Earlier quoted context omitted.
> If provoked, the agent will retaliate. > The agent is quick to forgive. Reminds me a bit of Marcus Aurelius: "From Rusticus... I learned... with respect to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong, to be easily disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they have shown a readiness to be reconciled." http://directingmind.com/meditations#1-7
Such a progressive lesson to get from a guy who, in less tender moments, beheaded people who wouldn't make sacrifices to the gods. Humanity is weird.
'Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation (2007)
101–110 of 117 posts
Re: 'Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation (2007)
#102Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Define righteous? Define immoral? The point here was that credit scores do not only rate your own behavior, but also those of people around you. If your neighborhood is bad, your credit score might reflect that instead of your own performance as a debtor. And if your neighborhood becomes hip and gains a better reputation, your credit score might improve even though you're still the same person.
Could you send me something reflecting why you think credit scores are based on the neighborhood in which you reside?
Re: 'Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation (2007)
#103Earlier quoted context omitted.
First, the point of these discussions is explicitly to stay within the lines. We all know there's a billion elaborations that you could make, but those are different problems. Worthy and interesting problems, even, but different problems. Second, there isn't always a great option for that, no.
'Staying within the lines' is why game theory doesn't actually work as a good predictor of human behaviour.
Re: 'Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation (2007)
#104See also https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/09/160915085719.h... Two people can hunt deer together, but if they are alone, they can only hunt rabbits. The person belonging to the Envious group will choose to hunt rabbits because he or she will be at least equal to the other hunter, or maybe even better; the Optimist will choose to hunt deer because that is the best option for both hunters; the Pessimist will…
Re: 'Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation (2007)
#105Re: 'Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation (2007)
#106One could back out their car and pretend to have dug out the whole thing :)
Re: 'Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation (2007)
#107Earlier quoted context omitted.
Richard Dawkins didn't pioneer that idea, it was Robert Axelrod. The seminal book about the topic is Axelrod's "The Evolution of Cooperation": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Evolution_of_Cooperation (Dawkins was a prominent advocate of Axelrod's work, though. And "The Selfish Gene" is definitely a great read in its own right.)
Thank you for the correction. I read the book about 10 years ago and completely forgot that he wasn't talking about himself. Finally had a chance to look at the chapter again now and indeed he is discussing Axelrod's competitions in great depth.
Re: 'Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation (2007)
#108Re some of the other comments about Robert Axelrod's tournament and evolution:
- As part of the project, the Axelrod library developers have written Python wrappers for the original Fortran code (https://github.com/Axelrod-Python/axelrod-fortran)
- Have used reinforcement learning to train strategies based on machine learning paradigms (https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.06307). EDIT: here are a couple of blog posts about recent research work http://vknight.org/unpeudemath/math/2017/07/28/sophisticated... and http://marcharper.codes/2017-07-31/axelrod.html
Disclaimer: I'm one of the maintainers of the project.
Re: 'Snowdrift' game tops 'Prisoner's Dilemma' in explaining cooperation (2007)
#109Earlier quoted context omitted.
That resolution only holds if you assume the other player to be equally rational in the PD.
In fact the strategy is simpler if the other player is exactly as rational as you: simply cooperate. The other player, being exactly as rational as you, will follow the same reasoning as you do to come to the same conclusion, and will do exactly the same thing as you. I would always cooperate with a copy of myself, for instance. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superrationality (Of course, the assumption "my opponent is…
This runs into problems of computability though: if we run the opponent's code to see what it does, and it turns out that their program runs our code to see what we do, we can get stuck in an infinite loop.
Like most incomputable problems, we can take a conservative approach: try to prove that it cooperates, using some incomplete computable algorithm; defect if we can't prove it. One simple algorithm is to check if the source code is the same as ours; more sophisticated algorithms would perform static analysis of the code.