Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

deepmind.google

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

101–110 of 157 posts

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#101

Post by dwb »

tsimionescu wrote: post #89
brotchie wrote: post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Originally rejected the paper premise, but I get it now, certainly made me question my belief that consciousness binds to any arbitrary information processing that's of sufficient complexity. IIUC the author is saying that the human brain is running directly on "layer zero": chemical gradients / voltage changes, while AI computes on an abstraction one layer higher (binary bit flips over discretized dyanmics). In esse…

> while AI is running on a discretization of this (we're essentially discretizing the physical dynamics and to create state changes of 0 -> 1, 1 -> 0). But this is just a discretization we impose when we try to represent the system for ourselves. The reality is that the AI is a particular time-ordered relation between the continuous electric fields inside the CPU, GPU, and various other peripherals. We design the sys…

The computer and the program wouldn't exist without us, though. They only exist to be interpreted by us. The physical properties of the circuits outside of what we cajole them into doing are irrelevant, meaningless. The circuits only do their work regardless of particular interpretations; they wouldn't exist at all without people building them to be interpreted.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#102

Post by TimTheTinker »

brotchie wrote: post #94
tsimionescu wrote: post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> while AI is running on a discretization of this (we're essentially discretizing the physical dynamics and to create state changes of 0 -> 1, 1 -> 0). But this is just a discretization we impose when we try to represent the system for ourselves. The reality is that the AI is a particular time-ordered relation between the continuous electric fields inside the CPU, GPU, and various other peripherals. We design the sys…

This is a good counter argument to the paper, honestly.

I think a better counter is the question "Is there a meaningful difference between binary discretization and Planck units? Aren't those discrete/indivisible as well?"

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#103

Post by GMoromisato »

neosat wrote: post #52
GMoromisato wrote: post #24

I think this is a circular argument. It defines a separation between computation and experience (between the abstraction and the "mapmaker") and then concludes that computation cannot be experience because they are in separate categories. There are really only two solutions to the Hard Problem of Consciousness: 1. Consciousness is an unknown physical something (force/particle/quantum whatever). 2. Consciousness is an…

Agree with your points on the primary two questions and the circular argument in the original article. However, re: " How is it that atoms/electrons/photons suddenly start experiencing pain? What is it, in terms of atoms/forces, that's experiencing the pain?" that's an interesting question but not necessarily fundamentally refuting of #1. If you start with #1 "Consciousness is an unknown physical something (force/par…

Agreed! I'm skeptical of consciousness requiring some exotic new physics (a quantum phenomenon or a new form of energy or somesuch) but we can't prove that it doesn't.

Honestly, if someday a scientist proves that consciousness is a fundamental force like gravity, I would say, "yup, that makes sense!" even if I don't think it's likely.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#104

Post by tsimionescu »

cameldrv wrote: post #91
tsimionescu wrote: post #25

I've never understood why certain philosophers view computation as some kind of abstract symbolic manipulation, while they easily accept that consciousness is a physical process. Computation is something that a computer provably does. We build physical hardware, at great effort, to do computation. The hardware works and does the computation regardless of whether there is anyone to understand or interpret it. If it di…

The issue that the paper brings up is that the same physical process can be interpreted as multiple different computational processes. If the content of consciousness (the hard problem, qualia) is only dependent on the computational process, and not its particular physical instantiation, then which qualia are generated from a particular physical process?

> The issue that the paper brings up is that the same physical process can be interpreted as multiple different computational processes.

I don't think this is relevant to the notion that consciousness is a form of computation.

The assertion that consciousness is a form of computation basically means that the physical process that happens in the brain/body that we recognize as consciousness can be described in terms of a computational process. A consequence of this, if it is true, is that replicating the same computation in a CPU would make the physical process that happens in the CPU just as conscious - assuming that we had identified the correct computation.

In this theory, the thing that would be conscious would be the physical CPU, just like the thing that is conscious is a physical human brain/body. The computation is just an abstract description of the common properties between the CPU and the human brain/body. It's not relevant that we could also describe the process inside the CPU as being a completely different computation - the abstract model is only required to be able to build and program the CPU.

To go back to my mechanical door analogy: we create an abstract model of the computations needed to make a computational system open a door when a person is near. We use this model to create the computational system, and we see the door opening when a person goes near the sensor. Now, we can interpret the computation happening inside the system in many other ways - but that won't change the fact that the door opens when a person is near, in any way.

I am not claiming that any of this constitutes proof that consciousness must be a computation. What I'm claiming though is that the paper, and similar arguments, are not refuting the right claims, and generally have a misunderstanding of what "computation" actually means, and its relation to physical processes.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#105

Post by GMoromisato »

renticulous wrote: post #57
GMoromisato wrote: post #24

I think this is a circular argument. It defines a separation between computation and experience (between the abstraction and the "mapmaker") and then concludes that computation cannot be experience because they are in separate categories. There are really only two solutions to the Hard Problem of Consciousness: 1. Consciousness is an unknown physical something (force/particle/quantum whatever). 2. Consciousness is an…

With the emergence argument, I have the following retort. How can something emerge if it wasn't embedded or hidden within the system already?

I think when people say "emergent" they mean that it happens because of a combination of parts forming something greater.

For example, if you decompose an airplane into its pieces, you will discover than none of the pieces can fly from Boston to San Francisco by itself. Wings can't fly without engines, engines can't work without fuel, etc. etc.

Maybe consciousness is a process that requires many different components or steps. No one component is conscious, but the running process is.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#106

Post by dwb »

colordrops wrote: post #84
brotchie wrote: post #82

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's the difference between: a) Actually pouring a cup of water into a pond (layer zero), and b) Running a fluid dynamics simulation of pouring a cup of water into a pond (some layer above layer zero).

I understand the original framing which is what you are repeating. I'm saying the framing itself is an illusion. It's an arbitrary distinction and also implies fully understanding all the underlying processes that go into pouring a cup of water in a pond (we don't) and that running a fluid dynamics simulation is some trivial thing (it's not).

It's not arbitrary because people are making exactly this distinction in order to argue that it's possible for computers to be conscious, which this paper argues against. So the distinction exists at least for the purposes of this argument. Whether it "really" exists of course depends on your perspective.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#107

Post by RC_ITR »

GMoromisato wrote: post #35
metalcrow wrote: post #13

I've attempted desperately to understand this paper after thoroughly reading it and have made 0 progress. Can anyone who does understand it attempt to explain? Currently my understanding is that this paper is claiming that "concepts" are a fundamental building block of experience (which relates to consciousness), and can only be built by a mapmaker which is something that directly converts continuous physical phenome…

It starts by saying that a simulation of something is not the real thing. A simulation of a hurricane is not a hurricane. That's certainly true and even obvious. Then they say that current AI is just a simulation of consciousness and therefore is not real consciousness. Moreover, it can never be real consciousness because it is just a simulation. But that's a circular argument: they are defining AI as a simulation. B…

We invented a word for a very specific thing (consciousness) and are now debating whether that relatively unimportant word represents a large open set or a narrow closed set.

We do one thing in our bodies with relatively binary nervous system and a fundamentally continuous endocrine system. That's clearly and unanimously consciousness. We also, however, see other animals with similar set-ups but less capabilities, so we understand it exists on a spectrum.

We separately invented a thing that gets to similar outcomes with fundamentally binary logic gates.

Our minds are drawn to comparison and classification, so we fight over how similar or different those two things are in a way that often feels unsatisfactory because in order to meaningfully compare the two, we have to reduce them in a way that feels like its underselling either/both.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#108

Post by Windchaser »

Exoristos wrote: post #37
GMoromisato wrote: post #24

I think this is a circular argument. It defines a separation between computation and experience (between the abstraction and the "mapmaker") and then concludes that computation cannot be experience because they are in separate categories. There are really only two solutions to the Hard Problem of Consciousness: 1. Consciousness is an unknown physical something (force/particle/quantum whatever). 2. Consciousness is an…

4. It is ἐνέργεια, direct spark, of the God. It can be described but not comprehended, imitated but not replicated.

to be fair, at one time "life" was also seen this way. "There's a magic sauce, an elan vital, that makes living organisms live".

But in the end, it turned out to be biochemistry.

I think, given our history, it makes sense to be skeptical of claims that suggest that the things we don't yet understand cannot be comprehended or replicated.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#109

Post by soco »

metalcrow wrote: post #13

I've attempted desperately to understand this paper after thoroughly reading it and have made 0 progress. Can anyone who does understand it attempt to explain? Currently my understanding is that this paper is claiming that "concepts" are a fundamental building block of experience (which relates to consciousness), and can only be built by a mapmaker which is something that directly converts continuous physical phenome…

"ceci n'est pas une pipe" - a century old argument which still holds.

Re: The Abstraction Fallacy: Why AI can simulate but not instantiate consciousness

#110

Post by tsimionescu »

dwb wrote: post #101
tsimionescu wrote: post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> while AI is running on a discretization of this (we're essentially discretizing the physical dynamics and to create state changes of 0 -> 1, 1 -> 0). But this is just a discretization we impose when we try to represent the system for ourselves. The reality is that the AI is a particular time-ordered relation between the continuous electric fields inside the CPU, GPU, and various other peripherals. We design the sys…

The computer and the program wouldn't exist without us, though. They only exist to be interpreted by us. The physical properties of the circuits outside of what we cajole them into doing are irrelevant, meaningless. The circuits only do their work regardless of particular interpretations; they wouldn't exist at all without people building them to be interpreted.

The physical computer could exist regardless of us. The program, if by that we mean "a human model of the computation happening in a physical computer" is just a description, yes.

It would be extraordinarily unlikely, but physically conceivable, that a physical system that is organized exactly like a microcontroller running an automatic door program, together with a solar panel, a basic engine, and a light sensor, could form randomly out of, say, a meteorite falling in a desert. If that did happen, the system would produce the same "door motor runs when person is near sensor" effect as the systems we build for this.

The physical circuit are doing what they are doing because of physics. They don't care why they happen to be organized the way they are - whether occurring by human design or through random chance.

Edit: I can add another metaphor. Consider buildings: clearly, buildings are artificial objects, described by architectural diagrams, which are purely human constructs, and couldn't be built without them. And yet, there exist naturally occurring formations that have the same properties as simple buildings - and you can draw architectural diagrams of those naturally occurring formations; and, assuming your diagrams are accurate, you can predict using them if the formations will resist an earthquake or collapse. Physical computers are no different from artificial buildings here, and the logic diagrams and computer programs are no different from the architectural diagrams: they are methods that help us build what we want, but they are still discovered properties of the physical world, not idealized objects of our own making; the fact that naturally occurring computers are very unlikely to form doesn't change this fact.

Post reply on HN