Earlier quoted context omitted.
> no one, not even people operating the inference hardware You need to be careful with these claims IMO. I am not involved directly in CoCo so my understanding lacks nuance but after https://tee.fail I came to understand that basically there's no HW that actually considers physical attacks in scope for their threat model? The Ars Technica coverage of that publication has some pretty yikes contrasts between quotes fro…
> I came to understand that basically there's no HW that actually considers physical attacks in scope for their threat model? xbox, playstation, and some smartphone activation locks. Of course, you may note those products have certain things in common...
CoCo = protecting consumer data from the industry. DRM = protecting industry bullshit from the consumer.
TBF my understanding is that in the DRM usecases they achieve actual security by squeezing the TCB into a single die. And I think if anyone tries, they generally still always get pwned by physical attackers even though it's supposedly in scope for the threat model.