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Good point! But they argue that: > PT_DENY_ATTACH (ptrace constant 31): Invoked at process startup before any sensitive data is loaded. Instructs the macOS kernel to permanently deny all ptracerequests against this process, including from root. This blocks lldb, dtrace, and Instruments. > Hardened Runtime: The binary is code-signed with hardened runtime options and explicitly without the com.apple.security.get-task-a…
Couldn't someone just uhh... patch their macOS/kernel, mock these things out, then behold, you can now access all the data? If it's not running fully end to end in some secure enclave, then it's always just a best effort thing. Good marketing though.
Apple is perfectly capable of doing remote attestation properly. iOS has DCAppAttest which does everything needed. Unfortunately, it's never been brought to macOS, as far as I know. Maybe this MDM hack is a back door to get RA capabilities, if so it'd certainly be intriguing, but if not as far as I know there's no way to get a Mac to cough up a cryptographic assertion that it's running a genuine macOS kernel/boot firmware/disk image/kernel args, etc.
It's a pity because there's a lot of unique and interesting apps that'd become possible if Apple did this. Darkbloom is just one example of what's possible. It'd be a huge boon to decentralization efforts if Apple activated this, and all the pipework is laid already so it's really a pity they don't go the extra mile here.