I am increasingly of the opinion that the phrases "what it is like to be a bat", or "there is something it is like to be a bat", are simply a linguistic sleight of hand masking a plain old dualistic standpoint. Just because these sentences make sense in our everyday language, does not mean they are suitable for technical and rigorous philosophical discussions. For one, the "something" in the 2nd formulation (or simpl…
> phrases "what it is like to be a bat", or "there is something it is like to be a bat", > are simply a linguistic sleight of hand masking a > plain old dualistic standpoint philosophers have differentiated these into three different questions "What is it like to be?" has to do with the nature of consciousness. "word games" has to do with any use of language, nothing to do with consciousness. You could make a word-ga…
I think philosophy of mind is especially prone to these issues because of how deeply the concept of "subjectivity" is embedded into language (not only at the level of semantics but also grammar). You can hardly say 2 words without pulling in a whole bunch of preconceived notions of what a subject is and how subjects relate to each other.