Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I would rather see a sandbox approach that restricts the locations and types of files that can be read and written. Which is exactly what is in the security proposal linked at the bottom of the article.
Thanks for pointing that out. I missed these 2 items on first glance. Limiting access to certain directories: https://github.com/WICG/writable-files/blob/master/EXPLAINER... Limiting write access to certain file types: https://github.com/WICG/writable-files/blob/master/EXPLAINER... FWIW: On the surface, this appears to contradict the following quote from tfa: > ...ensures that the user is always in full control over…
The problem with that is there is no hard distinction between a data file and an executable. Essentially every kind of file, when opened, causes code to be executed, usually significantly influenced by the content of the file.
This API is moving the security perimeter back, making it the responsibility of every local app that may open a file touched by this API — essentially every file it might open — to ensure unexpected/malicious content can’t do anything bad. That’s not going to happen. Instead, users are going to have to be “sure” not to open files via this API using sites they don’t trust. That’s pretty weak compared to what we’re generally used to today (which doesn’t seem strong enough already).