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Hardware backdoors in some x86 CPUs

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101–104 of 104 posts

Re: Hardware backdoors in some x86 CPUs

#101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A poorly documented or undocumented (debugging) backdoor in a chip marketed for ATMs and medical hardware, enabled by default, at the very least qualifies as reckless endangerment.

Not really. A properly designed network should take account for such things as unknown/irreparable flaws. An irreparable backdoor in a device can be mitigated with a gatekeeper, something akin to a firewall that will not allow a threat actor to have access to a faulty device. The real recklessness would be allowing an ATM unfettered access to the internet on the assumption that the manufacturer has already protected…

I was basically going to quote your whole statement here and then point to the more than 19 US states that have had Water Treatment plants forced to disconnect much of their Operational Technology systems.

Re: Hardware backdoors in some x86 CPUs

#102
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sure but the cops aren't going to pull you over based on what you think about Chinese policy. Government do mess with people across international borders, but the capacity to do that is inherently limited.

> Sure but the cops aren't going to pull you over based on what you think about Chinese policy. You might be surprised to learn that China has operated clandestine prisons in the US! https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-arrested-operati...

> "This is gaming the system, changing the post between this and https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49073612 edit for clarity: the submitter kept changing the title and body between this and the linked post. This was the "mistaken duplicate" before."

Bruh, I am not "gaming the system", the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) is gaming the system.

Re: Hardware backdoors in some x86 CPUs

#103
post #101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not really. A properly designed network should take account for such things as unknown/irreparable flaws. An irreparable backdoor in a device can be mitigated with a gatekeeper, something akin to a firewall that will not allow a threat actor to have access to a faulty device. The real recklessness would be allowing an ATM unfettered access to the internet on the assumption that the manufacturer has already protected…

I was basically going to quote your whole statement here and then point to the more than 19 US states that have had Water Treatment plants forced to disconnect much of their Operational Technology systems.

And those disconnects would be that effective gatekeeper. Maybe overkill, but "air gapping" is a often a reasonable mitigation.

Re: Hardware backdoors in some x86 CPUs

#104
post #86

(2018) And "x86" sort of gives the wrong impression -- this isn't an AMD or Intel chip; it's a 2001-era VIA chip.

Intel chips also have a hardware backdoor in the form of a separate core that the neither the user nor the installed operating system control. Intel Management Engine: https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_Management_Engine As do AMD chips: AMD Platform Security Processor: https://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/AMD_Platform_Security_Process...

Irrelevant. The IME/PSP are not described in this article and function differently.
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