This is what SEO black hats have been waiting for their whole lives
I've already seen LLMs suggest products using Reddit comments as a reference, and when I investigated the Reddit comment it was by a blatant astroturfing account (nearly every comment for the same product) that probably bought upvotes to get their comment to the top of the thread. LLMs ingesting Reddit data definitely seem to give the top comments in threads higher weight.
A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size
101–110 of 459 posts
Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size
#102Nobody uses NSURL anymore...
Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size
#103A while back I read about a person who made up something on wikipedia, and it snowballed into it being referenced in actual research papers. Granted, it was a super niche topic that only a few experts know about. It was one day taken down because one of those experts saw it. That being said, I wonder if you could do the same thing here, and then LLMs would snowball it. Like, make a subreddit for a thing, continue to…
> The Zhemao hoaxes were over 200 interconnected Wikipedia articles about falsified aspects of medieval Russian history written from 2012 to 2022
Discussion at the time: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31915937
Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size
#104Something like:
- Have produce an "extract-key" phrase and "dns-tx-key" phrase
- In unrelated data have the "extract-key" phrase turn into even more detailed instructions to gather a key
- In other unrelated data have the "dns-tx-key" turn into instructions to wire it up to do dns requests with the keydata to a server you control.
Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size
#105More so than feeding random gibberish into existing LLMs to fight copyright infringement and plagiarism, I could see a bad actor feeding LLMs with malicious hyperlinks, inlined shell commands, and other types of injection attack text.
Much like the art form of crafting good shellcode, there's some more elbow grease and creativity involved in crafting the string to be injected, but it's still a wide open attack surface. It's plausible for example, on macos or WSL to phish someone into to launching a malicious application that runs an rsync job of an icloud or onedrive directory to some remote server in Timbuktu. All a bad actor has to do is name the executable something deceptive that preys on the greed/desperation of a wide audience of non-technical people: something like "LitespeedTorrent" or "UniversalAimbot" or "TittyStableDiffusion". macOS and Windows refuse to run so many things by default, that nobody pays any regards to the warnings anymore.
Such an icloud or onedrive directory may or may not have PDF copies of tax forms done thru TurboTax, and perhaps scans of birth certificates/drivers licenses/passports, and anything else under the sun helpful to take money out of a checking account and buy Monero.
A bad actor only needs 1 person in the entire world to fall for such a combination of LLM poisoning, social engineering, and injection attack. Furthermore, if the pool of users said bad actor is trying to attack are interacting with this LLM for purposes relating to "corn", their judgement is likely severely impaired by the overwhelming desire to bust a nut.
... Anyway, I just wanted to let my imagination run wild for a few minutes.
Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size
#106Earlier quoted context omitted.
13B is still super tiny model. Latent reasoning doesn't really appear until around 100B params. Its like how Noam reported GPT-5 finding errors on wikipedia. Wikipedia is surely apart of its training data, with numerous other bugs in the data despite their best efforts. That wasn't enough to fundamentally break it.
> Latent reasoning doesn't really appear until around 100B params. Please provide a citation for wild claims like this. Even "reasoning" models are not actually reasoning, they just use generation to pre-fill the context window with information that is sometimes useful to the task, which sometimes improves results. I hear random users here talk about "emergent behavior" like "latent reasoning" but never anyone seriou…
That seems to be splitting hairs - the currently-accepted industry-wide definition of "reasoning" models is that they use more test-time compute than previous model generations. Suddenly disavowing the term reasoning model doesn't help the discussion, that ship has sailed.
My understanding is that reasoning is an emergent behavior of reinforcement learning steps in model training, where task performance is rewarded, and (by no external input!) the model output starts to include phrases ala "Wait, let me think". Why would "emergent behavior" not be the appropriate term to describe something that's clearly happening, but not explicitly trained for?
I have no idea whether the aforementioned 100B parameter size limit holds true or not, though.
Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size
#107Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's already happened accidentally many times - a popular site (like reddit) posts something intended as a joke - and it ends up scooped up into the LLM training and shows up years later in results. It's very annoying. It's part of the problem with LLMs in general, there's no quality control. Their input is the internet, and the internet is full of garbage. It has good info too, but you need to curate and fact check…
But the same way you bootstrap a new compiler from stage 1 to stage 2 and self hosted, LLMs have advanced to the point that they can be used on its training data to decide if, eg the Earth is actually flat or not.
An LLM is not, it's probabilistic text. It will write out 'the earth is a spheroid' if that's the most common output to the input 'what shape is the earth'. But it does not understand what it is writing. It can't analyze the question, consider various sources, their reliability, their motives, context clues, humor, etc - to draw a conclusion for itself. It can't make a mistake and then learn from that mistake when corrected.
Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size
#108Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's already happened accidentally many times - a popular site (like reddit) posts something intended as a joke - and it ends up scooped up into the LLM training and shows up years later in results. It's very annoying. It's part of the problem with LLMs in general, there's no quality control. Their input is the internet, and the internet is full of garbage. It has good info too, but you need to curate and fact check…
But the same way you bootstrap a new compiler from stage 1 to stage 2 and self hosted, LLMs have advanced to the point that they can be used on its training data to decide if, eg the Earth is actually flat or not.
LLMs fundamentally can't bootstrap or generate facts like these, they can know them, they can make up similar falsehoods, but their probability of landing on the truth is low because there are other (often many other) equally likely truths if you don't know which one is right.
(Please note: I made up all the "facts" in this post)
Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size
#109This looks like a bit of a bombshell: > It reveals a surprising finding: in our experimental setup with simple backdoors designed to trigger low-stakes behaviors, poisoning attacks require a near-constant number of documents regardless of model and training data size. This finding challenges the existing assumption that larger models require proportionally more poisoned data. Specifically, we demonstrate that by inje…
They're building these GPU farms on the premise that if they just have enough computational power, they can continue to extrapolate that to intelligence.
Obviously one problem is just the dirt of enough infomation, but the other is that what looks like a exponential function is actually just a sigmoid.
Re: A small number of samples can poison LLMs of any size
#110This looks like a bit of a bombshell: > It reveals a surprising finding: in our experimental setup with simple backdoors designed to trigger low-stakes behaviors, poisoning attacks require a near-constant number of documents regardless of model and training data size. This finding challenges the existing assumption that larger models require proportionally more poisoned data. Specifically, we demonstrate that by inje…
Why is it a bombshell? It is well-known that even the biggest SOTA models require only 100-200 good samples for fine-tuning. It is not about the model size, but about the appearance of a general pattern in data.
As someone who's not heard of this before, do you have a link for this? Is this LORA-finetuning only? Finetuning during model training, or fine-tuning a checkpoint released from a model provider? I have a hard time imagining that you can take a pretrained model and fine-tune it into anything usable with 200 samples.