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Bypassing Safari 17's advanced audio fingerprinting protection

fingerprint.com

111–120 of 266 posts

Re: Bypassing Safari 17's advanced audio fingerprinting protection

#113

I feel like these days (especially given the recent focus on side channel attacks) it is basically a given that adding uniform noise to something that leaks data does not work, because you can always take more samples and remove the noise. Why did Safari add this? I understand that needing more samples is definitely an annoyance to fingerprinting efforts, but as this post shows it's basically always surmountable in s…

> Why did Safari add this?

A lot of Apple's "privacy" features nowadays are marketing. It's privacy theater. What matters is whether they can tell a plausible story to the public, not whether is technically effective.

Re: Bypassing Safari 17's advanced audio fingerprinting protection

#114

I'm really ready to just be "that guy" that browses with JS disabled.

Good luck, I recently gave up that fight after needing to disable it to view the content of nearly every single website I visited.

It's not even just cloudflare and similar DDOS checks, but now even things that should just be in the HTML of the page are loaded with JS.

Re: Bypassing Safari 17's advanced audio fingerprinting protection

#115
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think that is correct, but it still seems like an amount of leakage that could be further correlated with other another trick. There was previously a site which could indicate how globally unique your environment was (some combination of screen size, user-agent, fonts?, etc). Locking down to a specific hardware+browser configuration probably does a lot to remove anonymity.

You may be thinking of https://www.amiunique.org/fingerprint

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Re: Bypassing Safari 17's advanced audio fingerprinting protection

#117

It seems like rather than adding a random amount to each sample (which lets them compute a mean by recreating the same audio and extracting out the differences), Safari could instead add randomness that is based on a key that rotates every hour. (Function of audio sample and key, so the noise would be the same in a given session, but useless for tracking an hour later).

If you averaged together ten such samples, you'd get something that approaches the true values from the device. The more samples you have, the closer it would get. Fixing this would require removing the information leak entirely, not just masking it under a layer of random deviations.

[flagged]

Re: Bypassing Safari 17's advanced audio fingerprinting protection

#119
post #97
post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm the opposite. I think website = sanboxed, native = pownage so whenever I can use a website version I often prefer it over a native app. I use photopea all the time now. it's available on every machine, even machines I don't have permission to install software on

You can sandbox native apps too. Hell, even run them in an airgapped virtual machine. I wouldn't trust a browser sandbox all that much given the high interest in subverting it.

What’s an easy way to sandbox apps on Windows?

Sorry, I’d prefer to stick with my operating system, not install QubesOS.

Re: Bypassing Safari 17's advanced audio fingerprinting protection

#120
post #110
post #87

Another interesting technique to fingerprint users online is called GPU Fingerprinting [1] (2022). Codenamed 'DrawnApart', the technique relies on WebGL to count the number and speed of the execution units in the GPU, measure the time needed to complete vertex renders, handle stall functions, and more stuff ________________ 1. https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/researchers-u...

browsers should come with a default software renderer, and behave like the mic and camera where the site will require user permission to release the hardware GPU render path.

I feel like the constraints could open up an interesting demoscene too.
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