Earlier quoted context omitted.
He also claims that TOTP storage in the password manager is useless. It's only useless if the entire password manager is compromised. If your attack vector is a keystroke logger, or compromise of a single password via a dump, or even someone having written down the password... storing the TOTP is still effective.
Keylogger would still get the TOTP code. Dump would include the TOTP secret. Why write only the password down if you still need password manager for the TOTP code? I think I mostly agree TOTP in password manager is useless, but it's not worse than not having TOTP at all so it's whatever.
Why even let users set their own passwords?
111–120 of 392 posts
Re: Why even let users set their own passwords?
#112Earlier quoted context omitted.
I kinda wish there was something like cookies, but even more persistent. Lets call them permacookies. I want to "remember my device", and have that keep me logged in forever with a permacookie. I don't even want to have a username and password. I want to create an account and be forever logged in. There would be mechanisms to backup my permacookies, or transfer them to other devices. I'd have control of which sites c…
Honestly that feels like what apps are. One of the most compelling reasons to install an iOS app for something like an online bank is so that I won't have to worry about my cookies expiring and forcing me to login again.
Re: Why even let users set their own passwords?
#113TOTP and passwords are not the 'similar' because TOTP is a secret generated from the 'key' and is only valid for a short time period
this make usage of that secret vastly more challenging for attackers, especially at scale.
I've seen real attacks where passwords are stolen, it is impossible to keep track of that. However for TOTP since the attacker has to login NOW, you can very easily detect anomalies of a new IP addr with many successful logins for different accounts
Or to put it differently, when you capture a password it is always valid credential but for TOTP, it requires more advanced infrastructure(automatic logins, save tokens)
and even then the token will eventually expire, with password you can generate infinite tokens
Re: Why even let users set their own passwords?
#114We probably will stop one day, but that day isn't yet for many services. There are people who would be unable to use those services if that can't set the password to either the same or a variant of one they always use. In the tech wold we often forget that there is a wide disparity in people's ability to use tech. Take my father, there is no way he could use a password manager, or two factor, it's just never going to…
> He has a notebook of passwords, that's how he works and he won't change. A notebook in a locked safe is the most secure datastore for 90 - 98% of the population - depending of how deeply you distrust NSA.
If someone breaks into my house I’d rather they just got my TV and some belongings rather than my life savings.
Re: Why even let users set their own passwords?
#115Earlier quoted context omitted.
Honestly that feels like what apps are. One of the most compelling reasons to install an iOS app for something like an online bank is so that I won't have to worry about my cookies expiring and forcing me to login again.
I hate the fact that if you lose your phone and restore to a new one, suddenly every app is logged out again. Like can't the login-state be part of the backup? If I was logged in when the backup was taken, I should still be logged in when restored to a new device.
Re: Why even let users set their own passwords?
#116Earlier quoted context omitted.
I kinda wish there was something like cookies, but even more persistent. Lets call them permacookies. I want to "remember my device", and have that keep me logged in forever with a permacookie. I don't even want to have a username and password. I want to create an account and be forever logged in. There would be mechanisms to backup my permacookies, or transfer them to other devices. I'd have control of which sites c…
Honestly that feels like what apps are. One of the most compelling reasons to install an iOS app for something like an online bank is so that I won't have to worry about my cookies expiring and forcing me to login again.
Re: Why even let users set their own passwords?
#117We probably will stop one day, but that day isn't yet for many services. There are people who would be unable to use those services if that can't set the password to either the same or a variant of one they always use. In the tech wold we often forget that there is a wide disparity in people's ability to use tech. Take my father, there is no way he could use a password manager, or two factor, it's just never going to…
> Take my father, there is no way he could use a password manager...He has a notebook of passwords Your father does use a password manager: a slow, very inconvenient one. If you could teach him to reach for ctrl-c/ctrl-v instead of a pencil, it would be easier for him.
Your notebook will look markedly different from a website that tries to imitate your notebook. Your password manager will only look markedly different from a website imitating your password manager if you have a certain level of awareness and acuity of what happens on-screen and what it means. I think GP's father doesn't have that awareness, and never will, by choice. They choose to spend their energy elsewhere.
Younger generations had no choice and will have spent that energy already by the time they're 12 years old, and have these problems less.
Re: Why even let users set their own passwords?
#118Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's why we're in the process of phasing out third-party cookies but retaining first-party cookies. It's the closest dividing line we have for "good" and "bad" cookie applications: most good cookies are first-party (there are some use cases that are unfortunately caught in the crossfire) and most bad ones are third-party. Any time you give developers access to storage on the user device for any reason, you've given…
I was talking about first-party cookies. Third-party cookies don’t have this ambiguity, they’re unequivocally bad.
We want apps to be able to store session IDs so that I don't have to send my username/password with every single HTTP request. But as soon as I've given you permission to remember my session, you can use that to start tracking my movements on your site. There's no way around that.
The only thing we could do is add a layer on top that prevents most sites from using cookies at all—make cookies a permission similar to camera and screen sharing. But first-party cookies aren't easy to use for abusive purposes and (as we all found out post-GDPR) popup fatigue is real, so I'm personally okay leaving them as is by default. Anyone who isn't comfortable with them can easily install extensions that implement more complex behaviors.
Re: Why even let users set their own passwords?
#119Earlier quoted context omitted.
Using economics terminology doesn’t make this insensitive opinion any more valid. Technology is for people, not the other way around.
Nobody gets to decide what's more or less sensitive. Younger generations can argue being rendered homeless due to mass housing affordability issues is also insensitive.
The fact is, anti-human attitudes to both housing and technology are harmful everywhere. Nobody has to "win" at the other side's expense here.
Re: Why even let users set their own passwords?
#120This article is the very embodiment of how I think about authentication! I once tried explaining to a top-brass security professional at Microsoft why mandatory, SMS-based '2FA' wouldn't be an improvement over simple passwords - they just didn't get it. I wish I could have shown them this essay. Legitimising 'Risk-Based Authentication' as a strategy is a big mistake in the software industry. It allows criminals to si…
> phishing resistance (with UX that supports that) and low-level security audits of encryption software and hardware Pardon my ignorance, but isn’t this saying “we can’t rely on reducing the likelihood of breaches, we should focus on reducing the likelihood of breaches”? Your recommendations are no more deterministic than the methods you eschew.