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How does one go about setting up (easy) server of some sort to see what servers are being connected say when investigating a different area?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I never asked them to do that in the first place, so I'll be blocking it from now on. Apple's working on making sure you can't block it. They already keep you from blocking their own traffic with Little Snitch and similar tools: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24838816
Isn't that just with Big Sur? Also, I'm using the hosts file method.
While other posts on this topic are too alarmist, this one is way too Apple apologetic for my taste. * There is no information on how often the validation happens. All this investigation concludes is that it doesn't happen when closing and immediately re-opening an app. Is it every week? Every reboot? Every hour? If it's less, that's essentially the same as doing it on every launch. * There is no justification for se…
Isn’t OCSP an open standard for handling certificate revocations? The standard specifies plaintext, because the standard can’t assume that the client has a way to form an encrypted connection to the revocation list.
[1]: https://blog.cloudflare.com/validating-leaked-passwords-with...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I never asked them to do that in the first place, so I'll be blocking it from now on. Apple's working on making sure you can't block it. They already keep you from blocking their own traffic with Little Snitch and similar tools: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24838816
if they keep doing like this I will block their entire ASN .
OCSP doesn't seem like the right protocol for this. Apple should probably just ship you a list of hashes of revoked certificates once a day, and should do the check locally. (Obviously, the global certificate database is too big to send to every user, but Apple should be able to determine the subset of certificates they trust, and the even smaller subset of those that are revoked or compromised.) To me, it sounds lik…
This does seem like a situation where a CRL would be a better fit than OCSP. On the other hand, CRLs have been pretty thoroughly deprecated for browser usage, so Apple probably just reached for the first tool that was already available to them.
Stapling and crl-shipped-with-browser still works.
While other posts on this topic are too alarmist, this one is way too Apple apologetic for my taste. * There is no information on how often the validation happens. All this investigation concludes is that it doesn't happen when closing and immediately re-opening an app. Is it every week? Every reboot? Every hour? If it's less, that's essentially the same as doing it on every launch. * There is no justification for se…
Exactly the apologetic that you are talking about. Everyone has a different security update cadence (e.g. patch Tuesday for Microsoft), but each application launch is not a reasonable one. Given Apple's recent propensity for banning developers who stand against them (whether you agree with those developers or not), this is aimed squarely at dissent.
While other posts on this topic are too alarmist, this one is way too Apple apologetic for my taste. * There is no information on how often the validation happens. All this investigation concludes is that it doesn't happen when closing and immediately re-opening an app. Is it every week? Every reboot? Every hour? If it's less, that's essentially the same as doing it on every launch. * There is no justification for se…
1) Even plain access logs — basically what a HTTP request, or a TCP connection can tell you — is a lot. Gather those for a couple of days, and you have a good map of the user. More so if you have an ID of machine and the actual executable hash.
2) "But we are the good guys" is a non-defense. Good guys can turn bad, they can be coerced by the bad guys, and
3) since the requests fly out in plain text, there is an unknown number of questionably-aligned guys in between capable of sniff your data. You only need one bad enough guy to get into serious trouble if that's what they want.
This is not alarmist. It's just common sense. The same common sense that you use to avoid certain neighborhoods at certain times of night.
If anyone is concerned with ocsp activity and verifications being requested all over the web, then oh boy stay away from https. OCSP is a good thing, and the web - and your signed applications - are better off with it.
Yeah, I feel like I'm taking crazy pills; did everyone just not know about OCSP until Apple did it? Spoiler alert, you've probably already used OCSP on the web.
It's worth noting a couple differences between HTTPS OCSP and Developer ID OCSP. First, with Developer ID, the only DNS request is for ocsp.apple.com, so the DNS request by itself doesn't expose any information about the Mac app being launched, unlike with HTTPS.
Second, the caching of Developer ID OCSP responses tends to be much much shorter than for HTTPS. Prior to Thursday's outage, the standard cache length for Developer ID OCSP responses seemed to be 5 minutes. (Apple seems to have raised it to 12 hours now.) In contrast, I just checked the latest response in my OCSP cache, which was for http://ocsp.digicert.com, and its validity is 7 days. So the rate at which Developer ID OCSP requests are made seems to be much higher than for HTTPS, and thus there's greater chance of exposure.
There will be a day when all apps on a mac will only be installable from the app store. Developers will be forced to buy macs and subscribe to Apple’s developer program to support it. Customers will be trained to not care. And HN Apple fanboys and fangirls will try to justify why this is a Good Thing(TM).
We’ve been hearing that for years, yet it hasn’t happened. Apple seems to recognize the value of the Mac as an general computing platform.
While other posts on this topic are too alarmist, this one is way too Apple apologetic for my taste. * There is no information on how often the validation happens. All this investigation concludes is that it doesn't happen when closing and immediately re-opening an app. Is it every week? Every reboot? Every hour? If it's less, that's essentially the same as doing it on every launch. * There is no justification for se…
To log in to my banking account, I need the correct password. No problem, I keep it in a password manager. To open the password manager, I need the correct password. No problem, I keep it in a password manager. To open the password manager, I need the correct password. No problem, I keep it in a password manager. To open the password manager, I need the correct password. No problem, I keep it in a password manager. And so on.
Imagine that, but for “verifying the HTTPS connection”.