RSA 2048 is still the openssh default, i.e., best current advice from the openssh authors. The fact that this article's author labels that as "yellow" is a red flag.
I agree. It would be nice if the line: > RSA 2048: yellow recommended to change was followed by at least some link that explains why is it unsafe. Could anyone elaborate further? UPDATE: there is now a link up in this thread, from the user fjarlq, which points to an NSA recommendation from 2015. The recommendation seems to be related to the need of having a "quantum computing resistant" key. But with quantum computin…
Upgrade your SSH keys
101–110 of 159 posts
Re: Upgrade your SSH keys
#102Re: Upgrade your SSH keys
#103Earlier quoted context omitted.
You are misunderstanding. Curve25519 offers 128 bits of symmetric security, or the equivalent of a 256 bit elliptic curve key.
even if that is true. its still not enough to protect anything of value.
Re: Upgrade your SSH keys
#104Could someone provide a link with decent explanation why? Is it solely out of fear that it will be cracked soon on quantum computer?
Re: Upgrade your SSH keys
#105But RSA isn't broken, it is well understood, is "boring" (a plus on security, usually), has bigger bit sizes (according to people that know a lot more to me that's a plus point, regardless of EC requiring smaller ones, because of certain attacks), isn't hyped and sponsored by the NSA and isn't considered a bad choice by experts.
Not too many years ago Bruce Schneier was skeptical about EC, because of the NSA pushing for it. Now, I also trust djb and i an sure that ed25519 is a good cipher and there are many projects, like Tor that actually benefit from it, increasing throughput, etc., but for most use cases of SSH that might not be the issue, nor the bottleneck.
So from my naive, inexperienced point of view RSA might seem the more conservative option. And if I was worried about security I'd increase the bit size.
Am I going wrong here?
Re: Upgrade your SSH keys
#106And I think that was in the context of some DSA or ECDSA weakness, possibly a side channel attack or something similar. I forgot the details :(
What are your thoughts on this? Should we focus more simplicity and robustness of the implementation, rather than just the strength of the algorithm itself?
Re: Upgrade your SSH keys
#107Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you're concerned about hostname leakage in your pubkeys, you're almost certainly doing something wrong.
If you want SSH access to Github or Gitlab, you'll need to paste your pubkey there. Leaking your user@host can be a concern if you're trying to maintain anonymity, e.g. Gwern, particularly if your username is your real name. You can strip out the user@host part from the paste, but it's safer to just get rid of it. It's easy to accidentally paste the whole thing into an .ssh/authorized_keys file, for example. Admitted…
Re: Upgrade your SSH keys
#108Re: Upgrade your SSH keys
#109Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you're trying to maintain anonymity, why is your username your real name?
Even if it's not, your default hostname when using a MacBook Pro is typically " s-MacBook-Pro.local" which reveals you're using a MacBook Pro. That info leak probably doesn't matter, but generally you want to reveal as little information as possible.
Re: Upgrade your SSH keys
#110Earlier quoted context omitted.
Even if it's not, your default hostname when using a MacBook Pro is typically " s-MacBook-Pro.local" which reveals you're using a MacBook Pro. That info leak probably doesn't matter, but generally you want to reveal as little information as possible.
What kind of person cares enough about anonymity to change the comment in their ssh key, but not change the default hostname of their Mac? That person is very inconsistent.