Earlier quoted context omitted.
Hence my qualification at the start. My problem with deontological ethics is that the justification of it abruptly hits an impenetrable wall, i.e. the rule or the duty, unless you appeal to some benefit or prevention of harm to rational beings. Even in the Metaphysics of Morals, the whole concept of duty would be arbitrary if not in reference to rational beings. But happy to be corrected.
It's been twenty years since I read Kant, but it differs from utilitarianism in that it has no concern for utility of others, rather it's "if I could pick rules for everybody to follow, those are the rules I should follow. Ergo if I never want anybody to lie to me, then it is always immoral for me to lie -- anything else would be a contradiction, since it assumes two rational agents coming to different conclusions.
So that type of lying is strictly forbidden. You do not want to be deceived. But if include in "lies" such things as reading fiction aloud, then that can be permissible as you can want that: you aren't really deceived or betrayed.