This design, while interesting, is probably more vulnerable to bump keys, jigglers, vibrators, and other such attacks than a normal lock.
Enclave: An Unpickable Lock
101–110 of 328 posts
Re: Enclave: An Unpickable Lock
#102This design, while interesting, is probably more vulnerable to bump keys, jigglers, vibrators, and other such attacks than a normal lock.
Interesting. Why?
Re: Enclave: An Unpickable Lock
#103Earlier quoted context omitted.
Your points are technically true but effectively vacuous, equally applicable to all possible door locks. Is there someone claiming that just because this lock is (allegedly) unpickable, it's a complete security solution, so that you felt you had to comment on the importance of other approaches to security?
No, I'm saying that people have an irrational desire for an unpickable lock, perhaps not having considered their security/threat model.
Everyone interested in lock picking has considered breaking the window. I promise, you're not the first person to think of that, and it doesn't bear repeating in these kinds of conversations.
Re: Enclave: An Unpickable Lock
#104I’m not in any way shape or form equipped to evaluate the lock itself, but I’ve seen enough “uncrackable” security measures being cracked to know better than to believe in flawless security. So… “Unpickable”, “invulnerable”? That’s the sort of language that makes me very grumpy indeed when talking to a security professional.
Re: Enclave: An Unpickable Lock
#105Re: Enclave: An Unpickable Lock
#106This design, while interesting, is probably more vulnerable to bump keys, jigglers, vibrators, and other such attacks than a normal lock.
Interesting. Why?
More moving parts, more possibilities to create instantaneous shear spaces if you send a storm of vibrations through the system.
Re: Enclave: An Unpickable Lock
#107I’m looking forward to sometime next month or so: “Little click on one…”
He needs to trademark that phrase. It’s so iconic of him.
Re: Enclave: An Unpickable Lock
#108While very cool and seemingly well-designed, this seems like a derivative of the lock developed by the YouTuber StuffMadeHere. A little strange to see someone applying for a patent for a version of someone else's design.
A little strange to see someone applying for a patent for a version of someone else's design
I'm pretty sure 95% of patent applications and 50% of granted patents are attempts to steal someone's invention out from under them.
Re: Enclave: An Unpickable Lock
#109Not the LockPickingLawyer (I hope he gets his hands on one soon) but here's a video review/demonstration: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNHFyc1oMwU
+1. LPL has disproven the claims of many "unpickable" locks. If computer security has taught me anything, unhackable/impenetrable claims, cyber or physical, should be met with skepticism.
I used to be huge Abloy Protec2 fanboy until I found out that they are very litigious, which made me wonder if their locks have been picked but the results were just taken down. I think they are still great locks. If anyone is going to break into my house there are easier and faster ways than picking the lock. However, the notion of an unpickable lock requires a lot of convincing for me to accept now.
Re: Enclave: An Unpickable Lock
#110Earlier quoted context omitted.
I have always said "if someone made it, someone can break it" Nothing is unhackable/impenetrable. period.
We've had theoretically-unbreakable cryptography for a long time now, particularly hash functions and encryption ciphers. There are still some weaknesses around timing attacks, and of course there's always the "wrench attack," but the algorithms themselves are as secure as we will ever need anything to be.
None of our block cipher or hash function primitives have unconditional security proofs; a lot of the reason to accept them is that the best-known attacks against the widely-used ones are very poor, even after a lot of knowledgeable people have studied them for a long time. But that doesn't logically exclude the possibility that there are unknown mathematical insights that would lead to much more effective attacks.
Often, protocols or constructions on top of these cryptographic primitives may have proofs that unconditionally reduce their security to the security of the primitives ("breaking this is at least as hard as AES", normally because "if you could break this, you could also break AES"), or in some cases proofs that do this by making only comparatively uncontroversial mathematical assumptions.
This is a good situation to be in, all things considered, and way better than the past, but it's not an ideal situation!