With pleasure - (CTO of DNSFilter, this is my world)
DNS over DTLS (RFC 8094) speaks only to UDP
This could be compared with DNSCrypt's implementation
DNS over TLS (RFC 7858) is TCP focused
DNS over HTTPs is focused on... you guessed it, HTTPs
So all the same thing, all trying to add security and privacy, just over different transport mechanisms.
While we're at it -- you did not mention DNS over QUIC: https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-huitema-quic-dnsoquic-00.htm...
Some factors which start to come in to play with the various options are:
Compatibility with firewalls and proxies (DNS over HTTPs wins, others over port 853 have a disadvantage, even if you put them on port 443, they may get stopped by deep packet inspection)
TLS Improvement knobs: 0-RTT, TCP Fast Open, etc. (You can find a summary of these here: https://dnsprivacy.org/wiki/display/DP/DNS+Privacy+Implement... )
And closely related, performance. It's tough to beat a lossy protocol with minimal overhead (UDP), but there have been a lot of improvements with Keep alive, eDNS0, pipelining, etc.
We're currently doing a lot of testing around this, as we are working to offer useragents and LAN proxies implementing DNS over TLS, compared with DNSCrypt.
Finally: DNSSEC. It lives in a different part of the 'security' spectrum here... The purpose of DNSSEC is to be able to authenticate the validity of an answer when traveling through untrusted parties (say you're using a third-party resolver, or do you trust your ISP's DNS to not mangle with responses). It does not encrypt request/responses. It does not provide privacy. It answers the question: "Can I trust this response I received for example.org to be the one that example.org intended me to receive?"