I guess taking some risks as I am not really authorized to use social media, but at AWS there is a sauron like focus on not letting internal engineers view customer data. On my service we don't even have tools to do it and the security controls are very tight and getting tighter all the time. It's a big fucking deal, if not the biggest fucking deal, besides KTLO. Posting to get ahead of some of the comment here on se…
While I recognize that's the ideal goal, and most appropriate, I think there may be gaps in practice. My team just discovered yesterday that a Kinesis Firehose Stream can still deliver to an S3 bucket that lacks a bucket policy and whose ACLs disable any access to it at all. That diminished my confidence a little bit that all teams are perfectly in compliance of the overall goal.
AWS Support able to access any S3 object due to permission change
111–120 of 134 posts
Re: AWS Support able to access any S3 object due to permission change
#112Such concerns specifically led to my decision of only uploading sensitive data to S3 with client side encryption. Since the aws cli tool only supports server side encryption with keys stored on amazon servers (where the non-default managed keys cost like 1 USD per month), I decided to simply symmetrically encrypt the backup of my syncthing data volume with AES256 using gnupg and only then pushing it to the S3 bucket.
Is there a managed service that does this? A Dropbox-like UX that client-side encrypts everything and then persists it on S3 or the like. I don’t want to fiddle with it myself but I’d pay for that kind of service
Re: AWS Support able to access any S3 object due to permission change
#113I guess taking some risks as I am not really authorized to use social media, but at AWS there is a sauron like focus on not letting internal engineers view customer data. On my service we don't even have tools to do it and the security controls are very tight and getting tighter all the time. It's a big fucking deal, if not the biggest fucking deal, besides KTLO. Posting to get ahead of some of the comment here on se…
While I recognize that's the ideal goal, and most appropriate, I think there may be gaps in practice. My team just discovered yesterday that a Kinesis Firehose Stream can still deliver to an S3 bucket that lacks a bucket policy and whose ACLs disable any access to it at all. That diminished my confidence a little bit that all teams are perfectly in compliance of the overall goal.
Re: AWS Support able to access any S3 object due to permission change
#114Re: AWS Support able to access any S3 object due to permission change
#115Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I know how dumb customers can be I find this insulting as a customer. Is AWS usually contemptuous of its customers? I don't think I've ever called my customer "dumb", and working as a consultant I've seen all kinds of interesting things. People make mistakes. They're always in a hurry. They may have a hard time understanding ambiguous, complex or incomplete documentation. The interface may be confusing and lead the…
>I find this insulting as a customer. Is AWS usually contemptuous of its customers? Oh come off it. We've all seen the idiotic things that "users" can do. Someone complains something isn't working. Then you go through the steps to see what they have done, and you think "why would you ever do that?" We've all been there, and if you haven't been there then you just haven't had much interaction with "users". "Take it ea…
Re: AWS Support able to access any S3 object due to permission change
#116Such concerns specifically led to my decision of only uploading sensitive data to S3 with client side encryption. Since the aws cli tool only supports server side encryption with keys stored on amazon servers (where the non-default managed keys cost like 1 USD per month), I decided to simply symmetrically encrypt the backup of my syncthing data volume with AES256 using gnupg and only then pushing it to the S3 bucket.
Re: AWS Support able to access any S3 object due to permission change
#117Earlier quoted context omitted.
When I was at Facebook (2018-2020) there were in fact few permission barriers (click through the screen warning you to follow the rules, and that's at the UI level not to mention pulling stuff directly from Tao through the old PHP interfaces still laying around, or just building a user context from scratch), but plenty of auditing and automated detection.
I always did wonder how good the detection systems would be at catching people who access private data directly from Tao.
Re: AWS Support able to access any S3 object due to permission change
#118I guess taking some risks as I am not really authorized to use social media, but at AWS there is a sauron like focus on not letting internal engineers view customer data. On my service we don't even have tools to do it and the security controls are very tight and getting tighter all the time. It's a big fucking deal, if not the biggest fucking deal, besides KTLO. Posting to get ahead of some of the comment here on se…
It was like this at Facebook as well.
Re: AWS Support able to access any S3 object due to permission change
#119I guess taking some risks as I am not really authorized to use social media, but at AWS there is a sauron like focus on not letting internal engineers view customer data. On my service we don't even have tools to do it and the security controls are very tight and getting tighter all the time. It's a big fucking deal, if not the biggest fucking deal, besides KTLO. Posting to get ahead of some of the comment here on se…
KTLO?
Re: AWS Support able to access any S3 object due to permission change
#120When I worked in aws, this is primarily used to check for permissions of an object. I know how dumb customers can be, for the most part this is used to see why a customer cannot delete a bucket or object those sort of things. I don't remember having ability to see actual customers data only metadata is accessible. Edit: Based on what I know, I'm pretty sure support will not be able see any of the customers data.
> I know how dumb customers can be (...) This sort of personal attack is unwarranted and extremely unfair. AWS is renowned for it's byzantine and ever-changing and expanding nature, to the point it's outright practically impossible to know extremely basic things such as what are you paying for and how much you are paying.