, must have an utility function and a subjective probability function such that their behaviour is always governed by the EV of that utility with respect to that probability.