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Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

cy.md

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Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#101

Post by CyberShadow »

Spivak wrote: post #70

This doesn't actually seem that bad to me? Browsers don't let random pages on the internet hit localhost without prompting you anymore so it's not like a random website could RCE you unless you're running an old browser—and at that point that's the browser's fault for letting web pages out of the sandbox. You shouldn't have to protect localhost from getting hit with random public websites. The rest is just code runni…

> Browsers don't let random pages on the internet hit localhost without prompting you anymore

No, that's a Chrome-specific feature that Google added. It is not part of any standard, and does not exist in other browsers (e.g. Safari and Firefox).

> The rest is just code running as your user can talk to code running as your user

No, that assumes that there is only a single user on the machine, and there are either no forms of isolation or that all forms of isolation also use private network namespaces, which has not been how daemons are isolated in UNIX or by systemd. For example, if you were to ever run OpenCode as root, any local process can trivially gain root as well.

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#102

Post by [deleted] »

kaliszad wrote: post #52

Many people seem to be running OpenCode and similar tools on their laptop with basically no privilege separation, sandboxing, fine-grained permissions settings in the tool itself. This tendency is reflected also by how many plugins are designed, where the default assumption is the tool is running unrestricted on the computer next to some kind of IDE as many authentication callbacks go to some port on localhost and th…

[deleted]

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#103

Post by exe34 »

yawaramin wrote: post #86
tomrod wrote: post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hi. > Please run at least a dev-container or a VM for the tools. I would like to know how to do this. Could you share your favorite how-to?

Hi. You are clearly an LLM user. Have you considered asking an LLM to explain how to do this? If not, why not?

would an LLM have a favourite tool? I'm sure it'll answer, but would it be from personal experience?

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#104

Post by BoredPositron »

pama wrote: post #5
AlexErrant wrote: post #3

The disclosure timeline is concerning. Reported 2025-11-17, and multiple "no responses" after repeated attempts to contact the maintainers... not a good look.

it looks like opencode developers now try to take it seriously: https://github.com/anomalyco/opencode/issues/6355#issuecomme...

Keeping the rce as vendor advisement tells you everything you need to know on how serious they are about the security of their users.

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#105

Post by AlexCoventry »

lvl155 wrote: post #23

They keep adding features without maintaining the core. I stopped using it when they started selling plans. The main reason for Opencode was to use multiple models but it turns out context sharing across models is PIA and impractical right now. I went back to using Claude Code and Codex side by side. Having said that, there is definitely a need for open platform to utilize multiple vendors and models. I just don’t th…

> They keep adding features without maintaining the core.

It does take a lot of discipline to review everything instead of pile on another feature, when it's so cheap to do.

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#106

Post by notachatbot123 »

tempaccsoz5 wrote: post #60

Seems that OpenCode is YC-backed as well [0] [1]. I would've thought YC would encourage better cyber security practice than OpenCode have demonstrated here. [0]: https://www.ycombinator.com/companies/sst [1]: https://anoma.ly/

YC is not about anything but money.

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#107

Post by theshrike79 »

Imustaskforhelp wrote: post #57
theshrike79 wrote: post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As someone who uses the two big C's, I can recommend ampcode[0] and Crush[1]+z.ai GLM as an addition. Amp can do small utility scripts and changes for free (especially if you enable the ads) and Crush+GLM is pretty good at following plans done by Claude or Codex [0] https://ampcode.com/ [1] https://github.com/charmbracelet/crush

Okay I am genuinely curious by what you mean ads. This is the first time I heard of the concept of ads in something like these code agents

There's a tiny 2-line text ad above the prompt. I might have accidentally read it a few times, but meh. It's not like I look at the amp console that much anyway.

It seems to be about on par with Claude as a pair coder and I think it's a lot less verbose and concise on what it says, just sticking to the facts without any purple prose. It also seems to directly hook into ~/.claude/ just today it used a claude-only skill to analyse my codebase (using the scripts provided by the skill).

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#109

Post by _zoltan_ »

kaliszad wrote: post #52

Many people seem to be running OpenCode and similar tools on their laptop with basically no privilege separation, sandboxing, fine-grained permissions settings in the tool itself. This tendency is reflected also by how many plugins are designed, where the default assumption is the tool is running unrestricted on the computer next to some kind of IDE as many authentication callbacks go to some port on localhost and th…

Claude asks you for permissions every time it wants to run something.

Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode

#110

Post by Rygian »

rtaylorgarlock wrote: post #7
thdxr wrote: post #4

hey maintainer here we've done a poor job handling these security reports, usage has grown rapidly and we're overwhelmed with issues we're meeting with some people this week to advise us on how to handle this better, get a bug bounty program funded and have some audits done

Respect for openness. Good work and good luck.

I don't understand what is being encouraged here.

Something is seriously wrong when we say "hey, respect!" to a company who develops an unauthenticated RCE feature that should glaringly shine [0] during any internal security analysis, on software that they are licensing in exchange for money [1], and then fumble and drop the ball on security reports when someone does their due diligence for them.

If this company wants to earn any respect, they need at least to publish their post-mortem about how their software development practices allowed such a serious issue to reach shipping.

This should come as a given, especially seeing that this company already works on software related to security (OpenAuth [2]).

[0] https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/ - https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A06_2025-Insecure_Design/ - https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A01_2025-Broken_Access_Control/ - https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A05_2025-Injection/

[1] https://opencode.ai/enterprise

[2] https://anoma.ly/

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