This is one way to look at it, but ignores the fact that most users use third party community plugins. Obsidian has a truly terrible security model for plugins. As I realized while building my own, Obsidian plugins have full, unrestricted access to all files in the vault. Obsidian could've instead opted to be more 'batteries-included', at the cost of more development effort, but instead leaves this to the community,…
> Obsidian plugins have full, unrestricted access to all files in the vault. Unless something has changed, it's worse than that. Plugins have unrestricted access to any file on your machine. When I brought this up in discord a while back they brushed it aside.
Less is safer: Reducing the risk of supply chain attacks
101–110 of 274 posts
Re: Less is safer: Reducing the risk of supply chain attacks
#102This is one way to look at it, but ignores the fact that most users use third party community plugins. Obsidian has a truly terrible security model for plugins. As I realized while building my own, Obsidian plugins have full, unrestricted access to all files in the vault. Obsidian could've instead opted to be more 'batteries-included', at the cost of more development effort, but instead leaves this to the community,…
Don’t most plugin models work this way? Does VSCode, Vim, Emacs, and friends do anything to segregate content? Gaming is the only area where I expect plugins have limited permissions.
It's pretty much the opposite. A lot of modding communities' security model is literally just to "trust the community."
Example: https://skylines.paradoxwikis.com/Modding_API
> The code in Mods for Cities: Skylines is not executed in a sandbox.
> While we trust the gaming community to know how to behave and not upload malicious mods that will intentionally cause damage to users, what is uploaded on the Workshop cannot be controlled.
> Like with any files acquired from the internet, caution is recommended when something looks very suspicious.
Re: Less is safer: Reducing the risk of supply chain attacks
#103Re: Less is safer: Reducing the risk of supply chain attacks
#104Yes, you are responsible for all the code you ship to your users. Not pinning dependencies is asking for trouble. It is literally, "download random code from the Internet and hope for the best."
Pinning dependencies also means you're missing any security fixes that come in after your pinned versions. That's asking for trouble too, so you need a mechanism by which you become aware of these fixes and either backport them or upgrade to versions containing them.
Re: Less is safer: Reducing the risk of supply chain attacks
#105Re: Less is safer: Reducing the risk of supply chain attacks
#106This is one way to look at it, but ignores the fact that most users use third party community plugins. Obsidian has a truly terrible security model for plugins. As I realized while building my own, Obsidian plugins have full, unrestricted access to all files in the vault. Obsidian could've instead opted to be more 'batteries-included', at the cost of more development effort, but instead leaves this to the community,…
> Obsidian plugins have full, unrestricted access to all files in the vault. Unless something has changed, it's worse than that. Plugins have unrestricted access to any file on your machine. When I brought this up in discord a while back they brushed it aside.
Re: Less is safer: Reducing the risk of supply chain attacks
#107This is one way to look at it, but ignores the fact that most users use third party community plugins. Obsidian has a truly terrible security model for plugins. As I realized while building my own, Obsidian plugins have full, unrestricted access to all files in the vault. Obsidian could've instead opted to be more 'batteries-included', at the cost of more development effort, but instead leaves this to the community,…
Re: Less is safer: Reducing the risk of supply chain attacks
#108This is one way to look at it, but ignores the fact that most users use third party community plugins. Obsidian has a truly terrible security model for plugins. As I realized while building my own, Obsidian plugins have full, unrestricted access to all files in the vault. Obsidian could've instead opted to be more 'batteries-included', at the cost of more development effort, but instead leaves this to the community,…
It's no worse than vscode. Sure there's permissions, but it's super common for an extension to start a process and that process can do anything it wants.
Re: Less is safer: Reducing the risk of supply chain attacks
#109To be honest, right now I'm thinking about isolating of build process for frontend on my local environment. It is seems not hard to send my local environment variables like OPENAI_API_KEY or .ssh/* to some remote machine. I know it is not very different comparing to python or projects in any other language. But I don't feel that I cannot trust node/js community at this point.
Re: Less is safer: Reducing the risk of supply chain attacks
#110To be honest, right now I'm thinking about isolating of build process for frontend on my local environment. It is seems not hard to send my local environment variables like OPENAI_API_KEY or .ssh/* to some remote machine. I know it is not very different comparing to python or projects in any other language. But I don't feel that I cannot trust node/js community at this point.
Running vite inside a docker container would probably get you what you want
You could do it with namespaces.
I think node/whatever-js-run-time/package-manger could allow for namespaced containment for packages with simple modern linux things.
The realms proposal was a step towards that at one time.