The entire thing is worth reading, but the key take away: "Regulatory mistakes and agency issues within banks encouraged poor credit decisions. Spanish banks lent into overpriced real estate, and German banks lent to a state they knew to be weak. Current account imbalances within the Eurozone — persistent and unlikely to reverse without policy attention — implied as a matter of arithmetic that there would be loan flo…
Greece
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Re: Greece
#12This is a much better primer on the situation: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/anil.kashyap/research/papers...
Re: Greece
#13Interfulidity is one of the best economics blogs out there. Last year he did a five-part series on welfare economics[0] that, while quite lengthy, was very well-done. Anybody that's interested in political economy, but has a more traditional Econ 101 background, it's a good place to start. [0]: http://www.interfluidity.com/v2/5149.html
Utility is ordinal not out of some deep desire on the part of economists to "appear scientific" but because it reflects a simple empirical fact about humans. "Utility" is a measure of value to someone, and human values are ordinal: I value my children more than my cats, and no number of cats will ever equal the value of my children. It would be incoherent and wrong to say I value my children ten times more than my cats, and no cardinal relationship between them could possibly represent reality.
This is not mysterious or esoteric. The ordinality of human values is what makes rational choice under uncertainty such a difficult problem, because we can't compute expected values from ordinals (unless there happens to be a market in the things we value, in which case we can get cardinality through prices... but there is no market in children or many other things we value.)
By making it sound like economist's interest in publicly testing ideas by systematic observation, controlled experiment and Bayesian inference--which is what the discipline of science actually is--is some kind of inexplicable fetish instead of a perfectly reasonable goal for anyone who wants to say anything meaningful or interesting about the world, the author does everyone a great disservice.
Re: Greece
#14The entire thing is worth reading, but the key take away: "Regulatory mistakes and agency issues within banks encouraged poor credit decisions. Spanish banks lent into overpriced real estate, and German banks lent to a state they knew to be weak. Current account imbalances within the Eurozone — persistent and unlikely to reverse without policy attention — implied as a matter of arithmetic that there would be loan flo…
So we just ignore the fact that the Greek government misrepresented their economic state, failed to implement the necessary changes and then puts up a completely bogus referendum?
The implication is that Greek's issues were used as a scapegoat for a systemic problem.
Re: Greece
#15Until/unless the rich European countries are willing to subsidize the poorer countries, as a financial union, the Euro is just a complete non-starter since the fiscal policies these states need are so far apart.
Re: Greece
#16The entire thing is worth reading, but the key take away: "Regulatory mistakes and agency issues within banks encouraged poor credit decisions. Spanish banks lent into overpriced real estate, and German banks lent to a state they knew to be weak. Current account imbalances within the Eurozone — persistent and unlikely to reverse without policy attention — implied as a matter of arithmetic that there would be loan flo…
So we just ignore the fact that the Greek government misrepresented their economic state, failed to implement the necessary changes and then puts up a completely bogus referendum?
Re: Greece
#17The entire thing is worth reading, but the key take away: "Regulatory mistakes and agency issues within banks encouraged poor credit decisions. Spanish banks lent into overpriced real estate, and German banks lent to a state they knew to be weak. Current account imbalances within the Eurozone — persistent and unlikely to reverse without policy attention — implied as a matter of arithmetic that there would be loan flo…
So we just ignore the fact that the Greek government misrepresented their economic state, failed to implement the necessary changes and then puts up a completely bogus referendum?
The mismanagement leading up to the financial crises was of course the fault of the Greek government. However, the reforms that the EU has proposed/enforced since then seem to have been more about punishing the Greeks than about actually building a properly functioning economy. That might feel justified (and because of that it has the support of many voters) but long-term it is not a viable solution to the problem.
Re: Greece
#18The entire thing is worth reading, but the key take away: "Regulatory mistakes and agency issues within banks encouraged poor credit decisions. Spanish banks lent into overpriced real estate, and German banks lent to a state they knew to be weak. Current account imbalances within the Eurozone — persistent and unlikely to reverse without policy attention — implied as a matter of arithmetic that there would be loan flo…
So we just ignore the fact that the Greek government misrepresented their economic state, failed to implement the necessary changes and then puts up a completely bogus referendum?
Re: Greece
#19The entire thing is worth reading, but the key take away: "Regulatory mistakes and agency issues within banks encouraged poor credit decisions. Spanish banks lent into overpriced real estate, and German banks lent to a state they knew to be weak. Current account imbalances within the Eurozone — persistent and unlikely to reverse without policy attention — implied as a matter of arithmetic that there would be loan flo…
So we just ignore the fact that the Greek government misrepresented their economic state, failed to implement the necessary changes and then puts up a completely bogus referendum?
But since they didn't default, and instead the banks holding the bad debt were bailed out indirectly though loans to Greece (a tiny fraction of which remained in Greece, mind you), national income did shrink by 1/3 because of many of the changes that the institutions insisted take place _did_ take place. Now the likelihood of those loans getting paid back is as close to nil as non-failed state can get. So, to look to the future rather than the past, everybody should be trying to figure out how to repay the institutions as much money as possible. Shrinking national income further isn't going to do that.
With respect to the "completely bogus referendum", not gonna bite.
Re: Greece
#20The entire thing is worth reading, but the key take away: "Regulatory mistakes and agency issues within banks encouraged poor credit decisions. Spanish banks lent into overpriced real estate, and German banks lent to a state they knew to be weak. Current account imbalances within the Eurozone — persistent and unlikely to reverse without policy attention — implied as a matter of arithmetic that there would be loan flo…
So we just ignore the fact that the Greek government misrepresented their economic state, failed to implement the necessary changes and then puts up a completely bogus referendum?
Greece's debt was restructured to be drawn out into longer payment terms at a lower interest rate and at a reduced principal to be fair to them and to prevent a financial collapse.
It's containment. It's been 5 years of containment now, and it's working to some extent as nations within the eurozone are much less exposed to the greek situation than they were 5 years ago.