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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/
And if you prefer your philosophical thought experiments to be accompanied by a pop-rock sound track, you're in luck:
Certain types of knowledge cannot be encoded effectively. What I mean by an encoding that's effective is one that translates my subjective experience of the idea or the thing so that you can "imagine" or "visualize" the thing by the mere act of decoding my encoding. Experiencing the thing directly does not count as an encoding in this case. Defining the precise meaning of "encoding" is left as an exercise to the read…
Just to summarize the article: People doing a "non physical" experiment, while using physical proof methods. This is scientific comedy at its finest, people.
You even got the facts wrong. They are not doing a "non physical experiment". They are proposing a thought experiment -- you know, the kind lots of scientists did, Einstein and Shroedigger among them.
The "non physical" part is just that it tries to establish that there is "non physical" knowledge (qualia). That is, nothing about the experiment as a process (as opposed to the output) is necessary to be "non physical"...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X8aWBcPVPMo
Am I missing something obvious? Why should we accept that the conclusion is true, rather than discarding one of the premises?
So if the value of science is its predictive capacity, then how does one verify that capacity? Through reproducibility. This property is essential to modern research; all scientific results must be able to be reproduced by anyone (assuming they have the appropriate equipment and the ability to adhere strictly to a specific procedure). For if reproducibility were not a requirement, then science would be of little value.
For some reason, a lot of scientists (or maybe just people on the internet who like the idea of science) pigeonhole themselves into the philosophies of positivism, physicalism, and materialism. I don't know why. I do research in quantum chemistry, and even as I learn more about the subject (and quantum field theory), no increase in knowledge has ever changed my philosophical stance. The only thoughts that run through my mind as I learn more are "Cool, now I can make better predictions" or "Hey, that's kind of elegant that nature works that way".
I find it odd, then, that so many people derive their entire life philosophy from sensory input corresponding to output from other humans. It's weird to me. If one were to plant a microchip that affected optical nerves into the brain of one of these people, and the microchip caused them to see an object that wasn't there, I would hardly be surprised if they denied seeing the object at all once they realized the object's visibility wasn't "reproducible".
Is it really the case that so many believe that what is real is not only what is personally experienced, but what is also supposedly personally experienced (and thus communicated) by others?
Playing devil's advocate, assume the simulation hypothesis (I don't actually believe it, but it's useful to illustrate my point). Furthermore, suppose that each individual human has been fed sensory input that only they are capable of experiencing, but the input is both personally predictable and reproducible. And lastly, the program running the universe does not allow any chain of interactions to exist that would permit the information describing these individual experiences to be transmitted to other humans.
What's wrong with this? Nothing. It's perfectly reasonable that every person in the simulation observes aspects of the universe that are unique to them, and them alone. It meets the "predictive" requirement for science at an individual level, and while it's personally reproducible, it's not consensually reproducible. Does that really make it any less real?
At least for me, I'm confident that physicalism is false. Why? Because if I were to rank everything I am certain about on a scale of most certain to least certain, at the top of the list would be "I am certain that I am experiencing my own existence". I cannot think of anything I am more sure about. Take away my senses (or manipulate them somehow), but as long as my brain is still functioning and I'm conscious, I'm still experiencing. The universe didn't have to be this way. It could have existed almost like it does now, except that all the people in it would have been philosophical zombies. (And perhaps all of you are, which would make me a solipsist, but at least I'm a solipsist that knows I'm not a p-zombie then.)
† My claim that "science is the ability to predict the future" and "better science corresponds to better predictions" is a semantic issue, and a whole debate could center around developing a consensus on good definitions. Wikipedia lists other attributes of the word "science" in addition to predictability. If you don't like my definition, make up a new word and substitute it for "science"; the argument holds regardless.
Just to summarize the article: People doing a "non physical" experiment, while using physical proof methods. This is scientific comedy at its finest, people.
Yeah, because professors of philosophy and epistemologists toil for years about the subject, but some 2-minute comment shows it for what it is... You even got the facts wrong. They are not doing a "non physical experiment". They are proposing a thought experiment -- you know, the kind lots of scientists did, Einstein and Shroedigger among them. The "non physical" part is just that it tries to establish that there is…
Neither Einstein nor Schrodinger "did" thought experiments. They used thought experiments (which is a really terrible name for imaginary scenarios) to motivate arguments and guide thinking, not to demonstrate anything.
No one who has been paying attention to the history of knowledge uses thought experiments for anything other than illustrative, explanatory or motivational purposes. In particular, the conceit that imaginary scenarios can teach us anything about the way reality actually is long outdated, as no such imaginary scenario has ever done any such thing.
Relativity was motivated by thought experiments, but so too have been numerous false ideas. Therefore thought experiments can do nothing to distinguish false ideas from true ones, so anyone who uses them for that purpose is doing them wrong.
I don't understand how the thought experiment isn't simply begging the question. It states in its premises that (A) Mary already has all physical knowledge and (B) she later gains new knowledge. If the conclusion (that not all knowledge is physical) wasn't true, the premises could not be consistent. Am I missing something obvious? Why should we accept that the conclusion is true, rather than discarding one of the pre…
For example, there is an actual argument in the philosophy of science that is based on the supposition that there is a substance that is "identical to water in every respect" but "is not H2O but rather XYZ".
Philosophers take this "argument" quite seriously, and get rather testy when you point out that the premise is a contradiction: if something has "all the properties of water", then that must include properties under electrolysis, and under electrolysis water decomposes to 2H and O, not X, Y and Z (whatever those might be). If you say this to a philosopher they will reply, "Yes, but what if it doesn't?" as if that was a coherent statement.
So the answer to your question is, "Because if we allowed ourselves to discard one of the premises we'd have a much harder time motivating this whole ridiculous discussion, and since our livelihood depends on such ridiculous discussions, we're not about to let that happen!"
I don't understand how the thought experiment isn't simply begging the question. It states in its premises that (A) Mary already has all physical knowledge and (B) she later gains new knowledge. If the conclusion (that not all knowledge is physical) wasn't true, the premises could not be consistent. Am I missing something obvious? Why should we accept that the conclusion is true, rather than discarding one of the pre…
Philosophers typically assume certain "fixed points" in arguments that they then refuse to budge from under any circumstances. It is a mental dysfunction, a kind of inbuilt rigidity of mind, that is peculiar to the breed. For example, there is an actual argument in the philosophy of science that is based on the supposition that there is a substance that is "identical to water in every respect" but "is not H2O but rat…
I don't understand how the thought experiment isn't simply begging the question. It states in its premises that (A) Mary already has all physical knowledge and (B) she later gains new knowledge. If the conclusion (that not all knowledge is physical) wasn't true, the premises could not be consistent. Am I missing something obvious? Why should we accept that the conclusion is true, rather than discarding one of the pre…
Philosophers typically assume certain "fixed points" in arguments that they then refuse to budge from under any circumstances. It is a mental dysfunction, a kind of inbuilt rigidity of mind, that is peculiar to the breed. For example, there is an actual argument in the philosophy of science that is based on the supposition that there is a substance that is "identical to water in every respect" but "is not H2O but rat…
Even here, the issues are related to metaphysics, not so much about chemistry:) There is a jump from empirical world (the world we are in) to possible worlds. Here is the article: Is water necessarily identical to H2O, by David Barnett http://spot.colorado.edu/~barnetdb/my_papers/Barnett_Water.p...