Earlier quoted context omitted.
Trust of a CA doesn't have to be binary - it could be stochastic. Let's say that when a browser wishes to revoke a CA certificate, it chooses a timeframe for a "deprecation period". Before the deprecation period, the CA is fully trusted. After the deprecation period, it has been completely eliminated. During the deprecation period, a browser will possibly pop up an error page rather than accepting the certificate. Th…
Would that not just encourage your average user to click through the security warnings and ignore them, potentially numbing them to other more important warnings? Users aren't the ones who should feel the pain of a rogue CA, we need the CA to feel the pain somehow.
If a CA is being revoked, that's pretty close to the maximum pain they'll feel. But suddenly revoking a CA will cause users the most pain - I'm trying to make that gradual. A competent site would react in the first week when a few users got a mild warning, get a certificate from a new CA, then hopefully complain to the original CA demanding a refund and whatnot.