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The Resolv hack: How one compromised key printed $23M

chainalysis.com

101–110 of 174 posts

Re: The Resolv hack: How one compromised key printed $23M

#101

Missing from the article - the hacker first compromised Resolv Lab's AWS account, took a private key from KMS that was used to control minting, then managed to extract $25 million into ETH before all protocol functions were suspended.

> took a private key from KMS

They used KMS to sign the minting operation, but they didn't "take" the key, AWS KMS doesn't let you extract keys.

Re: The Resolv hack: How one compromised key printed $23M

#102
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

you can send them around easily without having to deal with bullshit payment systems

But you do have to deal with bullshit payment systems. I can't receive stablecoins in my regular bank account, I'd have to set up some crypto nonsense on DankRocketBets or whatever for it to even work. Why would I do this when I can already receive actual USD without any extra ceremony? Stablecoins are a solution in search of a problem.

Crypto is how you can invest in crime without doing crime.

Re: The Resolv hack: How one compromised key printed $23M

#103

You shouldn't have a key that controls millions/billions of dollars on a cloud service. It should be on an airgapped laptop that was purchased anonymously, has never been connected to the Internet, and only runs software that has been vetted and loaded onto it via a CD-ROM or some other comparable method.

Have you actually tried to run a business this way?

$24m was lost. Setting this up is say $10k in time and materials. Although I would use a rack server.

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Re: The Resolv hack: How one compromised key printed $23M

#107

You shouldn't have a key that controls millions/billions of dollars on a cloud service. It should be on an airgapped laptop that was purchased anonymously, has never been connected to the Internet, and only runs software that has been vetted and loaded onto it via a CD-ROM or some other comparable method.

Have you actually tried to run a business this way?

I have, I've set up "truly offline" root certificate authorities and the like in the past.

Yes, it's a pain to operate, but if the alternative is "the bad guys get all of our money", then it can be worth it.

Re: The Resolv hack: How one compromised key printed $23M

#108

You shouldn't have a key that controls millions/billions of dollars on a cloud service. It should be on an airgapped laptop that was purchased anonymously, has never been connected to the Internet, and only runs software that has been vetted and loaded onto it via a CD-ROM or some other comparable method.

Have you actually tried to run a business this way?

Yeah. Sorry to say, but if you’re going to run a crypto company, and it’s even moderately successful, people are going to try to steal the key. Either you are extremely paranoid, or you’re going to lose a bunch of money, for yourselves or your investors.

Re: The Resolv hack: How one compromised key printed $23M

#109
post #16
post #10

If the admins can "lock all transactions", what's the point of it being a crypto?

I don't know how this specific thing works, but I don't really see any fundamental problem with mixing and matching. If you believe in the benefits of crypto, then 50% crypto is still possibly better than 0%. It's not like I forgo a lock on my front door just because my windows are made of glass.

The primary selling points of cryptocurrencies are all hinged on the promise that they are decentralized and can't be controlled by a single entity. Without that, all they are is a new version of PayPal or a credit card network that requires many orders of magnitude more compute resources to maintain.

Re: The Resolv hack: How one compromised key printed $23M

#110

Missing from the article - the hacker first compromised Resolv Lab's AWS account, took a private key from KMS that was used to control minting, then managed to extract $25 million into ETH before all protocol functions were suspended.

> took a private key from KMS They used KMS to sign the minting operation, but they didn't "take" the key, AWS KMS doesn't let you extract keys.

^ this is a common security misconception in crypto. "We're using an HSM, they can't steal our private key." OK genius now you still have to secure the HSM.

There's no shortcut to MPC/multisig with 3+ keyholders.

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