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Also requiring the recipient to log into Google to allow google to track them.
And conditioning users to click on links they see in emails. Ugh.
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I think you're overreacting there and misappropriating that term to express your outrage, without thinking of realistic use cases. It's a security feature. Bank apps and 2FA apps probably have it as well when displaying sensitive information. In Airbnb it's probably a protective measure to avoid sharing information via screenshots instead of links to the app / website though. That's not dystopian either though.
> It's a security feature. Bank apps and 2FA apps probably have it as well And I would be creeped out as well by a bank website disabling the ability to take screenshots! The computer is mine to command. I simply do not find acceptable that a user program can disable basic functionality.
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Also requiring the recipient to log into Google to allow google to track them.
I agree that this is something to be concerned about but according to the instructions it doesn't require a Google login so you could do the entire session in a private browsing window if you wanted as long as you can get the verification code by SMS or the email address.
I feel that many of these pseudo-secure, proprietary enhancements to email create a false sense of security for non-tech-savvy users. Given the smoke-and-mirrors presentation of this as a way to "secure your email^tm" and the plethora of recent info leaks, i am sure some poor c-level exec will get caught inadvertently sharing something with an external recipient thinking that it will disappear in a few days, but then…
https://support.office.com/en-us/article/mark-your-email-as-...
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I think what the parent is saying is that they feel this DO NOT FORWARD header feature is being presented as a security feature. I probably agree
This is an algorithmically enforced one, though.
I feel that many of these pseudo-secure, proprietary enhancements to email create a false sense of security for non-tech-savvy users. Given the smoke-and-mirrors presentation of this as a way to "secure your email^tm" and the plethora of recent info leaks, i am sure some poor c-level exec will get caught inadvertently sharing something with an external recipient thinking that it will disappear in a few days, but then…
1) Security has to be enforced by code
2) Your employees are reasonable, and won't try to maliciously bypass security controls
I'm firmly in camp #2. In a normal corporate setting, a locked door or a locked cabinet is security, even with a cheap, easily pickable lock.
That's all this is. And for 95% of corporate applications, that's good enough. If you have high-level executive crime, or a scandal where you killed a few people, this won't help, of course. But if you'd like to keep an upcoming merger confidential, or maintain a trade secret, or anything vaguely normal, this is more than good enough.
This also helps with email retention policies. Sometimes you want ephemeral communications you don't want a record of. This isn't necessarily malicious either; in more litigious industries, emails can be obtained through discovery and quoted out-of-context. Things like typos can get you (goodness knows I've made enough of those). Sending an email which communicates something and disappears in a week is helpful.
This has the potential to create a huge legal headache. We can no longer rely on email to be there in our archive and presented as evidence in court, but now have to worry about expiry. In many countries an exchange of emails which represents a series of terms, restrictions, an offer, and finally acceptance can be considered a legally binding contract between parties and can be presented in court. With expiry and ema…
Seems simple enough.