Earlier quoted context omitted.
Quoting you here: "I'd also like to point out that the scope of the risk isn't trivial. For example, URL-based password resets are only as secure as the mailbox they are sent to. i.e. a significant number of domains are stolen and threatened to be stolen through email account exploits (re-registering previously used addresses, forwarding attacks, etc.) This is made even more complex when a domain expires and email on…
"why would your team not opt for things that ARE vetted as being secure, trusted, open, and have widespread adoption?" It was a classic case of letting product management opinion over-ride engineering implications. Namely, on behalf of customer service, I went to bat - hard - with the engineers, to give our CSRs a completely effective way to handle inbound password requests in cases where customers no longer had acce…
I personally don't see how having the plain-text passwords help in the case where the person owning the account doesn't have access to their email account. Since they don't have access, you can't exactly email them their password.