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DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

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Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

#111
post #40
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That seems to be imply that she is lying, though. What if she actually doesn't know the password? For example if it isn't her laptop or the password was written down and lost or it is an old encrypted volume which she doesn't use anymore, etc.

Federal investigators and prosecutors aren't dumb. For all of those scenarios that you mentioned, it would be easy to tell whether or not this was a laptop that she used frequently. Where did she get it from? (or from whom? - she should be able to say.) In what condition was the laptop found, on her desk? opened? screen saver on? or powered down? in a pile, covered in dust? any fingerprints or other signs of use? Any…

> Federal investigators and prosecutors aren't dumb. For all of those scenarios that you mentioned, it would be easy to tell whether or not this was a laptop that she used frequently.

Why doesn't the prosecutor ask banks and other parties for the records necessary to prove the accused is guilty? This is a mortgage fraud case right? Why can't they look at emails, contracts, bank records, and phone records that 3rd parties must have?

Since you can't defraud yourself, there has to be some other party involved who can turn over evidence against you.

If the prosecutor is so smart, why demand that the defendant incriminate himself? That is how the system in France works. Perhaps this prosecutor should move there.

Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

#112
Well, they can't force anything if only she knows the password. For what I've read they can only threaten with and convict for obstruction of justice, a felony.

So, depending on her mindset she can choose whether to become a convicted fraudster or a convicted but potentially innocent freedom and privacy fighter (with that 10-year sentence). I'm not saying that doing time isn't easy but...

Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

#113
post #63

Earlier quoted context omitted.

None of those are reasonable or reliable indications that he/she is lying about having forgotten a password. There are fingerprints or signs of use? What if the defendant has been actively trying to remember the password, or has just done something as simple as moved the laptop's location to get it out of the way? Removable media present? What if it was left in there from when they did have use of the password and di…

>None of those are reasonable or reliable indications that he/she is lying about having forgotten a password. I agree fully, forgetting passwords happens. My AD account at work has a short, random password with a forgiving lifespan. Even though I have to enter it a few dozen times a day, following the long weekend I had for the 4th it took me 5 minutes of sitting at my desk before I remembered enough to make a few gu…

Add to that that at least my muscle memory is especially flaky when I try hard to remember what I'm actually supposed to type and/or I'm otherwise under stress/nervous. Usually just not thinking about the password for 5 minutes works, potentially facing 10 years in prison is certainly not gonna help.

Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

#114
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Do you think the government should have subpoena power in order to collect evidence? Do you think they should be able to search a murderer's home for the weapon? I'm not saying they should have this power without a warrant, but nobody has the protection from a _reasonable_ search.

Do you think the government should have subpoena power in order to collect evidence? Do you think they should be able to search a murderer's home for the weapon? Of course they should. But that's no the issue here. The issue at hand is whether or not the government can compel you to give them information. Consider this. You have a box, buried in the Mojave desert, with some documents in it. You've memorized the gps c…

In all the discussion here, I think yours is the absolutely best analogy. Perfectly illustrates the cost of brute-forcing versus the accused just revealing the crucial little information. Even informed guessing of the password is covered (the accused was seen lately in that corner of the Mojave, maybe the box is there?).

Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

#115

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think that's where forensics would come in: "This is a 2TB drive. All the data on the drive amounts to 1.5TB. QED, there is 500GB of data missing." More interesting, IMO, would be how alleged steganography would be handled.

Thankfully that is not how truecrypt works. The volume would be reported as the full 2TB (or however large the container is), it is up to you to not use all the space (which you could do, it will just silently start overwriting the hidden volume. They would have nothing to go on other than you didn't fill the disk (who does?).

When writing a byte, how does truecrypt knows it isn't overwriting a random file in a hidden volume ?

Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

#116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Thankfully that is not how truecrypt works. The volume would be reported as the full 2TB (or however large the container is), it is up to you to not use all the space (which you could do, it will just silently start overwriting the hidden volume. They would have nothing to go on other than you didn't fill the disk (who does?).

When writing a byte, how does truecrypt knows it isn't overwriting a random file in a hidden volume ?

It doesn't. Essentially, you have to make sure that you don't fill up the volume space or else you will overwrite the hidden volume.

Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

#117

Earlier quoted context omitted.

When writing a byte, how does truecrypt knows it isn't overwriting a random file in a hidden volume ?

It doesn't. Essentially, you have to make sure that you don't fill up the volume space or else you will overwrite the hidden volume.

So, if my volume size is 100G on a 200G drive, I have 80G of data, If I write another byte, how Truecrypt knows it won't overwrite one byte of the hidden volume ?

Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

#118
What worries me about this precedent that your computer can be immediately taken from you and interrogated against your will, the computer will not be given any rights.

The computer needs the right to plead the 5th. One day far in the future, computers will be part of who we are. Basic Human rights was designed to protect humans, not the computers. When the computers integrate with us, I hope we can take back all the rights the courts have stolen. Pleading the 5th will be futile, as all the courts have to do is download your computer module and then scan the logs of what you did, where you did it, and what you were thinking when you did it.

This stuff is important, and needs a creative solution that stops the criminals while not making everyone a criminal.

Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

#119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It doesn't. Essentially, you have to make sure that you don't fill up the volume space or else you will overwrite the hidden volume.

So, if my volume size is 100G on a 200G drive, I have 80G of data, If I write another byte, how Truecrypt knows it won't overwrite one byte of the hidden volume ?

It doesn't.

If you write anything to the non-hidden volume while you don't have the hidden volume mounted, you risk overwriting part of the hidden volume.

Re: DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop

#120
post #119

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So, if my volume size is 100G on a 200G drive, I have 80G of data, If I write another byte, how Truecrypt knows it won't overwrite one byte of the hidden volume ?

It doesn't. If you write anything to the non-hidden volume while you don't have the hidden volume mounted, you risk overwriting part of the hidden volume.

Now, I got it, You have to mount both the hidden volume and the first level volume to safely write to the first level. Great.
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