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When your classmates threaten you with felony charges

miles.land

111–120 of 350 posts

Re: When your classmates threaten you with felony charges

#111
post #72

A private individual or company cannot file criminal/felony charges. Those are filed by a County Prosecutor, District Attorney, State Attorney, etc after being convinced of probable cause. They could threaten to report you to the police or such authorities, but they would have to turn over their evidence to them and to you and open all their relevant records to you via discovery. > Get a lawyer Yes, if they're seriou…

Isn't threatening to report someone to the authorities if you don't do something extortion?

As the linked article notes, it's explicitly against the California State Bar Code of Conduct to condition criminal proceedings on requiring a civil outcome, so while not technically illegal it's censurable - that's against the attorneys who threatened, not the clients they represent.

Re: When your classmates threaten you with felony charges

#112
post #57

I'm not a lawyer, but I am professionally interested in this weird branch of the law, and it seems like EFF's staff attorney went a bit out on a limb here: * Fizz appears to be a client/server application (presumably a web app?) * The testing the researchers did was of software running on Fizz's servers * After identifying a vulnerability, the researchers created administrator accounts using the database activity the…

Good analysis. I’m really confused why in the 2020s anybody thinks that unsolicited pentesting is a sane or welcome thing to do.

The OP doesn’t seem to have a “mea culpa” so I hope they learned this lesson even if the piece is more meme-worthy with a “can you believe what these guys tried to do?” tone.

While their intent seems good, they were pretty clearly breaking the law.

Re: When your classmates threaten you with felony charges

#113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I presume that the "limb" the EFF attorney went on is basically what would've been disputed in a court of law. It's easily argued that if an app is so badly configured that just _following the Firebase protocol_ can give you write access to the database, you haven't actually circumvented any security measures, because _there weren't any to circumvent_. It reminds me of the case where AT&T had their iPad data subscrib…

What's with the _ in your sentences?

Not the GP, but that is a common way of bolding words between the underscores in markdown syntax.

Re: When your classmates threaten you with felony charges

#114

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I presume that the "limb" the EFF attorney went on is basically what would've been disputed in a court of law. It's easily argued that if an app is so badly configured that just _following the Firebase protocol_ can give you write access to the database, you haven't actually circumvented any security measures, because _there weren't any to circumvent_. It reminds me of the case where AT&T had their iPad data subscrib…

What's with the _ in your sentences?

i think it's supposed to look like start and stop of underlines.

Re: When your classmates threaten you with felony charges

#117
post #57

I'm not a lawyer, but I am professionally interested in this weird branch of the law, and it seems like EFF's staff attorney went a bit out on a limb here: * Fizz appears to be a client/server application (presumably a web app?) * The testing the researchers did was of software running on Fizz's servers * After identifying a vulnerability, the researchers created administrator accounts using the database activity the…

I presume that the "limb" the EFF attorney went on is basically what would've been disputed in a court of law. It's easily argued that if an app is so badly configured that just _following the Firebase protocol_ can give you write access to the database, you haven't actually circumvented any security measures, because _there weren't any to circumvent_. It reminds me of the case where AT&T had their iPad data subscrib…

IANAL, but the law does not require you to "circumvent" anything[1].

Simply, anyone who "accesses a computer without authorization ... and thereby obtains ... information from any protected computer" is in violation of the CFAA.

If the researchers in question did not download any customer data, nor cause any "damages", I am not sure they are guilty of anything. BUT, if they had, "the victim had insufficient security measures" is not a valid defense. These researchers were not authorized to access this computer, regardless of whether they were technically able to obtain access.

Leaving your door unlocked does not give burglars permission to burgle you.

[1] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1030

Re: When your classmates threaten you with felony charges

#118

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I presume that the "limb" the EFF attorney went on is basically what would've been disputed in a court of law. It's easily argued that if an app is so badly configured that just _following the Firebase protocol_ can give you write access to the database, you haven't actually circumvented any security measures, because _there weren't any to circumvent_. It reminds me of the case where AT&T had their iPad data subscrib…

What's with the _ in your sentences?

They represent underlining.

Re: When your classmates threaten you with felony charges

#119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I presume that the "limb" the EFF attorney went on is basically what would've been disputed in a court of law. It's easily argued that if an app is so badly configured that just _following the Firebase protocol_ can give you write access to the database, you haven't actually circumvented any security measures, because _there weren't any to circumvent_. It reminds me of the case where AT&T had their iPad data subscrib…

What's with the _ in your sentences?

[deleted]

Re: When your classmates threaten you with felony charges

#120
> And then, one day, they sent us a threat. A crazy threat. I remember it vividly. I was just finishing a run when the email came in. And my heart rate went up after I stopped running. That’s not what’s supposed to happen. They said that we had violated state and federal law. They threatened us with civil and criminal charges. 20 years in prison. They really just threw everything they could at us. And at the end of their threat they had a demand: don’t ever talk about your findings publicly. Essentially, if you agree to silence, we won’t pursue legal action. We had five days to respond.

This during a time when thousands or millions have their personal data leaked every other week, over and over, because companies don't want to cut into their profits.

Researchers who do the right thing face legal threats of 20 years in prison. Companies who cut corners on security face no consequences. This seems backwards.

Remember when a journalist pressed F12 and saw that a Missouri state website was exposing all the personal data of every teacher in the state (including SSN, etc). He reported the security flaw responsibly and it was embarrassing to the State so the Governor attacked him and legally harassed him. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2021/10/missouri-gov-cal...

I once saw something similar. A government website exposing the personal data of licensed medical professionals. A REST API responded with all their personal data (including SSN, address, etc), but the HTML frontend wouldn't display it. All the data was just an unauthenticated REST call away, for thousands of people in the state. What did I do? I just closed the tab and never touched the site again. It wasn't worth the personal risk to try to do the right thing so I just ignored it and for all I know all those people had their data stolen multiple times over because of this security flaw. I found the flaw as part of my job at the time, I don't remember the details anymore. It has probably been fixed by now. Our legal system made it a huge personal risk to do the right thing, so I didn't do the right thing.

Which brings me to my point. We need strong protections for those who expose security flaws in good faith. Even if someone is a grey hat and has done questionable things as part of their "research", as long as they report their security findings responsibly, they should be protected.

Why have we prioritized making things nice and convenient for the companies over all else? If every American's data gets stolen in a massive breach, it's so sad, but there's nothing we can do (shrug). If one curious user or security research pokes an app and finds a flaw, and they weren't authorized to do so, OMG!, that person needs to go to jail for decades, how dare they press F12!!!1

This is a national security issue. While we continue to see the same stories of massive breaches in the news over and over and over, and some of us get yet another free year of monitoring that credit agencies don't commit libel against us, just remember that we put the convenience of companies above all else. They get to opt-in to having their security tested, and over and over they fail us.

Protect security researchers, and make it legal to test the security of an app even if the owning company does not consent.

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