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Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel
101–104 of 104 posts
Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel
#102[dead]
Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel
#103Earlier quoted context omitted.
> tone was appropriate TDR said: > You are absolutely deluded, if not stupid, if you think that a worldwide collection of software engineers who can't write operating systems or applications without security holes, can then turn around and suddenly write virtualization layers without security holes. This comment wouldn't survive HN scrutiny. It's a strawman argument, and doesn't address the core point at all: does vi…
Theo and Linus' prolonged public attitudes are exactly why I boycott OpenBSD and Linux.
Theo is probably autistic.
I work with a lot of great engineers with similar behavior. Their arguments are not personal, although they seem to be. They are just very passionate and care deeply about certain things (in this case operating systems security).
If you can get past the aggressive/offensive language they use and develop a relationship with them, they can be reasonable and helpful. That's been my experience.
Re: Arbitrary code execution in QubesOS via copy-to-VM error reporting backchannel
#104Earlier quoted context omitted.
In all fairness also read this: https://taviso.decsystem.org/virtsec.pdf
Yeah, I'm with Theo on this one. Conventional OS security between Ring-0 and everything else is well understood; the problem has become too much code in Ring-0, a great fraction of which has its own interfaces across the security boundary, and the Unix security model just doesn't scale. No capabilities, or even a sane and useful way of adding capabilities with everything in ring 0, and the flat integer namespacing of…
Tree is just a network topology, and if all machines in the network have the same vulnerability, you crack the whole network.