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The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

piotr.is

111–120 of 595 posts

Re: The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

#111
post #93

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't really buy that - you could just turn off iCloud backup and it'd avoid their current implementation.

And you think this will be the ultimate implementation? Let the devil in, and he'll treat himself to tea and biscuits.

I think it's possible to have nuanced policy in difficult areas where some things are okay and others are not.

Re: The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

#112
post #6
post #2

I have a newborn at home, and like every other parent, we take thousands of pictures and videos of our newest family member. We took pictures of the very first baby-bath. So now I have pictures of a naked baby on my phone. Does that mean that pictures of my newborn baby will be uploaded to Apple for further analysis, potentially stored for indefinite time, shared with law enforcement?

It's worth reading this, which is basically the only good reporting I've seen on this topic: https://daringfireball.net/2021/08/apple_child_safety_initia... There are legitimate things to be concerned about, but 99% of internet discussion on this topic is junk.

I still don't understand how this is allowed. If the police want to see the photos on my device, then they need to get a warrant to do so. Full stop. This type of active scanning should never be allowed. I hope that someone files a lawsuit over this.

Re: The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

#113

I really don't get all the hype. This is not a backdoor as it's called in TFA. It's not Apple "reaching into your device". It is literally checking for specific images and reporting their presence to Apply if found. It's not using AI to analyze your photos or anything like that. It's looking for specific images, and only prior to uploading them to iCloud. It won't even flag your own nasty images because the hash won'…

Wait are you saying you get ads based on things you converse about out loud in the real world because your phone is listening to everything in your pocket? You know that is a myth and isn't true, right?

Re: The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

#114

in "Photos" app, in the bottom right corner there is a "search" icon. When I click it, and entering "beach", I can see photos I've made on the beach (or in the sea, near the beach). What does it mean? My (and your) photos are scanned and analyzed. I've heard literally zero noise about this feature - nobody was complaining (at least not loud enough to let me notice it). So, why the hell all of that fuzz is being raise…

It turns out people liked it when their phone scanned their photos for 'selfie' or 'beach' for them.

Apparently tagging 'child porn' on your photos for searching isnt the killer feature someone thought it might be.

Re: The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

#115

I really don't get all the hype. This is not a backdoor as it's called in TFA. It's not Apple "reaching into your device". It is literally checking for specific images and reporting their presence to Apply if found. It's not using AI to analyze your photos or anything like that. It's looking for specific images, and only prior to uploading them to iCloud. It won't even flag your own nasty images because the hash won'…

I agree with you, but I want to correct you - they are using an image analysis hash, not a cryptographic hash. However it doesn’t change the logic of your argument. They require multiple positive marches, and they also require a visual derivative of the CSAM images to match.

Re: The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

#116

I really don't get all the hype. This is not a backdoor as it's called in TFA. It's not Apple "reaching into your device". It is literally checking for specific images and reporting their presence to Apply if found. It's not using AI to analyze your photos or anything like that. It's looking for specific images, and only prior to uploading them to iCloud. It won't even flag your own nasty images because the hash won'…

The 'hype' seems to me to be the valid-sounding concern that this tool creates the ability to "look for specific images prior to uploading them to iCloud" on Apple devices, and that while today that capability is exclusively applied to save the children, that tool could later be repurposed by authoritarian regimes or other human rights abusers.

Speaking towards what we can assume the authorities can do, we know the FBI cannot compromise an encrypted iPhone because they attempted to force Apple to do that via court order. From what I can tell, the objections to Apple's expanded protection tooling is similar to the objections to adding backdoors to iPhone encryption so the FBI can break into devices used by criminals. It's great to stop the crime today, but how could this be repurposed tomorrow.

Re: The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

#117

I really don't get all the hype. This is not a backdoor as it's called in TFA. It's not Apple "reaching into your device". It is literally checking for specific images and reporting their presence to Apply if found. It's not using AI to analyze your photos or anything like that. It's looking for specific images, and only prior to uploading them to iCloud. It won't even flag your own nasty images because the hash won'…

I think the perceived problem is the database of hashes to be matched. If this is a database that can be contributed to by other parties this can be used to "frame" people of a crime. This can the be used for example to get rid of political dissidents etc. Since there are just hashes in the database, this should be fairly easy.

This is what I THINK people are worried about. I don't have an Apple device so I haven't really fact checked all of this.

Re: The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

#118
post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The end isn't really compromised with their described implementation. The only thing sent is the hash and signature and that's only if there are enough matches to pass some threshold. I don't really view that as 'permanently compromised' - at least not in any way more serious that Apple's current capabilities to compromise a device. I think e2ee still has meaning here - it'd prevent Apple from being able to see your…

> The end isn't really compromised with their described implementation. They've turned your device into a dragnet for content the powers that be don't like. It could be anything. They're not telling you. And you're blindly trusting them to have your interests at heart, to never change their promise. You don't even know these people. You seriously want to cuddle up with that?

> "They've turned your device into a dragnet for content the powers that be don't like. It could be anything. They're not telling you"

They're pretty explicitly telling us what it's for and what it's not for.

> "And you're blindly trusting them to have your interests at heart, to never change their promise. You don't even know these people."

You should probably get to work building your own phone, along with your own fab, telecoms, networks, - basically the entire stack. There's trust and policy all over the place. In a society with rule of law we depend on it. You think your phone couldn't be owned if you were important enough to be targeted?

Re: The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

#119

I really don't get all the hype. This is not a backdoor as it's called in TFA. It's not Apple "reaching into your device". It is literally checking for specific images and reporting their presence to Apply if found. It's not using AI to analyze your photos or anything like that. It's looking for specific images, and only prior to uploading them to iCloud. It won't even flag your own nasty images because the hash won'…

It's a dam-break moment for Apple on privacy - until now, people could be unaware, or wave away , concerns about storing iCloud data exclusively on government servers because it was China, promoting ""antivirus"" software on boot because it was Russia, not encrypting iCloud backups because who knows maybe that's just been a complete oversight for years even after detailed reporting on how Apple used it to escape arguing about encryption after San Bernardino, and additionally made it super easy to get the backups, just show me a warrant

Now it's on _your_ phone in _your_ country. No handwaving, no sticking ones hand in the sand. The only hopeful argument being posited is that somehow this will "make iCloud more private in the long run"

Re: The deceptive PR behind Apple’s “expanded protections for children”

#120
post #87

Eh, I completely agree that this is a step too far, but the solution is so simple. Stop using Apple devices - luckily I switched from iOS to CalyxOS when my iPhone 7 broke earlier this year. Honestly, it wasn't so bad.

This is throwing the baby (pictures) out with the bathwater. I am for better or worse deeply rooted in the Apple tree (phone, laptop, tablet, and, recently, watch); for all its occasionally infuriating and arguably stupidly designed warts, the fact that so many features disappear and Just Work is something you can nary say for other ecosystems.
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