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PostgreSQL 9.2.4, 9.1.9, 9.0.13 and 8.4.17 released

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101–105 of 105 posts

Re: PostgreSQL 9.2.4, 9.1.9, 9.0.13 and 8.4.17 released

#101
post #33
post #8

I'm not an expert so I'll ask here: Is there an attack vector if you run PostgreSQL locally, no untrusted users are able to create connection strings and do not allow remote access? It seems to be no but I prefer to be sure ;)

To be sure, you should upgrade. Why do you not want to upgrade?

It's more that bootvis has no immediate slack time to deal with issues if the upgrade isn't smooth.

Re: PostgreSQL 9.2.4, 9.1.9, 9.0.13 and 8.4.17 released

#102
"...containing a database name that begins with '-'..."

And some people are laughing at me when I establish guidelines mandating (and enforcing in build scripts) very script rules as to precisely which subset of ASCII is allowed in filenames / identifiers / etc. in our codebase and in the builds we're producing.

Re: PostgreSQL 9.2.4, 9.1.9, 9.0.13 and 8.4.17 released

#104
post #94

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Which is not an uncommon situation actually. I've only started surveying the Internet for PostgreSQL for a bit more than a day and I've already discovered more than a hundred thousand (168,031) remotely-accessible PostgreSQL instances: http://www.shodanhq.com/search?q=port%3A5432

I'm surprised this is so common. I've never set up any database accessible to the public-- I've already got to worry about securing the public-facing web server, why add another vector for attack?

Even without being publically accessible, it's a DBA's nightmare scenario. There are plenty of corporate data warehousing environments in which many hundreds of employees have direct access to the database. This exploit would allow any of those employees to drop tables without exposing their credentials.

Re: PostgreSQL 9.2.4, 9.1.9, 9.0.13 and 8.4.17 released

#105

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It seems to me that even large, overly bureaucratic corporations need a process in place that allows deploying critical security updates in a reasonably expedient manner. Is this uncommon?

Well, it's only a critical security update if it affects your installation. If there's a way to protect without a quick rush software upgrade, you may as well wait until the next scheduled software upgrade.

Exactly. We were prepared for a "quick rush" but when the details were released we did a combination of nmap to look for any accidentally exposed Postgres installs + adding explicit firewall rules to reject all traffic on the related ports (all of them should be rejected by default rules anyway, but we wanted to ensure none of the ports had been accidentally opened up) "just in case", and at that point we felt we could take a slower, more measured roll out of the upgrade. In 5 minutes we were "in the clear" and could breathe a sigh of relief.

It's still important to apply the udates, as I wrote elsewhere, because it's one more way someone can mess you up badly if they have managed to penetrate other parts of our systems, but upgrades no matter how seemingly safe can also cause problems (fore example I test upgraded one VM that refused to come back up again afterwards - not Postgres' fault, but a config change someone had clearly not tested properly).

But in this case, knowing we have blocked the main attack vector means we can take the time to take a copy of each database VM we run, test apply the upgrade and verify everything works correctly before applying it live, instead of rushing it out.

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