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Fastmail, Runbox, and Posteo under DDoS extortion attack

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Re: Fastmail, Runbox, and Posteo under DDoS extortion attack

#101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

CloudFlare, AWS, GCP.

Cloudflare I agree, but "give us $10000 or we increase your AWS bill by $20000 per day" sounds like a viable extortion scheme to me.

AWS Shield (while expensive $36000 a year) does have `DDoS cost protection` as one of it's features. i.e. if you have to 10x your server fleet to outscale + outlast the ddos attack, then AWS will forgive the additional cost.

Re: Fastmail, Runbox, and Posteo under DDoS extortion attack

#102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One way is to build your software on top of distributed/content-addressed P2P software (not Blockchain, but pure P2P). The angle of attack disappears completely then. Otherwise, with centralized infrastructure, you identify the bad traffic and send it elsewhere, an instance that keeps connections open but delivers nothing and have a small amount of resource usage. Problem is that you still need to be able to handle t…

> One way is to build your software on top of distributed/content-addressed P2P software (not Blockchain, but pure P2P). The angle of attack disappears completely then. I can see how this works for some applications, but how would this work for SMTP and IMAP/JMAP?

> how would this work for SMTP

You can actually get this semi-transparently with a TOR-like system. (I'm not sure TOR itself actually implements all of this, and also TOR is perennially underprovisioned for political reasons, so this mostly won't work in practice.)

First, you need a distributed DNS mechanism to publish "example.com. 9999 IN MX 1 abcdefghijklmnop.onion". This is mostly static, so DDOS doesn't really work.

You then come up with a sequence of rendezvous servers, which we'll number starting from 1. (I think actual TOR just assumes a single (or few) rendezvous server is sufficient, but I'd need to go dig through the code to be sure.)

You then try (in sequence) servers 1,2+rand(2),4+rand(4),...,2^k+rand(2^k),... where rand(x) picks a random number in [0,x). (0: I'm not sure whether distinct rands should share lower bits; see below.) If a server is overloaded it just drops traffic on the floor.

The destination server then checks the rendezvous servers in sequence until it's gotten enough successes that any client would have tried one of the successful rendezvous servers in its random sequence ([0] above affects the distribution here).

Under heavy load, the destination server also sets a proof of work requirement (clientHello statisfies the standard hash-has-x-leading-zeros), which allows the rendezvous servers to drop most of the incoming traffic. Legitimate clients by definition are not spamming connections as fast as they can, so they can burn CPU to meet this requirement. DDOS clients can also burn CPU on this, but that reduces the rate at which they generate traffic.

The end result is volumetric attacks are spread over 2^k rendezvous servers, where k is dynamicly chosen such that they can handle the load[2], while for faux-legitimate attacks[1], DDOS will just push up the computational costs for legitimate clients without ever actually shutting down the target[3].

This works for anything TCP-like.

1: You can DDOS anything by just behaving like (absurdly many) legitmate clients, eg `while true;do wget http\://example.com/;done`.

2: If the rendezvous and destination servers are all similar, then the work per server scales as the square root of the attack volume. Or put the other way around, the amount of attack traffic this setup can absorb scales as the square of the traffic each server can handle.

3: So for faux-legitimate attacks, the attacker's goal is not to overwhelm the server, but to maximize the costs to legitimate clients trying to connect; the attacker will generate only (roughly) as much traffic as the destination can handle, with as large a proof-of-work as possible. Assuming the destination server normally runs around 50% load, the total work imposed on legitimate clients (distributed over all of them) will be about the same as the attacker's available CPU. If the destination server normally runs significantly below 50% load, the imposed work will be proportionately lower.

Re: Fastmail, Runbox, and Posteo under DDoS extortion attack

#103

The sooner these kids realize that DDoS extortion attacks do nothing except waste resources (and monetary resource to CloudFlare, basically), the sooner they'll give up. They hit a number of VoIP providers recently, too.

The latest attacks on VoIP providers resulted in a SIP/VoIP specific solution from Cloudflare. I expect we will see Cloudflare mail protection soon enough... Makes you wonder.

Stay tuned ..

Today we can help quite a bit by proxying TCP traffic using Cloudflare Spectrum, e.g., spoofed traffic will never reach origin as it can't complete a handshake, we can use things like SYN cookies to challenge source, etc.

In the future, there's a lot more we plan to do here.

Re: Fastmail, Runbox, and Posteo under DDoS extortion attack

#104
post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The latest attacks on VoIP providers resulted in a SIP/VoIP specific solution from Cloudflare. I expect we will see Cloudflare mail protection soon enough... Makes you wonder.

I first learned that someone cracked my app from a company that offered to help me fight cracked downloads of my app. I was immediately suspicious.

This isn't new; it's called a protection racket and it works especially well if you actually do have a mechanism to protect against the thing (though of course that's not a requirement if you're generating most of the problem yourself).

Re: Fastmail, Runbox, and Posteo under DDoS extortion attack

#105
post #7

Is the attack on its webmail/website or on their smtp servers? I’ve been wondering about this, but how does one protect smtp servers from distributed attacks? Let’s assume smaller attackers, do you just need good firewalls in front of your servers to prevent congestion to the smtp servers? Are there off the shelf tools that can be configured to help here (pf maybe)? Do tools like fail2ban help? For context, I’ve pick…

If they're hitting the outbound SMTP servers, there's no way (at least that I know of) to protect the IP/servers via obfuscation with a service like Cloudflare etc. Email deliverability relies heavily on the source IP of the sending SMTP for reputation and is going to be viewable in the headers of an email. Also changing IPs isn't a small task unless you're sitting on a load of good reputation IPs that are pre-warmed…

Cloudflare has a product where you don't actually need any public IPs to host your apps. You install a daemon on each server and firewall off the box. It makes it virtually impossible for someone to get around the DDOS protection.

https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections...

Re: Fastmail, Runbox, and Posteo under DDoS extortion attack

#106
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> TPM by default in Windows 11 is the latest in a long line of changes that's made it harder to take over an ordinary person's computer Interesting, I think of TPM as being for holding keys for bitlocker encryption or personal certificates. Can you clarify how TPM makes it harder for to remotely take over a computer?

It's what you can do with the TPM. With the TPM to hold keys, you can require that e.g. bootloader changes be signed by the vendor. It's hard for malware to convince an ordinary person to go into BIOS and disable vendor locked bootloaders. Of course, Microsoft also gets into trouble here, because sometimes the vendors (and Microsoft itself) don't put the option to disable locking in the BIOS.

but why does malware need to mess with the bootloader when you can launch DDoS attacks from userspace?

Re: Fastmail, Runbox, and Posteo under DDoS extortion attack

#107
post #85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How that's a good point: especially that if you DDoS while asking for a ransom, you take the risk that your botnets gets taken down. While if you "discretly" mine CPU (and/or GPU?) mineable cryptocurrencies, you kinda fly under the radar.

You DDoS from routers and other embedded devices which aren’t capable of mining anything.

There have been many attempts to do exactly that with varied success.

The best I could find was 250 a day using only 15,000 hosts. Not bad considering the cost is literally zero for the attackers. Scale that up to half a million hosts, which is a tiny botnet in reality would make 8000+ a day or over 3 million a year based on low hanging fruit

https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/01/thousands-of-iot-devices-can...

Re: Fastmail, Runbox, and Posteo under DDoS extortion attack

#108
Well that explains it, I literally switched from gmail to fastmail 2 days ago and it was going amazingly until last night when I couldn't load it. "Oh great, an unreliable service I just paid a year for" -- this makes me want to support them even more. Their customer support was fantastic. I didn't inquire about the outage, instead a dns issue I'd created.

If you're a heavy gmail user you should read this story of my last year (out of 10+) with them and IMO migrate off as soon as you can. I wish I hadn't used an @gmail as long as I did.

For some unknown reason, they won't tell me, G marked my google pay account as "possible fraud, unable to verify identity" at some point this year. No idea when, I realized it when CC expired and my 3 month old Google Fi account wouldn't pay its bill and it wouldn't let me enter a credit card to pay for any G service. My G services started to drop like flies once my card expired. They locked me out of Google Pay and won't let me enter a new CC to pay for subs/gdrive. I had to clear out the entire 50gb of my gdrive so that I could get EMAIL again to my now "free" gmail account which is hovering around its 15gb limit, that's how old it is. The real kicker; I can't contact support anymore because I'm not a "paying customer" who gets their "world class support."

The fun part of this was I was completely without a cell phone for a week until I got onto ATT. Support (live chat) was completely useless and just sent me to a page to send them a copy of my license and a utility bill. I did that about 4 times now and I still can't change CCs on my Google account to pay for things. And they still won't contact me, won't tell me what the deal is or anything. It's been about 6 months.

I was joking to a friend before I switched to Fi "watch this be a terrible idea, it breaks and I'm without a phone for a month and have nobody to fix it." Welp.

Anyway, I tried out Protonmail months ago and was completely unimpressed with its search, interface, etc. I had low expectations of fastmail (due to proton exp) but it's great, I'm really impressed. It threads conversations like you'd expect and I could actually find things I searched for, I sold a house in the middle of my Proton use and it was miserable keeping track of all of the emails/docs/etc I was getting/sending for some reason. I remember searching for important attachments and it finding 10s or hundreds of attachments that were my realtors signature picture of herself that showed up in every email.

Sorry for the tangent, be very careful of how much you rely on G services because this cliche horror story you randomly see on twitter/reddit completely happened to me. I'll never be able to stop using this @gmail account because I have so, so many things tied to it but I'm going to try my best to undo most of that.

My biggest fear now is that my G account gets completely locked and all of the things I use G to authenticate to will be lost. Undoing all that is a nightmare.

Use a custom domain for your email..

Re: Fastmail, Runbox, and Posteo under DDoS extortion attack

#109
post #106

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's what you can do with the TPM. With the TPM to hold keys, you can require that e.g. bootloader changes be signed by the vendor. It's hard for malware to convince an ordinary person to go into BIOS and disable vendor locked bootloaders. Of course, Microsoft also gets into trouble here, because sometimes the vendors (and Microsoft itself) don't put the option to disable locking in the BIOS.

but why does malware need to mess with the bootloader when you can launch DDoS attacks from userspace?

It's a lot easier for something like Windows Defender to untangle something confined to user space than something that can prevent the OS from protecting its files by taking over the boot process.
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