111–120 of 161 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Breaking RSA is a practical thing. E.g. forge email (most dkim keys are 1024 bit rsa). Break ssh (depends on key algo chose). Break pgp (depending on settings). Mitm https connections, Etc.
So if you were going to explain it to someone who's less technical, maybe saying "remove HTTPS" would be an oversimplified way to explain? (I don't think my contacts aren't going to know what SSH or PGP is, if that helps.)
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(not sure if replying to troll..) The argument against OTP is that by securely distributing the key of the same length as your message, you ostensibly already have a secure messaging mechanism; why would you need the OTP?
Well no, that's not true - a bank could issue you with a one-time-pad long enough to encrypt the next 10000 messages with you, and use that over the years - they just need to tell you which line of the key is needed to decrypt your message. In that scenario you only need to guarantee security for the first time the key is distributed(for example a file sent to you when the account is opened).
Actually this could be a nice service to offer now. We might worry that someday public key crypto will be broken, and we wouldn’t want all our old bank statements to become public at that point I guess.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Breaking RSA is a practical thing. E.g. forge email (most dkim keys are 1024 bit rsa). Break ssh (depends on key algo chose). Break pgp (depending on settings). Mitm https connections, Etc.
So if you were going to explain it to someone who's less technical, maybe saying "remove HTTPS" would be an oversimplified way to explain? (I don't think my contacts aren't going to know what SSH or PGP is, if that helps.)
For the vast majority of HTTPS (say, for example, Google or Hacker News) RSA is not used to agree the encryption. So although quantum computers would be a threat for other reasons, breaking RSA in particular doesn't just "remove HTTPS".
However, RSA is used to prove the identity of the server for most web sites even with a newer key agreement. So if an adversary can get on path between you and the server, they could get in the middle and masquerade successfully as the server - arranging key agreement with you, and then providing a convincing fake proof of identity, if they do so live.
In TLS 1.2 optionally, and to a greater extent in older versions (which are no longer used by popular web browsers) you can also use RSA to agree the encryption, and for sites using that breaking RSA would allow an adversary to interpose in real time, or to decrypt communication after the fact, but I'd be astonished if anywhere important still does that when talking a halfway modern browser.
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Why is this downvoted? Ain't it exponentially harder to break RSA using qubits each time you double the key length? Until we switch to quantum resistant algorithms, we can keep doubling the key length for some time no? 8192 bits should still be acceptable speed wise (if we consider that 2048 bits is broken, then I'll take slower operations over broken keys any day of the week).
Because it isn't. This paper (alegedly) uses sublinear qbits (that's the whole point).
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well no, that's not true - a bank could issue you with a one-time-pad long enough to encrypt the next 10000 messages with you, and use that over the years - they just need to tell you which line of the key is needed to decrypt your message. In that scenario you only need to guarantee security for the first time the key is distributed(for example a file sent to you when the account is opened).
So now people have to keep a piece of paper around or somehow put it into some software and not lose access. You're right, it would work. In reality, people can't even be bothered to use a password manager or understand even the most simple of new security software, let alone even remember their password. That makes it completely intractable as a solution.
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In the worst possible case we just switch to the one time pad encryption, which makes things inconvenient but literally can't be cracked by any computer or algorithm(tldr: the length of the key is as long as the length of the message, so a message can decode into anything and you can't tell whether the text you decoded is the right one or not). So a scenario where literally no encryption is available seems far fetche…
Yes, we simply change to one time pad encryption and ... distribute pre-share keys to every user on earth for every service that modern civilization relies on? The failure of RSA in a significant way would mean the end of modern commerce, military balance of power, and the sharing of information. It would be a history-altering event in the best case and devolve into existential war in the worst case. OTPs would do ex…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Breaking RSA is a practical thing. E.g. forge email (most dkim keys are 1024 bit rsa). Break ssh (depends on key algo chose). Break pgp (depending on settings). Mitm https connections, Etc.
So if you were going to explain it to someone who's less technical, maybe saying "remove HTTPS" would be an oversimplified way to explain? (I don't think my contacts aren't going to know what SSH or PGP is, if that helps.)