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The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

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Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#111
post #108
post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Similar to your idea is Kant's "thing-in-itself", which is just a way of saying that for any given object, there are attributes to it we're not able to observe - indeed, attributes we can't even imagine. We're trapped in our brain, behind a wall of sensory apparatus. There's no reason to assume that our senses provide the complete totality of reality. And if there are aspects of reality we cannot sense, then there is…

Isn't that ignoring the fact that we can build tools to translate unsensable things into sensable ones? E.g. infrared cameras allow us to sense infrared which we normally aren't able to. Theoretically we should be able to build tools to sense anything which has an effect on the world. If it has no effect on the world then does it even exist?

There's still things that are impossible to accurately measure from within our reality.

We, for instance, can't know or measure the precise state of things as they would've been had something different occured than what actually occured at an earlier time.

This is especially obvious in the realm of quantum mechanics, where you can't know what you would have measured if you had measured earlier or later than you did (I hope my interpretation as a layperson was correct here). That information just doesn't exist in our reality, but it may exist in some higher order place where all those realities can be observed.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#112
post #108
post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Similar to your idea is Kant's "thing-in-itself", which is just a way of saying that for any given object, there are attributes to it we're not able to observe - indeed, attributes we can't even imagine. We're trapped in our brain, behind a wall of sensory apparatus. There's no reason to assume that our senses provide the complete totality of reality. And if there are aspects of reality we cannot sense, then there is…

Isn't that ignoring the fact that we can build tools to translate unsensable things into sensable ones? E.g. infrared cameras allow us to sense infrared which we normally aren't able to. Theoretically we should be able to build tools to sense anything which has an effect on the world. If it has no effect on the world then does it even exist?

Viewing infrared extends one of our existing senses. Kant's point was that could be attributes of the thing that do not, in anyway, relate to our senses.

These attributes can't have any effect on the phenomenal world, or they'd be detectable, and by definition, they're not detectable by us. Unless, of course, our free will is part of the noumenal world, and our actions in the phenomenal world are simply one way of viewing our will.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#113
post #109

Earlier quoted context omitted.

He did not make the choice to murder if all the previous states, linked together to the outcome and thus it couldn’t have been different. If I’m a product of every moment, where the previous moments factor into my current moment.. I would only consider myself free if I had full control before birth into how my life plays out. Nobody is making choices is what I observe everyday, only forces are occurring and under the…

>He did not make the choice to murder if all the previous states, linked together to the outcome and thus it couldn’t have been different. To some extent yes, our choices and scope of action is constrained by our essential nature, some of which is determined before we are even born. However this doesn't absolve us of all accountability. It simply sets up a framework within which we can discuss what accountability is…

To all extent there is no choice. Randomness is a fallacy in this world, it doesn’t exist and or should be interpreted as what occurs associated as deterministic. People associate the word “random” to events they cannot process but still they’re set variables that factored into the final outcome with no other possible result when the exact variables are simulated again if possible. I think accountability isn’t a real thing in the sense of morally right and it’s just human conditioning to blame for us thinking it should ever exist when it’s morally not correct. Rehabilitation should always be the action humans take if we love ourselves and others. Else we’re playing with fire because the only thing separating us from a person who becomes a murder is our birth into this world and when society is imperfect to prevent inequality, genetics, environment, and travesty altering a state to poor health where one will commit murder or even suicide occurs. Similar to a chemical equation but longer to write out the formula and process to demonstrate again and again.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#114
post #89
post #85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think simonh was not arguing against the chain of causation, but rather agreeing with it, and arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" and in favor of "If the future can not be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" If an entity's decision process is is not not dependent and repeatable based entirely on it's internal state and per…

> I think simonh was ... arguing against "If the future can be perfectly predicted => people definitely do not have free will" Just so I'm understanding you correctly: Are you claiming that even if the future can be perfectly predicted, people can still have free will? At the moment of your conception, if I were to predict with 100% accuracy and confidence, every decision you will ever make in your life, would you st…

Yes, I would. I'm actually arguing something a bit more though, that if the future can not be perfectly predicted, people can not have an entirely free will.

I'm claiming that non-deterministic action would necessitate that we are at least partially subject to some external, truly random, processes that we don't control, and that in that case that process is what would ultimately causes our actions to be non-deterministic, not the individual themselves.

If my actions are not deterministic in the sum collection of my prior experiences/knowledge, and current perception, which at any given instant could be exactly known, then there must be an additional random source of input that is not 'me' that at least in part drives my actions, and thus such actions are not entirely driven by me and my "Free Will".

Imagine a deterministic entity, in a otherwise deterministic universe, rolling non-deterministic dice to decide it's actions. Does the non-determinism introduced by those dice make those choices more or less an act of that entity's will?

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#115
post #86
post #82

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> If my decisions are not a product of my prior state, then they are not my decisions. The definition of 'me' is my prior state. There are two problems with this definition of free will. First, it implies that your present self (and future selves) are all entirely subservient to your prior state, and surrounding environment. Ie, the present you has no way of overcoming your past self or your environment. This means t…

What if current behavior is not completely determined by previous state, and yet is also not random?

Saying what a thing is not can be helpful, but what is it? Like dualism, this is just kicking the philosophical can down the road.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#116
post #109

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>He did not make the choice to murder if all the previous states, linked together to the outcome and thus it couldn’t have been different. To some extent yes, our choices and scope of action is constrained by our essential nature, some of which is determined before we are even born. However this doesn't absolve us of all accountability. It simply sets up a framework within which we can discuss what accountability is…

To all extent there is no choice. Randomness is a fallacy in this world, it doesn’t exist and or should be interpreted as what occurs associated as deterministic. People associate the word “random” to events they cannot process but still they’re set variables that factored into the final outcome with no other possible result when the exact variables are simulated again if possible. I think accountability isn’t a real…

I take it you're not a fan of Quantum Mechanics?

I think that morality, love and justice emerge from human nature. I think that I, my self and my consciousness are emergent properties and I'm fine with that. I think that the purpose of human life is chosen for us by the rules of biology, natural selection, game theory and a host of other factors that, seemingly miraculously, lead me to the conclusion that the philosophical Good Life is desirable and largely attainable.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#117
post #116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To all extent there is no choice. Randomness is a fallacy in this world, it doesn’t exist and or should be interpreted as what occurs associated as deterministic. People associate the word “random” to events they cannot process but still they’re set variables that factored into the final outcome with no other possible result when the exact variables are simulated again if possible. I think accountability isn’t a real…

I take it you're not a fan of Quantum Mechanics? I think that morality, love and justice emerge from human nature. I think that I, my self and my consciousness are emergent properties and I'm fine with that. I think that the purpose of human life is chosen for us by the rules of biology, natural selection, game theory and a host of other factors that, seemingly miraculously, lead me to the conclusion that the philoso…

I don’t think it’s attainable but only what is destined happens. Quantum mechanics to me is something us humans do not have the ability to analyze to the depth of other things today. I assume it’s determinism as well. It’s possible to have local hidden variables that play into the determined outcome and which are not measurable in our universe or with our capabilities but still would be determinism at the heart. I think free will only exists if you have the perfect life, where one always enjoyed it and that to me is ignoring what I would associate “free” as in the definition. It’s more of like thinking well you can’t necessarily say the person didn’t want the existence.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#118

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you're taking the wrong message away from the following simple idea: "Good decisions depend on taking the available information into account." If we take this for granted, then it's not clear why free will is a good thing. How would you say pre-determined actions and free will are compatible? I would say they are not (and indeed randomness doesn't really help). In contrast, I would claim that the only sensibl…

The only conclusion here is that you believe free will can only be explained by dualism. Quantum nonlocality [1] provides at least one other explanation as a place free will may hide. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_nonlocality

Could you elaborate on what the definition of free will you're going by is? And how it's possibly supported by quantum non-locality?
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