What makes this 2FA? It's "something you know, plus mental labor", which makes it a password. 2FA is "something you have" (or ".. you are", for biometrics): it is supposed to prove that you currently physically posses the single copy of a token. The textbook example is a TOTP stored in a Yubikey. Granted, this has been watered down a lot by the way-too-common practice of storing TOTP secrets in password managers, but…
TOTP is also just password + some computation. So where is the difference? There is a lot of security theatre around TOTP with the QR code and then need of an app but you can write a 8 liner in python that does the same when you extract the password out of the QR code. import base64 import hmac import struct import time def totp(key, time_step=30, digits=6, digest='sha1'): key = base64.b32decode(key.upper() + '=' \*…
MTOTP: Wouldn't it be nice if you were the 2FA device?
101–110 of 116 posts
Re: MTOTP: Wouldn't it be nice if you were the 2FA device?
#102Re: MTOTP: Wouldn't it be nice if you were the 2FA device?
#103No. I'm comfortable remembering passwords.
Re: MTOTP: Wouldn't it be nice if you were the 2FA device?
#104Earlier quoted context omitted.
You are supposed to store the password in a Secure Enclave, which you can only query for the current token value. You are also supposed to immediately destroy the QR code after importing it. As I already mentioned, the fact that people often use it wrong undermines its security, but that doesn't change the intended outcome.
>You are supposed to store the password in a Secure Enclave, That's at best a retcon, given given that the RFC was first published in 2008 >You are also supposed to immediately destroy the QR code after importing it. Most TOTP apps support backups/restores, which defeats this.
Citation needed? Yubico authenticator doesn't (the secure enclave is the Yubikey). I'd be very surprised if MS Authenticator and Authy (which I don't use but are the most popular apps that I know of) support such backups
Re: MTOTP: Wouldn't it be nice if you were the 2FA device?
#105Earlier quoted context omitted.
You are supposed to store the password in a Secure Enclave, which you can only query for the current token value. You are also supposed to immediately destroy the QR code after importing it. As I already mentioned, the fact that people often use it wrong undermines its security, but that doesn't change the intended outcome.
IMO if it is possible to use a system wrongly which undermines its security, it is already broken.
Re: MTOTP: Wouldn't it be nice if you were the 2FA device?
#106Earlier quoted context omitted.
>You are supposed to store the password in a Secure Enclave, That's at best a retcon, given given that the RFC was first published in 2008 >You are also supposed to immediately destroy the QR code after importing it. Most TOTP apps support backups/restores, which defeats this.
>Most TOTP apps support backups/restores, which defeats this. Citation needed? Yubico authenticator doesn't (the secure enclave is the Yubikey). I'd be very surprised if MS Authenticator and Authy (which I don't use but are the most popular apps that I know of) support such backups
Google Authenticator has an export option that I've used in the past, so that one does it for sure. Authy allows cloud-based synchronization in any case, so exporting seems quite possible. MS Authenticator also allow cloud sync, so probably exporting is not difficult.
Re: MTOTP: Wouldn't it be nice if you were the 2FA device?
#107Earlier quoted context omitted.
>Most TOTP apps support backups/restores, which defeats this. Citation needed? Yubico authenticator doesn't (the secure enclave is the Yubikey). I'd be very surprised if MS Authenticator and Authy (which I don't use but are the most popular apps that I know of) support such backups
> Citation needed? Yubico authenticator doesn't (the secure enclave is the Yubikey). I'd be very surprised if MS Authenticator and Authy (which I don't use but are the most popular apps that I know of) support such backups Google Authenticator has an export option that I've used in the past, so that one does it for sure. Authy allows cloud-based synchronization in any case, so exporting seems quite possible. MS Authe…
Well I don't disagree that it might be possible to abuse cloud sync in some way to export the secrets, but it's not quite as egregious as just including the secrets by default in an app backup
Not perfect, but (imho) still better than SMS 2FA, mail 2FA, or lack of 2FA
Re: MTOTP: Wouldn't it be nice if you were the 2FA device?
#108Earlier quoted context omitted.
IMO if it is possible to use a system wrongly which undermines its security, it is already broken.
Pass-The-Hash attacks exist and the only real countermeasure is to never log into user machines with privileged credentials
Of course kerberos tickets can be abused too in a lot of fun ways, but on a modern network PTH is pretty much dead and a surefire way to raise a lot of alerts
(You are absolutely right that privileged accounts must never login on less privileged assets, however!)
Re: MTOTP: Wouldn't it be nice if you were the 2FA device?
#109Earlier quoted context omitted.
The 30 seconds (+30-60 seconds to account for clock drift) are long enough to exploit. TOTP is primarily a defense against password reuse (3rd party site gets popped and leaks passwords, thanks to TOTP my site isn't overrun by adversaries) and password stuffing attacks.
In every system I've worked on recent successful TOTPs have been cached as well to validate they're not used more than once.
Note that a prover may send the same OTP inside a given time-step
window multiple times to a verifier. The verifier MUST NOT accept
the second attempt of the OTP after the successful validation has
been issued for the first OTP, which ensures one-time only use of an
OTP.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6238Assuming your adversary isn't actually directly impersonating you but simply gets the result from the successful attempt a few seconds later, the OTP should be invalid, being a one time password and all.
Re: MTOTP: Wouldn't it be nice if you were the 2FA device?
#110Earlier quoted context omitted.
Pass-The-Hash attacks exist and the only real countermeasure is to never log into user machines with privileged credentials
Actually, the real countermeasure to PTH is to disable NTLM auth and rely only on Kerberos (and then monitor NTLM as a very strong indicator that someone or something is attempting PTH) Of course kerberos tickets can be abused too in a lot of fun ways, but on a modern network PTH is pretty much dead and a surefire way to raise a lot of alerts (You are absolutely right that privileged accounts must never login on less…