Not really shocking or new but kind of interesting. Why would they use 0days on security researchers. My guess is it's a test with upside. On the one hand if it works on a security researcher, you can go "live" because you got a good one and on the other hand you estimate that in the long run you'll get 1+x 0days out of the deal from said researcher. As a security researcher it also presents an interesting situation.…
North Korean campaign targeting security researchers
111–120 of 302 posts
Re: North Korean campaign targeting security researchers
#112Complete conjecture, but new macOS security update just went up, which includes this tidbit: > Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted image may lead to arbitrary code execution. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213906 Not a betting man, but I'd guess that's the vulnerability being discussed.
Re: North Korean campaign targeting security researchers
#113Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm really curious where the 0-day is in the code of the project honestly
This "UpdateCheckThread" code looks pretty funky, [0]. It downloads some stuff from a URL, writes a file to disk, and creates a process to run it. 0: https://github.com/dbgsymbol/getsymbol/blob/cb4bdedc1a85c308...
if (updateDlg.DoModal() == IDOK) { … }
then doesn’t that mean it only runs that code if the user clicks “OK” on the update dialog?(Edit: I think I understand now. It’s not the code, it’s the update URL that’s the problem, because it’s controlled by NK. So if you run this and blindly click “OK”, then it will download an executable that will infect your PC.)
(Edit 2: Or the issue is not in the source at all, but is in the prebuilt binary.)
Re: North Korean campaign targeting security researchers
#114I wonder what the chances are that a security researcher would execute a Windows binary they receive over chat from a rando. This isn't even security 101, just common sense at this point. If anything, I'm sure it gave researchers a chance to play around with the binary in a secure environment. They wouldn't even need to reverse engineer it, since the source code was made public by the attackers. Good guy black hats!…
Re: North Korean campaign targeting security researchers
#115Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It very well could be a DPRK actor, but let's please not kill perfectly valid discussion around attribution. I'm starting to believe that "killing perfectly valid discussion around attribution" is part of the game itself, after all we have at least two persons in this HN comments thread (the OP, and some other guy above who explicitly said that he worked for intelligence) who have worked directly for or adjacent to…
Given it's an official Google blog post related to a nation-state threat actor, somebody asking for valid attribution could be a way attackers try to: 1) Derail the conversation 2) Find out ways to further cloak their footprint IMO if you've worked in the field, you know it's a dumb question meant to invoke something. "Look! We've succeeded! We've dragged out 'w0z_' and have identified him as a possible (x)!" Sadly,…
Really? What does it take to sprinkle North Korea over my code? Is having the North Korean equivalent of JIS in strings enough? I mean, how could there possibly there be any footprint of anything. Does gcc leak info into the binary that my Debian system does not have in the first place? You need to get these guys when they are bragging to their friends. You can't look on the trails they leave behind ...
A lot of cyber security smells like bullet forensics.
Re: North Korean campaign targeting security researchers
#116I wonder how legit are some of the most popular download sites: e.g ffmpeg windows binaries [1] are hosted from some random person’s site. Sure you can check the checksum etc but that still doesn’t guarantee any relationship with a specific git commit. I would just assume that non-gh or official hosted downloads (where reproducible/attested builds are available) are just state actors by default. Am I paranoid? How do…
The same thing happens with mpv: https://mpv.io/installation/
The Windows download is provided by "shinchiro" on SourceForge.
The MacOS download is provided by "stolendata", on stolendata.net
Re: North Korean campaign targeting security researchers
#117Re: North Korean campaign targeting security researchers
#118Not really shocking or new but kind of interesting. Why would they use 0days on security researchers. My guess is it's a test with upside. On the one hand if it works on a security researcher, you can go "live" because you got a good one and on the other hand you estimate that in the long run you'll get 1+x 0days out of the deal from said researcher. As a security researcher it also presents an interesting situation.…
This is absolutely because NK doesn't want to pay market rate for 0days.
Re: North Korean campaign targeting security researchers
#119Not really shocking or new but kind of interesting. Why would they use 0days on security researchers. My guess is it's a test with upside. On the one hand if it works on a security researcher, you can go "live" because you got a good one and on the other hand you estimate that in the long run you'll get 1+x 0days out of the deal from said researcher. As a security researcher it also presents an interesting situation.…
This is absolutely because NK doesn't want to pay market rate for 0days.
Re: North Korean campaign targeting security researchers
#120I wonder how legit are some of the most popular download sites: e.g ffmpeg windows binaries [1] are hosted from some random person’s site. Sure you can check the checksum etc but that still doesn’t guarantee any relationship with a specific git commit. I would just assume that non-gh or official hosted downloads (where reproducible/attested builds are available) are just state actors by default. Am I paranoid? How do…
If I don't see a github action I'll usually pass on downloading. But what do you mean by "random person's site"? It's ffmpeg.org - is that not a reliable source?
The concern is that FFmpeg does not provide Windows binaries for themselves, they link to someone else who does.
You could argue that those providers are fine since they're implicitly being endorsed by FFmpeg, but it's not super clear whether they're trustworthy people involved in FFmpeg or randos that opened a GitHub issue saying "Hey I'm providing Windows binaries for people if they want them!"