Export grade ciphers have always been a blight on TLS.
I hope this is the last nail in the coffin to see the last of it disabled in the wild, you would have thought FREAK would have done the job.
Logjam TLS attack
11–20 of 103 posts
Re: Logjam TLS attack
#12Why are export grade ciphers even still a thing. I can't believe that libraries are still shipped with implementations for those. Also, scary that SSH appears to be partially affected(?)
Why are export grade ciphers even still a thing.
Because all the countries still can't get along with each other, and thus export restrictions still exist.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the...
Re: Logjam TLS attack
#13Why are export grade ciphers even still a thing. I can't believe that libraries are still shipped with implementations for those. Also, scary that SSH appears to be partially affected(?)
> Also, scary that SSH appears to be partially affected(?)
Yeah. Is it sufficient to set ServerKeyBits to 2048?
Re: Logjam TLS attack
#14Why are export grade ciphers even still a thing. I can't believe that libraries are still shipped with implementations for those. Also, scary that SSH appears to be partially affected(?)
Why are export grade ciphers even still a thing. Because all the countries still can't get along with each other, and thus export restrictions still exist. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the...
Shipping breakable encryption sounds worse than shipping none at all. Especially when over and over again it becomes a source of vulnerabilities :(
Re: Logjam TLS attack
#15Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm running Version 43.0.2357.65 (64-bit) Chrome, which is also vulnerable to this. I believe it's the latest production version.
43.0.2357.65 (64-bit) as well (latest), says is vulnerable.
Well, let's put this to rest. The latest DEV is vulnerable. Chrome is vulnerable as of today, period.
Version 44.0.2398.0 dev (64-bit)
Re: Logjam TLS attack
#16This isnt exactly news but I guess a good site with a codename is needed to fix things nowadays.
Also, its nice and dandy to have postfix use SSL but SMTP TLS is always set to opportunistic and can be degraded to no encryption by a MITM - because, you know, compatibility.
Re: Logjam TLS attack
#17Use a proper ciphersuite and stop worrying about downgrade attacks. https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS
Looks like it's not enough just to set a proper ciphersuite, it's also important to reconfigure the dhparams (which apparently isn't even possible in most common apache versions). Interestingly, Dovecot seems to have had the foresight to automatically regenerate dhparams weekly by default.
You mean like https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS#DHE_handsh... ?
Re: Logjam TLS attack
#18Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why are export grade ciphers even still a thing. Because all the countries still can't get along with each other, and thus export restrictions still exist. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the...
Shipping breakable encryption sounds worse than shipping none at all. Especially when over and over again it becomes a source of vulnerabilities :(
> Shipping breakable encryption sounds worse than shipping none at all.
Well, yeah, that's the idea—"export-grade cryptography" essentially means means "cryptography we, as a state actor, can win against in a cyberwar."
Re: Logjam TLS attack
#19For Nginx I think you can simply do !EXPORT to not support *EXPORT. There was a similar security bug which advised users to disable some EXPORT ciphers... correct me if I am wrong.
nginx takes OpenSSL cipher specs, as does apache and a lot of other programs.
The `openssl ciphers -v CIPHERSPEC` command will list out what's enabled with a given setting.
Re: Logjam TLS attack
#20Is TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA with a 768-bit group less secure than TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA? Doesn't DHE just add an extra perfect forward secrecy layer to the non-DHE cipher suite without changing anything else?