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The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

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Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#111

Post by AmericanChopper »

ImaCake wrote: post #75
AmericanChopper wrote: post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That is why they decided to work with chimeras instead of pursuing gain of function research. The distinction between gain of function research, and creating lab made chimeric viruses is purely semantic. If you were doing gain of function research, you'd spend most of your time creating chimeric viruses. The argument is that "not all chimeric virus experiments are gain of function research, because you might be con…

Isn't a chimera akin to putting part of one organism with another? I think this would make the astrazeneca vaccine a chimera (Adenovirus with SARS-COV2 spike protein). Obviously the AZ vaccine has not causes a pandemic so maybe the distinction is very important here.

The vaccine isn't a chimera virus, and the controversial research isn't similar to processes used to make the vaccines.

The research in Wuhan involved sequencing genomes from cornoaviruses found in bat guano, blood and saliva, mixing different sequences together, and using that to create brand new chimera viruses that could be cultured in a lab. Then testing the new viruses they'd created to see if they could infect human tissue, and perform other experiments that were motivated ultimately by a goal of creating a broad spectrum coronavirus vaccine.

None of this is part of a disputed conspiracy theory, you can read about it here: https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/06/29/1027290/gain-of-...

If you were attempting to create a viral bioweapon, this is exactly the sort of research you'd do. Mixing parts of different viruses together, and seeing what the new viruses did. The distinction here entirely comes down to the motives of the research. The reason the NIH funded this research to take place in China, is because those research practices had been prohibited in the US as the risks involved were seen as poorly understood. The argument that "that's not gain of function research because..." is just a contrivance of a poorly defined piece of jargon.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#112

Post by flybrand »

EMM_386 wrote: post #69
m0llusk wrote: post #57

The article notes that a lab leak or gain of function research or both are suspected because research with cultivated influenza strains was common at that time. In contrast, attempts by researchers at Wuhan to consistently cultivate coronavirus were unsuccessful. That is why they decided to work with chimeras instead of pursuing gain of function research. All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. We know…

> All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. What matters is how we respond to them. We won't be around to respond to them when the next engineered one is potentially much worse. This is an enormously dangerous global issue, we need to address origins.

There is a scenario where the origin story really matters:

If the origin story implies that the vendor is dishonest, then don’t trust that same vendor to solve the problem.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#113

Post by indymike »

goolulusaurs wrote: post #105

Why the hell would you put a virology lab in the middle of a huge city with millions of people? I am not a virologist, but to me it seems like if covid was a lab-leak then it could have been avoided very easily just by having the lab in the middle of nowhere, like in the desert or the artic. Instead of the whole world having to go into lock down, with millions dying, just put the lab in a remote location, and make it…

> This seems obvious, why isn't it standard protocol?

Would you take a job that had that requirement? Want a few days off? 2 week quarantine. Would investors be ok with this? Want to pay expensive PHD for vacation plus quarantine time (which could be days off x 10 working days every time). The problem is that the workers in the lab are just as human, have the same needs for relationships and contact, and some have enterprises outside of their day job. Want to speak at a conference? 2 week quarantine...

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#114

Post by flybrand »

tim333 wrote: post #95
halfmatthalfcat wrote: post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I understand the need to understand why but if we can't mount a response to any virus, it again, ultimately doesn't matter. We've instituted safeguards against car accidents (seatbelts, speed limits, harsh penalties for driving drunk, etc). What have we done for wide-spread, novel disease response?

If it was a lab leak it very much does matter and can be dealt with by stopping such stuff.

Even more so, if pursuing the origin story uncovers a dishonest or low integrity system - then we shouldn’t continue to trust that same system.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#115

Post by skohan »

EMM_386 wrote: post #69
m0llusk wrote: post #57

The article notes that a lab leak or gain of function research or both are suspected because research with cultivated influenza strains was common at that time. In contrast, attempts by researchers at Wuhan to consistently cultivate coronavirus were unsuccessful. That is why they decided to work with chimeras instead of pursuing gain of function research. All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. We know…

> All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. What matters is how we respond to them. We won't be around to respond to them when the next engineered one is potentially much worse. This is an enormously dangerous global issue, we need to address origins.

Yes absolutely it's incredibly relevant if world-crippling viruses are being engineered in labs, and should be a topic for public policy discussion.

COVID has been many times more damaging to the world than the bombs dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If we're at the point where science is capable of creating such pathogens, then we have to also consider the fact that this technology can make its way into the hands of bad actors.

That's a very different state of affairs than saying we need to be ready for a pandemic of natural origin which may occur every 100 years or so.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#116

Post by ModernMech »

tim333 wrote: post #95
halfmatthalfcat wrote: post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I understand the need to understand why but if we can't mount a response to any virus, it again, ultimately doesn't matter. We've instituted safeguards against car accidents (seatbelts, speed limits, harsh penalties for driving drunk, etc). What have we done for wide-spread, novel disease response?

If it was a lab leak it very much does matter and can be dealt with by stopping such stuff.

The point being made is that even if you stop all pandemics with a lab leak origin, pandemics will still happen. So at the end of the day if you prove covid was lab leak and put in safeguards that will, with 100% certainty stop pandemics with a lab leak origin, you’re nonetheless going to encourage yet pandemics because they are a fact of nature. Therefore it’s more important to respond pandemics rather than prevent them (because you can’t).

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#117

Post by goolulusaurs »

indymike wrote: post #113
goolulusaurs wrote: post #105

Why the hell would you put a virology lab in the middle of a huge city with millions of people? I am not a virologist, but to me it seems like if covid was a lab-leak then it could have been avoided very easily just by having the lab in the middle of nowhere, like in the desert or the artic. Instead of the whole world having to go into lock down, with millions dying, just put the lab in a remote location, and make it…

> This seems obvious, why isn't it standard protocol? Would you take a job that had that requirement? Want a few days off? 2 week quarantine. Would investors be ok with this? Want to pay expensive PHD for vacation plus quarantine time (which could be days off x 10 working days every time). The problem is that the workers in the lab are just as human, have the same needs for relationships and contact, and some have en…

Sure that makes sense, but you could crank their pay way up to compensate, build places for their family to stay if they desired like the families of the scientist working on the Manhattan project, present at conferences through teleconferencing. There are scientist who stay in Antarctica for months and the international space station. Yes it would be inconvenient, but look at what (maybe) happens if you don't.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#118

Post by indymike »

gregwebs wrote: post #46

TLDR for the paper: GoF is not necessarily the strongest candidate for this flu outbreak. However, all the candidates are man-made due to research efforts. To me this points out that every study on a pandemic-possible virus should have an extremely high bar to meet in terms of both safety and reason for performing the study in the first place. Effectively the only reason that is needed now to perform such research is…

> On the flip side we can't show much benefit from this kind of research.

In many ways GoF seems to bee like a site reliability team's "dynamite monkey Friday" where they try to break things in staging in unpredictable ways... hoping whatever they do to our staging environment doesn't leak to production. Fortunately, our app is not likey to cause bodily harm to anyone and not likely to cause a pandemic.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#119

Post by varelse »

rossdavidh wrote: post #101
m0llusk wrote: post #57

The article notes that a lab leak or gain of function research or both are suspected because research with cultivated influenza strains was common at that time. In contrast, attempts by researchers at Wuhan to consistently cultivate coronavirus were unsuccessful. That is why they decided to work with chimeras instead of pursuing gain of function research. All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. We know…

Whatever one thinks the optimal response to a pandemic should be, the fact that several nations of western Europe (e.g. France) with much different policies, have per capita mortality the same or higher, suggests that the policies used were not a major determinant of the outcome. If you plot per capita mortality for France and Sweden, they are almost identical, swapping places five times so far. Currently Sweden is s…

Why not focus instead on countries that did get this under control then? Some of them are even western.

Re: The Reemergent 1977 H1N1 Strain and the Gain-of-Function Debate (2015)

#120

Post by aught »

autoliteInline wrote: post #107
m0llusk wrote: post #57

The article notes that a lab leak or gain of function research or both are suspected because research with cultivated influenza strains was common at that time. In contrast, attempts by researchers at Wuhan to consistently cultivate coronavirus were unsuccessful. That is why they decided to work with chimeras instead of pursuing gain of function research. All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. We know…

>All of this focus on the point of origin is misplaced. I think it matters quite a lot, but not for scientific reasons. If the point of origin is sloppy lab practice (maybe it's impossible to not be sloppy) and everyone lied about it, I want to know everything. Trust is a hard thing to re-gain but I really want to know where we all stand. Realistic calibration of your position vs. power centers is always a good thing…

> …I want to know everything. Trust is a hard thing to re-gain but I really want to know where we all stand. Realistic calibration of your position vs. power centers is always a good thing.

I agree but that trust was never there. It has always been the case that the public cannot be trusted with information or full information that might cause any panic not because of the panic behavior itself but due to panic behaviors destabilizing markets. The former president had explicit selfish reasons for the direction but he also used it as a political tool attempting to use the panic in his favor and limit its influence: But both types of behavior are inappropriate and counterproductive to fighting a pandemic or any public emergency

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