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The Day the Telnet Died

labs.greynoise.io

101–110 of 414 posts

Re: The Day the Telnet Died

#101

This is about Telnetd. Not telnet itself.

  1. TELNET is an IETF-standard protocol defined by RFCs.
  2. Telnet is a well-known port assigned by the IANA (tcp/23).
  3. telnet is a client program, originated on Unix, available on many systems, and likely from a quite homogeneous codebase.
  4. telnetd is a server program, also originated on Unix for the purpose of implementing Telnet protocol as a login server. Also a homogeneous codebase or two.
TFA is about items 2 and 4, and 1/3 are completely unrelated.

IIRC, the only traffic that was monitored and detected here is the scanning. The vulnerability scanners that try and detect, for better or worse, what someone's running on port 23, fingerprint it, and figure out if it's a vulnerability.

Interestingly, filtering port 23 only mitigates the CVE by happenstance. It is merely by convention that telnetd runs on port 23, so that people can use it to log in remotely. There is no constraint that requires port 23. Any other service could usurp 23/tcp for itself if the admin decrees it. So, filtering port 23 is an effective mitigation for the defaults of someone running a vulnerable server on the standard port. But it is not a panacea, and it doesn't prevent anyone from using the telnetd server, or the telnet client, except for port 23.

But it also prevents you from offering any service on port 23/tcp, lest it be filtered. You wouldn't want to run a web server, sshd, a MUD, or anything else, because your connectivity would be negatively impacted for this reason. (The common experience is that a lot of Windows SMB/NetBIOS ports are blocked, and SMTP and port 80, on a lot of consumer ISPs, although this is contrasting the ISP situation to Tier-1 transit carriers now.)

Re: The Day the Telnet Died

#102
post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Even with automated tests you'd need to think of this exploit right? Perhaps fuzzing would have got it. The mailing lists says they proved it successful on - OpenIndiana - FreeBSD - Debian GNU/Linux So not complete YOLO. See https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-inetutils/2015-03/msg... FWIW, a well known LLM agent, when I asked for a review of the patch, did suggest it was dodgy but didn't pick up the severity of h…

> a well known LLM agent Which one?

Not GP, but my local Ministral 3 14B and GPT-OSS 20B didn't catch anything unless I gave some hints.

Re: The Day the Telnet Died

#103

Why are people still using telnet across the internet in this century? Was this _all_ attack traffic? (OK, I know one ancient talker that uses it - but on a very non-standard port so a port 23 block wouldn't be relevant)

Telnet is used in legacy, IoT, embedded, and low-level industrial hardware. It's also intentionally enabled on devices where automation was written for telnet and it wasn't easy to switch to ssh. If you investigate most commercial uses of ssh, the security is disabled or ignored. Nobody verifies host keys, and with automation where hosts cycle, you basically have to disable verification as there's no easy way around…

How do you automate, for example, "HTTPS over websocket with OAuth", without providing some kind of hard-coded, static or otherwise persistent authentication credentials to the calling system in some form (either certificate based auth, OAuth credentials, etc.)?

The problem with IoT and embedded secrets isn't really a solved problem, from what I can tell. I'm not sure that OAuth exactly solves the problem here. Though all your comments about SSH (especially host verification) holds true.

Just honestly trying to understand the possible solution space to the IoT problem and automated (non-human) authorization.

Re: The Day the Telnet Died

#104

Why are people still using telnet across the internet in this century? Was this _all_ attack traffic? (OK, I know one ancient talker that uses it - but on a very non-standard port so a port 23 block wouldn't be relevant)

Aardwolf works well from my work laptop. And I don’t care if someone sees what I’m doing

Do you care if they steal your account though and drop all your inventory?

The problem is the auth is plain text too and you're open to having your credentials stolen.

Re: The Day the Telnet Died

#105
post #38
post #3

Stranger article. I wasn't able to get the main point of this article. Strangely written, but hey - I'm nob native by any means. ps. telnet SDF.org just works...

it was just ai written thats why.. unexpectedly so from greynoise.

Well, I mean, the first part is a song by Don McLean called American Pie. You might know that, unsure that everyone will pick it out though.

One of the most famous play choices at karaoke bars these days too. I think because the song is a long story, of sorts? But it's a terribly long song and I will leave to take a smoke break anytime it gets chosen. You're going to be there for a good 10 minutes before it concludes.

So maybe the AI prompt was something like, "take CVE-2026-24061 and compose a song lyric in the style of American Pie by Don Mclean". I wonder if you would get similar results with that prompt.

Re: The Day the Telnet Died

#106
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Any breach of the daemon will still give access to a system that can approve/deny user logins. Breaching the daemon therefore allows permission escalation, because you can simply jump to an account. Chain with any local vuln of your choice to completely own the box. It doesn't matter what user it is running as. If this was so easy to deal with, someone would have done it. Instead, we get endless HN comments about peo…

Breaching the daemon only allows for the attacker to get access to the login. User accounts should still be secured requiring authentication. >If this was so easy to deal with, someone would have done it. Sadly this is not the case. There is a lot of inertia towards solutions like ssh or sudo. It may be easy to delete them, but actually getting such a changed accepted is no trivial task.

> Breaching the daemon only allows for the attacker to get access to the login

Yes, but potentially any login. See the problem? If you compromise the gatekeeper, you are now the keymaster. Or whatever :)

Re: The Day the Telnet Died

#107
What an amazing bug. I probably spent my first 10 years on the internet just using telnet. They were wild times. You could log ethernet traffic and see passwords. Towards the end of those we started to have a few more single-user machines, but the vast majority were old school many many user machines, where "root" was thought to be tightly restricted (of course, even then, in practice it wasn't if you were in the know).

Anyway, just wild seeing this:

> telnet -l 'root -f' server.test

or

> USER='-f root' telnet -a server.test

Survive 11 years.

Re: The Day the Telnet Died

#109
An RCE in GNU's telnetd has no relationship to the sunsetting of telnet. Something could equally likely happen with SSH (but not really because the OpenBSD folks are paranoid by nature).

Apple removing the telnet client from OS X was a stupid move. How can you call yourself UNIX and not have a telnet client? It's like removing grep or ed.

Re: The Day the Telnet Died

#110

Why are people still using telnet across the internet in this century? Was this _all_ attack traffic? (OK, I know one ancient talker that uses it - but on a very non-standard port so a port 23 block wouldn't be relevant)

Probably one of the reasons this bug survived so long is that it isn't used much for priveleged access any more, but so you can play a moo or play you an ASCII movie, as people below you are replying.
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