Earlier quoted context omitted.
>your hardware dies Or your backpack gets stolen. Oops. I swear, people who idolize passkey security must never travel anywhere. PS: "just have more devices with passkeys", they invariably say. Yeah right because people are made of money, everyone has the forethought, and a 2nd laptop in the US is a great asset when you're in Poland and can't login anywhere.
I've been avoiding passkeys but more and more websites are trying to push them, and one website I use now requires them. I've already got a password manager! I don't need to change everything again!
Microsoft Edge stores all passwords in memory in clear text, even when unused
101–110 of 243 posts
Re: Microsoft Edge stores all passwords in memory in clear text, even when unused
#102Earlier quoted context omitted.
One more reason to use hardware-bound passkeys and not passwords.
True. But then your hardware dies, and you're locked out of every account you own. It is objectively good security, but has a ton of usability headaches yet to be really solved. I've seen orgs move to passkeys only, then offer reset-questions (e.g. city of first job, etc); because the Customer Service volume/workflow wasn't figured out.
Thank you, then this is still true today?
Disappointing the rollout was botched (recall cross platform and password manager difficulties). Haven’t done research since but even with some new UIs and flows promoting passkeys in the past couple months, haven’t regained my trust either.
Re: Microsoft Edge stores all passwords in memory in clear text, even when unused
#103Correct me if I am wrong but chrome is-at least was- keeping passwords as raw text in Windows too. I got friend's forgotten password from Chrome on 2021 version
Re: Microsoft Edge stores all passwords in memory in clear text, even when unused
#104Earlier quoted context omitted.
> This comment feels like it's written by AI. Why exactly? I'm genuinely asking, because I feel like I get this a lot , and it is pretty frustrating.
I'm not the other commenter (and I believe you that it's not AI), but I'd guess it's mostly the first line: a short affirmation followed by "The problem is ...." feels like the sort of formula the LLMs love to use. (Not trying to imply that there's anything inherently wrong with it, of course.) While we're at it, I'm under the impression that the recent LLMs have also co-opted "genuinely", which I'll never forgive th…
As to that comment's tone, my entire comment history is visible going back years. I'd invite people to peruse it.
Re: Microsoft Edge stores all passwords in memory in clear text, even when unused
#105Earlier quoted context omitted.
Security isn't black and white. If i leave a post-it note of my logins on my monitor, that's definitely less safe than in a unlocked drawer, and so on.
If I leave a post-it note of passwords on my monitor inside a vault to which only I have access, it’s not a big deal. That’s the point of the “airtight hatch” metaphor.
Re: Microsoft Edge stores all passwords in memory in clear text, even when unused
#106Earlier quoted context omitted.
True. But then your hardware dies, and you're locked out of every account you own. It is objectively good security, but has a ton of usability headaches yet to be really solved. I've seen orgs move to passkeys only, then offer reset-questions (e.g. city of first job, etc); because the Customer Service volume/workflow wasn't figured out.
>your hardware dies Or your backpack gets stolen. Oops. I swear, people who idolize passkey security must never travel anywhere. PS: "just have more devices with passkeys", they invariably say. Yeah right because people are made of money, everyone has the forethought, and a 2nd laptop in the US is a great asset when you're in Poland and can't login anywhere.
Confirms that strategy then
For people who only use passwords having an extra device can help too. Google does not necessarily permit a login with a backup code, so to me it seems ideal to grab a spare phone, log into important accounts, and store it with a trusted party/friend.
It could be very difficult to login to an account like Gmail from overseas in the event of PC+phone[+hardware key] theft. Maybe no big deal if you can port your number to a new phone right away. Or maybe the trusted friend can help (unless Google still finds the login suspicious after all, no idea there)
Re: Microsoft Edge stores all passwords in memory in clear text, even when unused
#107Re: Microsoft Edge stores all passwords in memory in clear text, even when unused
#108Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've been avoiding passkeys but more and more websites are trying to push them, and one website I use now requires them. I've already got a password manager! I don't need to change everything again!
Your password manager almost certainly already has baked-in passkey support.
Re: Microsoft Edge stores all passwords in memory in clear text, even when unused
#109Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is accurate as far as page protection goes. The problem is the largest threat model. If Process A and Process B are running in the same user context on a desktop OS, PAGE_NOACCESS is not a strong boundary by itself. Process B may be able to obtain PROCESS_VM_OPERATION/PROCESS_VM_READ, change the page protection with VirtualProtectEx, inject code that calls VirtualProtect inside Process A, load a DLL, attach as a…
This comment feels like it's written by AI. Anyway, PAGE_GUARD helps you get around VirtualProtectEx, which is a very common way of detecting userspace cheats.
Re: Microsoft Edge stores all passwords in memory in clear text, even when unused
#110This feels like a case of "It rather involved being on the other side of this airtight hatchway"[1]. If you can read arbitrary process memory, you're probably also in a position to just dump out the passwords by pretending to be the user in question. > If an attacker gains administrative access on a terminal server, they can access the memory of all logged‑on user processes. If an attacker has administrative access,…
It honestly feels like more and more "security" people and businesses have less interest in actually securing systems and more in marketing themselves and their business hence the tendency to make every niche attack into a five alarm fire.