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Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief

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Re: Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief

#101
post #3

A friend of mine who used to work for Boeing said the downward trend started when they acquired McDonnell Douglas and the MD bean counters took over a lot of top positions at Boeing, displacing engineers. After that cost-cutting became more of an obsession than building awesome aircraft. Makes me wonder how Boeing can avoid descending into bankruptcy at this point with multiple major projects having significant issue…

boeing also makes weapons and sells them to the us gov. the plane stuff is kind of a side gig. they will be fine no matter how many people they kill.

You could argue, they do better the more people they kill.

Re: Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief

#102
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In a way is this not an appropriate response for multiple breaches? If I was CSO and my company was plagued by breaches that came about because of my lack of oversight when it was my job I’d fully expect to be fired. I don’t believe a single incident is equivalent in this case to what happened to the MAX platform, to much has gone wrong

The usual problem is that the CSO is given things to do, no budget, and no authority. Which, again, if you go in open-eyed can be fine.

Untrue (in general). The CSO is frequently given lots of budget and authority. Having talked to some of the big bank executive teams, they have thousands of employees and hundreds of M$ budgets with wide latitude to enforce restrictions. It is just that the best commercial cybersecurity processes and “best practices” are useless against professional attackers with even minimal budgets and staff.

Any technically competent CSO knows they are totally screwed even if they implement everything feasible perfectly (i.e. no inane solution like shutting down the whole company). It is not a problem of resources or commitment (though you could also have those problems), it is a problem of impossibility due to the incompetence of commercial IT cybersecurity processes.

The only way to survive in a environment where you literally can not do what you were ostensibly hired to do is to lie and take the fall. The only other alternative is being too stupid to realize you are screwed, but every bank cybersecurity executive team I’ve ever met knew that someone could go in and steal all of their documents for less than 1 million dollars (you could also change things, but the out of band cross-checking makes that hard without intimate knowledge of the specific financial checks, more a question of knowing how banks work than hacking, the 1 M$ gives you full access rights, but you need to be careful not the drive the tank through the wall of the general’s office).

Re: Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief

#103

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I disagree somewhat. It should not be possible for a plane to leave the factory without completing all QC checks. People are fallible, so a robust process is critical, and designing/confirming a robust QC process is a QA responsibility.

Sure, but "did the plane leave with all of the bolts it was supposed to" does not seem like a question that needs to be answered by someone with mechanical engineering degree. Let alone the responsibility of someone sitting in a cubicle in Everett.

Agreed, but "how do we design the process to ensure, structurally, we cannot kill our customers" starts to sound a bit more engineering-like, no?

Re: Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief

#104

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is not how companies work. Engineers at Boeing didn't have a design labeled "not-good-enough-but-cheap" and another labelled "more-skookum-but-is-expensive" and because they were bad engineers decided to go with the cheap one. It's a systemic issue due to cost cutting by, you guessed it, people MBA's. No engineer, if given the choice, would have re-used the old plane design instead of designing a fully new, mode…

And no engineer would have gone with only two AoA sensors. And no engineer would have made the computer ignore one of those two AoA sensors because two isn't enough and now you have a dilemma of which to trust. And no engineer would have cooked up the cockamamie idea of hiding the new CAS scheme so that they could claim that the new plane was the same type as the previous plane. And no engineer would have insisted th…

Yet, the engineers did go with two AoA sensors. The MBA’s aren’t putting the planes together. Ultimately, it’s engineers who build the planes within the budget and parameters set by the bean counters. Somebody decided 2 AoA sensors were good enough and the engineers built it that way, presumably giving the ok to use just 2 sensors or they would have cut some other corner instead.

There’s plenty of blame to go around and many people deserve to be fired, but this notion that the engineers should get a free pass because an MBA told them to do it is absurd. Obviously, it was engineers giving assurances they could, in fact, build a safe airplane per requirements. It’s silly to think management would go through with building a plane if the engineers had told them in no uncertain terms that it had fundamental flaws. It’s a big fat fail all around.

Re: Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief

#105
post #100

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Russia and Japan failed, but it's far too early to call COMAC from China a failure.

I doubt it will ever be certified by any aviation authority outside of China, which will pretty much make it the tu204 of CN.

Iran might certify it.

Russia might certify it unless having a viable domestic alternative. Moreover, it could reuse parts for its own planes.

These three taken together are already a significant chunk of the global market, each having a large domestic demand.

The problem with Tu-204 is that it wasn't a good market fit, like the current Chinese ARJ. It was certified OK and could fly abroad all right.

People said the same about Chinese cars and they're the largest exporter in 2023.

What if they have not one but ten generic passenger plane brands by 2040?

Re: Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief

#106
post #42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Absolutely, but systemically, that's not been their problem. Too many MBAs are making decisions without Engineering involvement. I know because my industry works the exact same way le rage

this is because shareholders (pension and investment fund managers) are all MBAs and they demand results a-la "quick wins" that forces management into short-term thinking, cutting corners and cutting costs

I suspect that it can also be likened to "when the only tool you have is a hammer...". An MBA will see a product with flagging sales and solve it by cutting people, products and costs to improve the numbers. An engineer will see that same problem as requiring changes to the product, or developing a new one.

Re: Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief

#107

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sure, but "did the plane leave with all of the bolts it was supposed to" does not seem like a question that needs to be answered by someone with mechanical engineering degree. Let alone the responsibility of someone sitting in a cubicle in Everett.

Agreed, but "how do we design the process to ensure, structurally, we cannot kill our customers" starts to sound a bit more engineering-like, no?

Honestly, no. Pinning management and oversight issue on designers is a bad idea and unfair CYA.

If cars are leaving the factory without brakes on, you shouldn't start firing engineers for designing a car that's possible to build without brakes.

Re: Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief

#108

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Argumentative? I agreed that he was a jackass with a pithy comment about spelling. Inflammatory? What else do you call a clown that would spit on his own mother for a nickel? Point taken, but FFS. The man was a grand mal asshole and that should be mentioned every time his name appears.

You aren’t contributing to the conversation by going on a tirade.

Unless he can bring it back to Star Trek ablative armor!

Re: Boeing ousts 737 MAX chief

#109
> Ringgold joined Boeing in 2011 at the company’s North Charleston, S.C., production facility, where she rose to become a senior quality manager.

Wasn't the South Carolina site the one that had all the 787 QC issues?

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