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Hackers Hit Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey in a ‘SIM Swap’

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Re: Hackers Hit Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey in a ‘SIM Swap’

#111
post #105

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The setup string which generates the time codes is basically a second password. If something can read that setup string, they can generate their own TOTP codes for your account whenever they want.

So you're not actually talking about the TOTP codes that are generated?

I've done a piss poor job of describing it, but the way TOTP works is there is a "setup code" or a setup "string". Often in a QR code format.

That string is all that is needed to generate all of the TOTP codes forever. So while the TOTP code that you type is different every minute, it's generated by doing some math on the setup string and the current time.

Some password managers (like 1Password) allow you to have them generate your TOTP codes by putting in your setup string into them (often using the exact same process you would do to setup your TOTP codes in an app). But i'm saying that's not a good idea if you are going for "most secure", because at that point if something were to somehow exploit your password manager, they will not only get your username and password, but will have that setup string as well so they can generate their own TOTP codes for you.

Re: Hackers Hit Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey in a ‘SIM Swap’

#112
post #42
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> “Never transfer my Number” flag what if you actually want to transfer your number?

OP's intent was clear, at least to me: never transfer my number on the phone. Require it to be in person with some stronger form of identification.

The problem is, I think a lot of these hacks have an internal connection. How much access do these 3rd party carrier stores have to transfer numbers?

Re: Hackers Hit Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey in a ‘SIM Swap’

#113
post #100
post #7

While companies definitely need to move away from SMS two factor it’s so entrenched (and simple) that more is needed. The government agencies that setup the mobile number portability system need to realise the seriousness of this flaw and allow a “Never transfer my Number” flag to be set in their databases. Until then even the lowest rung service desk agent at any telco has the ability to transfer numbers. A system l…

The problem is when a phone number is the only factor that is used. That is what Twitter allows. If you truly use an SMS only as a second factor - and don't provide recovery options only by phone, like Twitter - then you have much less of a problem. In that case, a compromised phone number does not give the attacker the password or other factor. SMS is still extremely imperfect for 2FA, but it's still a lot better th…

Actually 2fa via SMS is a bad idea. Check out Troy Hunt's HIBP project to get an idea of how common password reuse is.

A good way to think about the SMS problem is this: As a second factor, your cellphone is considered by many to be "something you have". TOTP like Google authenticator does verify you are in possession of that device through a shared secret key.

SMS does not verify this and the factor is not something you have. Instead, SMS is more like "something loosely associated with you that is transferrable and vulnerable to social engineering attacks".

Anything is better than nothing. However this may be worse because it provides a false sense of security.

https://i.pinimg.com/originals/8d/6e/f3/8d6ef375e012df303faa...

Re: Hackers Hit Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey in a ‘SIM Swap’

#114
post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are still ways to make the system more secure. For example, you have to physically go to a store to port the number unless you have the old SIM. Then it's not done immediately - there's a 72 hour period in which multiple texts and calls are sent to the old SIM asking for confirmation. If you physically have the old SIM this is instant, but if you claim to have lost it you need to wait 72 hours and provide a sig…

Sure, you could have a national "reality" TV show, everybody who lost their SIM has to go on the TV show for six months with it showing on screen which number they claim is theirs - so this way there's no chance they're a crook. Or make anyone who claims they lost their SIM wrestle a bear first before they get a replacement. Won't see many crooks take that on. But, I put it to you that this all seems very disproporti…

Being serious, I don't think waiting 72 hours for a SIM number port is an inconvenience.

IF you lose your phone & SIM inside it, you need to go to the store anyway, or have a new phone sent by post (takes a few days usually). One of these things has to happen! You need a new phone!

So what we are adding here is a 72 hour wait for the number port. In the meantime you have a temporary number.

Govt should legislate to make precautions like this compulsory, or to create incentives for good security like steep fines against the phone company for simjacking, together with private red teams probing phone corp's security in this regard and claiming part of the fine.

Re: Hackers Hit Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey in a ‘SIM Swap’

#116
post #58

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There are still ways to make the system more secure. For example, you have to physically go to a store to port the number unless you have the old SIM. Then it's not done immediately - there's a 72 hour period in which multiple texts and calls are sent to the old SIM asking for confirmation. If you physically have the old SIM this is instant, but if you claim to have lost it you need to wait 72 hours and provide a sig…

Sure, you could have a national "reality" TV show, everybody who lost their SIM has to go on the TV show for six months with it showing on screen which number they claim is theirs - so this way there's no chance they're a crook. Or make anyone who claims they lost their SIM wrestle a bear first before they get a replacement. Won't see many crooks take that on. But, I put it to you that this all seems very disproporti…

>Or make anyone who claims they lost their SIM wrestle a bear first before they get a replacement. Won't see many crooks take that on.

Definitely the phone company to go with!

Re: Hackers Hit Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey in a ‘SIM Swap’

#117
post #99
post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Unfortunately, the current corporate thinking in Poland is that 2-factor authentication means SMS. I see banks and other companies introduce this in spite of known vulnerabilities. SMS is NOT a secure second factor!

What's the universally accepted alternative?

There is no universally accepted second factor.

* SMS (and automated voice call) are bad for people who live in areas with poor phone coverage, people with international phone numbers, and people who want good security.

* TOTP is bad for people who don't have smartphones.

* FIDO U2F is bad for people who don't have $20, safari/iOS users, and people whose devices don't have USB.

* Vendor-specific apps are bad for people who don't have smartphones, people with low spec or poorly supported smartphones, blind people, and the privacy-conscious.

* Smart card readers and physical tokens with screens cost $$$, often aren't accessible to blind people, and are too bulky for users to carry more than one or two.

* Paper single-use codes are bad for people who log in regularly, people who don't have printers, and don't scale to multiple services all that well.

* All of the above are bad for people who are forgetful or clumsy enough to regularly lose or break the second factor.

WITH THAT SAID, you can still provide Hacker-News-reader-approved two-factor authentication by basically copying Google: Offer the user TOTP, FIDO, SMS and paper codes, let them choose any two.

Gain bonus points with a setting that stops customer services resetting the password or disabling 2fa, and a week-long warning/waiting period in case account hijackers dial up the security settings to stop the original user getting their account back.

Re: Hackers Hit Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey in a ‘SIM Swap’

#118
post #115

The second factor for authentication is best handled by having it under the account holder's control. Either a client side TLS certificate or a Yubi key. The former is better in my opinion since it's compatible with application level protocols other than HTTP.

USB smartcards worked flawlessly for 10+ years.

Last gen titan key finally supports work in a driverless smartcard mode, but you have to custom order them as I understood

Re: Hackers Hit Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey in a ‘SIM Swap’

#119
Please do not allow people to call SMS 2FA. For it to be 2FA, it must be: something I know alone, something I possess alone, something I am alone. Otherwise, it's just another account identifier (and likely spoof-able). SMS and phone numbers are none of these.

In same vein, I wish security questions would die in a fire. Always treat them like additional passwords: use nonsensical words and store them in your password manager.

Re: Hackers Hit Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey in a ‘SIM Swap’

#120
In India it's not just that these digital services are at stake due to SMS OTP, entire banking security, Tax filing to Aadhaar (UID containing all data of an Indian Citizen) relies upon SMS OTP.

SIM swapping attacks could have devastating effects on the lives of the people here.

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