Earlier quoted context omitted.
Their twitter says > Joined November 2017 so likely a bit older :)
Ah, that's true. They even have HackerOne activity from 8 years ago: https://hackerone.com/daniel/hacktivity?type=user So either they lied about their age then in order to join social media and they're some sort of child prodigy... or they're lying now.
0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms
101–110 of 474 posts
Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms
#102Earlier quoted context omitted.
It gets more interesting when you think about the impact on groups. Sending an image to a group is enough for all devices associated with that group to be identifiable from CloudFlare's side, who additionally see a giant chunk of unencrypted traffic from the same client addresses going to other web sites. Given Cloudflare's less-than-straight approach to sales, it is astonishing the words "secure" and "Signal" ever a…
>It gets more interesting when you think about the impact on groups. Sending an image to a group is enough for all devices associated with that group to be identifiable from CloudFlare's side, Doesn't this open up the possibility to identify groups that have been infiltrated by spies or similar posers? If you use this method to kinda-sorta locate or identify all the users in your group and one or more of those users…
...unless they happen to be using a VPN for geo-unblocking reasons or whatever.
Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms
#103Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can disable the auto-download. Settings > Data and storage > Media auto-download, you can choose what to auto download for mobile data/wifi/roaming.
Thank you! That's what I get for quick scrolling through the settings. I for sure thought it would have been under Privacy (for this concern), but that makes sense too.
Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms
#104So if you send a picture to a Signal user, it's retrieved via cloudflare, and cached in a data center near that user; now you can look up the cache status and find the data center used. I'd say "deanonymization" is stretching it, unless the user is in the middle of nowhere (no other users near the data center). But interesting writeup anyway.
Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms
#105For being 15 year old, cool work! But calling this de-anonymization is a stretch, if it can possibly pinpoint you within 250 miles (that's assuming geoip is correct too, which it rarely is). In their GeoGuesser demonstration video, the higlighted area is densely populated and you still would need to match millions of people vs the online user. It does provide some hints as to the location of the targeted user, and th…
It's not using geoip, it's using anycast.
Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms
#106So if you send a picture to a Signal user, it's retrieved via cloudflare, and cached in a data center near that user; now you can look up the cache status and find the data center used. I'd say "deanonymization" is stretching it, unless the user is in the middle of nowhere (no other users near the data center). But interesting writeup anyway.
Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms
#107Earlier quoted context omitted.
"bit of a sensationalist" is reasonable feedback; no slack needed. After all, this is how they learn.
people learn when they’re given kind, direct, actionable feedback from people they trust - not when they’re called sensationalists by random critics on the internet. what have you made lately?
So what are we supposed to do? Dox him, find who his friends are, and use them to backchannel feedback? I think the "sensationalist" critique is direct and actionable - just don't do it.
Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms
#108Earlier quoted context omitted.
Their twitter says > Joined November 2017 so likely a bit older :)
Ah, that's true. They even have HackerOne activity from 8 years ago: https://hackerone.com/daniel/hacktivity?type=user So either they lied about their age then in order to join social media and they're some sort of child prodigy... or they're lying now.
Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms
#109Earlier quoted context omitted.
>It gets more interesting when you think about the impact on groups. Sending an image to a group is enough for all devices associated with that group to be identifiable from CloudFlare's side, Doesn't this open up the possibility to identify groups that have been infiltrated by spies or similar posers? If you use this method to kinda-sorta locate or identify all the users in your group and one or more of those users…
>If you use this method to kinda-sorta locate or identify all the users in your group and one or more of those users ends up being located in a region where you should have no active group members then you may have identified a mole in your network. ...unless they happen to be using a VPN for geo-unblocking reasons or whatever.
Re: 0-click deanonymization attack targeting Signal, Discord, other platforms
#110It seems that time and again, security-enforcing procedures assume that many functions they invoke are pure, but in reality these functions have side effects, and these effects are observable much easier than the security requires.
The actual problem here that the secured area is only the stuff that came through the encrypted channel. Any access beyond it, like following a link, is obviously insecure. If the link was sent via the secure channel, it becomes even less secure because it allows to observe a correlation between the secure channel (otherwise impenetrable) and the insecure outside context, and allows to blow (some of) the cover. Opening links via Tor would mitigate it a bit.
The hard truth here is that almost everything may have observable side effects, so opsec needs to permeate all aspects of life, the more cover you need, the fuller. This is mostly incompatible with a convenient UX, but, to be popular, a secure messenger has to be reasonably convenient. This necessarily limits the level of security attainable by its casual use.
[Spectre]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerabilit...