British intelligence able to read and flag private Snapchat messages
111–120 of 125 posts
Re: British intelligence able to read and flag private Snapchat messages
#112Re: British intelligence able to read and flag private Snapchat messages
#113The MOD encourages their personnel to use Snapchat, and blocks WhatsApp (on their internal networks). What more do you need to know?
Re: British intelligence able to read and flag private Snapchat messages
#114I don't know much about hashing but is it possible five eyes just has a zettabyte-scale rainbow table covering scary words? They could use that to score encrypted messages and act on the scary ones.
(Although in the background, fuckups are always possible and they did send a fighter jet initially so there was some pressure to follow through. Still not enough to risk a major secret.)
Re: British intelligence able to read and flag private Snapchat messages
#115This is why even if you aren't doing anything wrong, you should always use E2E encrypted communication.
Re: British intelligence able to read and flag private Snapchat messages
#116Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nah the best you could do for a long while was just to have n^2 bilateral encryption sessions that behave like a group channel. Only fairly recently was a workable construction for doing many-party encryption sessions actually developed, called TreeKEM, and is now standardized in the IETF MLS standard. This is literally bleeding edge cryptography. It's an extremely flexible design and has relatively few constraints i…
> Nah the best you could do for a long while was just to have n^2 bilateral encryption sessions that behave like a group channel. What? We could do better than that before we had group chats. PGP will let you send encrypted email to multiple recipients, and multiple simultaneous bilateral encryption sessions are not involved. The system is: 1. You encrypt the message using a symmetric encryption key. 2. You encrypt t…
TreeKEM also manages sublinear communication, constant per message (since there's a shared secret already used for the ratchet) and logn for key updates or group membership changes.
Re: British intelligence able to read and flag private Snapchat messages
#117Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nah the best you could do for a long while was just to have n^2 bilateral encryption sessions that behave like a group channel. Only fairly recently was a workable construction for doing many-party encryption sessions actually developed, called TreeKEM, and is now standardized in the IETF MLS standard. This is literally bleeding edge cryptography. It's an extremely flexible design and has relatively few constraints i…
When talking about recent, you're talking about 6 years ago right?
Re: British intelligence able to read and flag private Snapchat messages
#118Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Nah the best you could do for a long while was just to have n^2 bilateral encryption sessions that behave like a group channel. What? We could do better than that before we had group chats. PGP will let you send encrypted email to multiple recipients, and multiple simultaneous bilateral encryption sessions are not involved. The system is: 1. You encrypt the message using a symmetric encryption key. 2. You encrypt t…
PGP is poorly suited for live conversations with rotating members like this since it doesn't support post-compromise security or perfect forward secrecy (not in-protocol, at least), which most people would expect from an E2EE chat protocol. I was speaking of protocols that did have these properties. TreeKEM also manages sublinear communication, constant per message (since there's a shared secret already used for the…
> I was speaking of protocols that did have these properties.
The method PGP uses to encrypt messages to multiple recipients will still work for whatever protocol you have in mind. Why is your dislike for PGP relevant?
Re: British intelligence able to read and flag private Snapchat messages
#119Re: British intelligence able to read and flag private Snapchat messages
#120Earlier quoted context omitted.
PGP is poorly suited for live conversations with rotating members like this since it doesn't support post-compromise security or perfect forward secrecy (not in-protocol, at least), which most people would expect from an E2EE chat protocol. I was speaking of protocols that did have these properties. TreeKEM also manages sublinear communication, constant per message (since there's a shared secret already used for the…
The concept of encryption is poorly suited for live conversations with rotating members. If you don't know who you're talking to, there's no point in encrypting your message. > I was speaking of protocols that did have these properties. The method PGP uses to encrypt messages to multiple recipients will still work for whatever protocol you have in mind. Why is your dislike for PGP relevant?
I don't dislike PGP I'm just saying that it doesn't natively have PFS and PCS, which are generally accepted by security people as being necessary properties for a protocol to be considered full E2EE.