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HipChat security notice

blog.hipchat.com

101–110 of 119 posts

Re: HipChat security notice

#101

Earlier quoted context omitted.

HipChat has been a pile of crap for a long time. Why people willingly use that over Slack remains a mystery.

Slack does the same thing... files are uploaded to S3 as well. Slack isn't a panacea when it comes to security.

Being uploaded to S3 isn't the problem; it's public access to the S3 URL that's the issue. You can't publicly access an uploaded Slack S3 file.

Re: HipChat security notice

#102
post #11

Why are they force resetting everyone's password if they are bcrypt'ed?

CYA. If they didn't force resetting passwords, they would at least appear to not have done "everything possible" to protect the account.

Re: HipChat security notice

#103

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Serious question: Do you need the non-techy explanation?

no.. but I could be a non IT user using hipchat. This sentence is likely meaningless to me.

Better would be "We securely[1] store your passwords"

blah blah...We take your privacy very seriously...blah blah...

[1] Technically, we use bcrypt with a random salt.

Re: HipChat security notice

#104

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What about using one of those pesky popular operating systems that everyone else uses. They're such big targets, using them only increases the bounty someone would get if they exploited them. You can build your own internal operating system to minimize the risk that anyone can break into your company's machines.

That's a bit different - no one here is suggesting recreating tools, merely using existing tools in a more secure manner and segmenting them off from the general public and sometimes the rest of your network too. Lowering your attack surface is often the cheapest way to stop attacks.

What's being suggested is still a significant increase in spend for infrastructure. Self-hosting is not free. You lose economies of scale on the services. You need to hire an inhouse IT and/or infrastructure/ops team to support them. Your probability of downtime increases significantly, which comes with a cost. It's the same tradeoff you're talking about, with the only difference being the scale of cost.

Re: HipChat security notice

#105
post #87
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

it's considered best security practice to do so

By whom?

Science.

You might find the below numbers interesting. Note that this performance is only one workstation with 8x gtx980. Even the mighty bcrypt (sidebar, look at the sha512 #s) won't save you if your password is bad. Now consider social media mining to enhance the word list. Now consider that (anecdotally) I have never done a hashcat audit and not had to have a conversation with someone about choosing better passwords:

Hashtype: bcrypt, Blowfish(OpenBSD) Workload: 32 loops, 2 accel

Speed.GPU.#1.: 6398 H/s Speed.GPU.#2.: 6507 H/s Speed.GPU.#3.: 6513 H/s Speed.GPU.#4.: 6643 H/s Speed.GPU.#5.: 6534 H/s Speed.GPU.#6.: 6512 H/s Speed.GPU.#7.: 6689 H/s Speed.GPU.#8.: 6542 H/s Speed.GPU.#*.: 52338 H/s

https://gist.github.com/epixoip/c0b92196a33b902ec5f3

Re: HipChat security notice

#106
Just got hit by this. Everybody in my team was using HipChat as a primary online communication tool. So, was nice to see nobody in the room for a while.

  Fine, but I wonder why they didn't reset the API tokens while resetting password immediately. Are they managed by the different servers/services?

Re: HipChat security notice

#107

Doubt this will be a popular view around here, but using a 3rd party service for internal business communications is just a bad idea. I've seen companies posting root passwords, ssh keys, salaries, internal financial details, etc in Slack and HipChat. Just waiting for a disaster to strike, adding value for every additional company to the target. Maybe this breach won't be the last straw, but it's a consistent risk. Y…

>You can run your own MatterMost or XMPP server quite easily and even lock it down to behind VPN only to minimize security risks almost completely.

What about Matrix?

Re: HipChat security notice

#108

Doubt this will be a popular view around here, but using a 3rd party service for internal business communications is just a bad idea. I've seen companies posting root passwords, ssh keys, salaries, internal financial details, etc in Slack and HipChat. Just waiting for a disaster to strike, adding value for every additional company to the target. Maybe this breach won't be the last straw, but it's a consistent risk. Y…

I had a gig at a company that used Hipchat once. I generally like the app, but I was shocked/appalled that posting files to the chat got uploaded to the AWS cloud with a URL that is retrievable anywhere. Do you know how often things like logs, config files, etc. got posted to chats? That place wrote insurance software too, so plenty of juicy financial information in their systems.

[deleted]

Re: HipChat security notice

#109

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's a bit different - no one here is suggesting recreating tools, merely using existing tools in a more secure manner and segmenting them off from the general public and sometimes the rest of your network too. Lowering your attack surface is often the cheapest way to stop attacks.

What's being suggested is still a significant increase in spend for infrastructure. Self-hosting is not free. You lose economies of scale on the services. You need to hire an inhouse IT and/or infrastructure/ops team to support them. Your probability of downtime increases significantly, which comes with a cost. It's the same tradeoff you're talking about, with the only difference being the scale of cost.

You need to have one person who can run apt-get upgrade a few times. Most of the good development and operations people are capable of it in my experience at least. It requires at most a few days upfront and a couple hours of monthly work to keep things up to date.

It's not remotely comparable to re-developing the whole system. If your developers can maintain their own machines, they can probably handle this.

Re: HipChat security notice

#110
I understand not disclosing the vulnerability itself, but if they won't even disclose the affected library's name then they are being grossly irresponsible or are under an NSL. If they are under an NSL and not just being irresponsible that would mean the vulnerability is part of one of the stolen NSA exploit kits.

If I use the library, and it is non-essential for my business, then I should know what it is so that I can remove it.

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