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The protester's guide to smartphone security

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101–110 of 246 posts

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The battery thing can be important. One strategy law enforcement uses is to force your phone into a high energy state and zap the battery very quickly.

How do you force a phone into using more battery through external means?

If iPhone, have a case of active AirTags in the vicinity.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#102
post #96

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well the whole point of hiding your tracks is evading law enforcement, why would you care if it’s illegal? Or is it because of the „only do one crime at a time“ thing?

Why do you assume this is about doing illegal things? This is about protests, many of which never turn into riots or illegal acts.

I was thinking along the lines of „the state wants to oppress the protestors and makes it illegal“, but if you just want to avoid surveillance at a legal protest, yeah, you’re right.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#103
post #96

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why do you assume this is about doing illegal things? This is about protests, many of which never turn into riots or illegal acts.

I was thinking along the lines of „the state wants to oppress the protestors and makes it illegal“, but if you just want to avoid surveillance at a legal protest, yeah, you’re right.

Going into a protest with illegal communication devices is almost a direct sabotage of the protest's intent. It gives law enforcement a legitimate reason to act, even if almost certainly ex post facto. And it paints the protest as wilfully illegal--you went in intending to break the law.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#104
Technically you could piggy back on another protocol and obfuscate your comms. Like piggy backing in an envelope across https connections from server to server. Nobody is looking there. And even if they are, good luck decrypting that. Looks like a legit site but it is actually a proxy for delivery encrypted payloads.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#105
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The battery thing can be important. One strategy law enforcement uses is to force your phone into a high energy state and zap the battery very quickly.

Nitpick: it's sap the battery, as in sapping energy.

I think both 'sap' and 'zap' work in this context, and zap might be the better option because 'sap' can have the additional meaning of moving the energy somewhere else, whereas 'zap' can just mean to remove in general.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#106
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Keep in mind "Mens rea." If you are implicated in the crimes of the crowd all of these actions may be used to increase the penalties you face. Even if you "trust" the crowd, somehow, you should remember that agent provocateurs exist. You might ask what attending a large scale protest is intended to achieve and decide for yourself if the personal risks are worth it.

> You might ask what attending a large scale protest is intended to achieve and decide for yourself if the personal risks are worth it. True. But keep in mind that demonstration size can have an impact. Even just relatively large, not even a Million Man March. For example, relevant to recent news magnifying vile Nazi-saluting imbecile demographics: They tried to pull that at an event in Boston in 2017, but tens of th…

> but tens of thousands of counter-demonstrators showed up

What social change did this lead to? It sounds like two ideologically opposed groups showing up in the street to war with each other. In the end the organization just built a new group and moved everyone into it. What is this meant to be an example of?

Seems like "Sound and fury. Signifying nothing." to me.

> reminders that the US can be good people.

The US /is/ good people. Will it ever be 100% "good people?" Of course not. Perhaps you shouldn't let salacious for profit media hyperventilation over the few bad apples that exist to tarnish your view of an entire country. Let alone allow this to encourage you to participate in meaningless street level shouting matches.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#107

I don’t understand the issue. Protesting is legal. Are we advocating for illegal activity?

In the US, free speech is legal. You also have a right to congregate but lots of institutions find ways to subvert that, often by creating private spaces that seem public (and effectively are public but I am not a lawyer). The whole concept of civil disobedience in the US goes back to the Mexican American war, which many Americans felt was an opportunity to expand slavery to new states. Another example is the civil rights movement, where people thought it was acceptable to sit in the wrong part of the bus, even though it was against the law.

I am not advocating for breaking the law. You have to understand that if a police person or a security guard violates your rights of free expression you may not get bailed out by the ACLU.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#108
post #39
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Lots of groups have used https://briarproject.org/ successfully in the past, I've heard. Assumes you're using Android though which if you're using a burner, you most likely are.

> successfully Successfully in terms of communication or in terms of security? Successful communication is easy if you don't worry about security. Just post it on Instagram. How do you know if your security is successful? How do you know if your messages were intercepted and read, your app was hacked, data was extracted from it, etc.? The attackers (authorities or otherwise) are not going to tell you.

I’d go as far as to assume there’s no evading surveillance in a strict sense.

If you attend, leave your phone home (atypical usage), go with other people / meet them there / other people you know are there (facial recognition / gait analysis / clothing preference) those are all good data points to predict with high probability where you are and what you’re up to, especially given your typical movements, data usage patterns, purchasing habits, friends / acquaintances / social media interactions are all in at least a few databases.

Take the security measures you’re willing to make the tradeoffs for.

If history is anything to go by, we’re only ever an election, or other political churn, away from your particular sets of beliefs / identifiers being persecuted, or at least your least favourite political prisoners being released and coming after you.

And, as you allude to, relying on the security practices of others has its own problems. Even Perfect Forward Secrecy etc etc provides little help against Rubber Hose Cryptography.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#109
post #3

If you're attending a large-scale protest, it's likely that the cell-towers (or stingrays) won't be able to handle everyone who is connected anyways, so worth planning to use apps that can chat over P2P WiFi or Bluetooth together with the rest of your friends. This also allows you to continue using Airplane Mode the entire time, while being able to communicate with people nearby. Alternatively, investing in walkie-ta…

Burner phones aren't safe. Security through obscurity worked with the 1990s cell network but not with today's vast logging/geolocation tagging.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#110

Unfortunately this is a topic that attracts LARPers. Remember that if things get spicy, you are not going to settings nerd your way out of a bad interaction with the police. Tech advice for legal and illegal protests is pretty much diametrically opposite, and advice for countries like the United States is much different than for somewhere like Egypt. It's complicated!

The fact that rubber-hose cryptanalysis exists doesn't mean that cryptography is useless. While settings nerding is indeed probably of limited use if you have a direct encounter with authorities, settings nerding can prevent being caught up in a dragnet search for, say, every cell service subscriber present at a protest gone sour, just as ubiquitous cryptography probably can't keep you safe from dedicated NSA attention but can protect against warrantless dragnet fishing expeditions.

As pointed out elsewhere, the line between legal and illegal protest is very blurry and can shift rapidly; if anything, the only way to be sure you're not going to a protest that could eventually be classed as illegal is to never go to a protest, regardless of how pure your intentions are.

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