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The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

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Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#111
post #78
post #20

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Right, should've remembered reading that. Am I the only one who thinks that's a crazy thing to put in LP?

He said there wasn't much value in the wallets. Doesn't strike me as crazy to keep a small amount in something convenient. You see a similar convenience/security trade off made by big players, with immediate transactional needs satisfied by online/hot wallets and reserves held in offline/cold wallets.

That's true.

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#112
While this could be what happened, I suspect otherwise.

For many years, those of us in the cryptocurrency fields have said never enter your keys on a computer. Generate them offline on a hardware device and let that be it. The person making this claim clearly had to enter unencrypted keys into a computer to put them into his laspass vault. There are a number of malware variants that specifically target keys and search things like input fields in web forms and clipboards for those keys.

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#113

And when I say that I will stop using 1password when the local vault no longer works, people look at me like I'm paranoid and crazy. I've looked at the white paper https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-p... , I think 1password has a decent security posture for their cloud offering but then there's always the risk of a breach where the attacker controls the site and can intercept your master passw…

There is always the risk of an attacker infiltrating the company to write vulnerabilities or a government forcing the cloud provider to write malicious code in order to degrade security. That's what the U.S. government almost succeeded at forcing Apple to do in the wake of the San Bernardino case.

A local vault is better than a cloud vault, but if that local vault software is written by a commercial company there's still that risk.

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#114
post #81
post #76

This is quite interesting. A couple of weeks ago, I received an extortion phishing email, but it was directed to a secondary email address that hasn’t been previously compromised. It made it past Gmail’s spam and phishing filters into my inbox. Maybe a coincidence, but I guess every weird thing that happens is going to raise alarm bells. I was suspicious of the LastPass concept (storing passwords in a cloud app) when…

I’d love to hear the story about bypassing/resetting that 2FA setting? Sounds suspiciously like something that could be social engineered around by a sufficiently skilled attacker? I am very much of the opinion that if I fuck up my side of 2FA protection, the resources/accounts they’re protecting should be lost forever. (Or at the very least, a co-account holder might be able to reset some things, like my AWS IAM cre…

Fair enough.

It was a support request, and IIRC they disabled it remotely.

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#115
post #98

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is the added security just that Dropbox is a lower value target (possible) and that attackers won't think to look for password databases in Dropbox accounts if they do compromise Dropbox (less likely)? Or is there something more to it? EDIT: Given the replies below, I should be clear that I'm not interested in comparing to LastPass, I'm comparing to Bitwarden. LastPass had an obviously bad security model that failed…

No. When you login to LastPass, your password can be taken if LastPass is compromised. You have to trust that LastPass will not do it. If you login to Dropbox, the master password to your keepass database cannot be stolen. You don’t need to trust Dropbox. But what you said is also an additional benefit.

In theory, the master password is never supposed to leave your device even with the cloud-based password managers. So, yes, you're trusting that their clients do what they say they do, and I suppose an attacker could hijack the client and offload your password.

That said, the same risk applies to any client you use. Someone could have compromised the latest update of KeePassX as readily as they can compromise LastPass's client. If you don't have automatic updates then that's helpful, but I'm not sure it's producing enough security to be worth the extra hassle.

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#117
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I used to use KeePass and synced the database (but not the keys or password) with Dropbox. Very secure and mostly convenient.

Is the added security just that Dropbox is a lower value target (possible) and that attackers won't think to look for password databases in Dropbox accounts if they do compromise Dropbox (less likely)? Or is there something more to it? EDIT: Given the replies below, I should be clear that I'm not interested in comparing to LastPass, I'm comparing to Bitwarden. LastPass had an obviously bad security model that failed…

The database is encrypted when at rest; i.e., no plaintext is stored on Dropbox. Assuming your master password is decent, you could plaster the database on a billboard and it would be safe. LastPass, on the other hand, encrypts some information (the actual passwords). The URLs and other sensitive information is stored in plaintext in the cloud. [Final edit. I swear.] As you note, as long as the entire blob is encrypted it doesn't really matter how it's replicated; BitWarden's one-stop-shopping can certainly be more convienent.

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#118
post #91
post #76

This is quite interesting. A couple of weeks ago, I received an extortion phishing email, but it was directed to a secondary email address that hasn’t been previously compromised. It made it past Gmail’s spam and phishing filters into my inbox. Maybe a coincidence, but I guess every weird thing that happens is going to raise alarm bells. I was suspicious of the LastPass concept (storing passwords in a cloud app) when…

On a balance of risks, your your former employer may have made the right call. The issue is, do you use something that isn't perfect but everybody can use, or do have a substantial portion of tech illiterate people not use anything, which would be an even greater risk.

I think the policy is fine, but since I left my former employer more than a year ago, the policy should have been lifted on my personal account automatically (assuming that my former employer deactivated the work account, which I expect that they did).

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#119
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Switched from LastPass to Bitwarden some time ago. The only issue I had thus far was exporting the contents out of LastPass. Some of the special characters in some passwords did not export properly. I had to add those items by hand. As for Bitwarden, I like the UI (iPad, Mac, iPhone) but routinely forget how to generate a new password - the function is buried inside one of the menu options. Other than that, I really…

Quick tip: if you have Bitwarden's browser extension installed, you can use Cmd + Shift + 9 (I'm assuming it's Ctrl + Shift + 9 for Windows) to load your clipboard with a randomly generated password: h4!E49vFcGEE%c#$HZ%z*3^5B

Awesome, thanks for the tip!

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#120

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is the added security just that Dropbox is a lower value target (possible) and that attackers won't think to look for password databases in Dropbox accounts if they do compromise Dropbox (less likely)? Or is there something more to it? EDIT: Given the replies below, I should be clear that I'm not interested in comparing to LastPass, I'm comparing to Bitwarden. LastPass had an obviously bad security model that failed…

The database is encrypted when at rest; i.e., no plaintext is stored on Dropbox. Assuming your master password is decent, you could plaster the database on a billboard and it would be safe. LastPass, on the other hand, encrypts some information (the actual passwords). The URLs and other sensitive information is stored in plaintext in the cloud. [Final edit. I swear.] As you note, as long as the entire blob is encrypt…

But that is the same claim that Bitwarden and 1Password make. Both insist that they don't ever see your master password, which means that your vault security depends entirely on it being good enough. And both encrypt everything.

Assuming that I trust Bitwarden not to lie about their security model, what do I gain by piecing together multiple tools to accomplish the same thing?

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