Earlier quoted context omitted.
Actually it's not, and it would break enough that they wouldn't be able to do that without complaints. See the entire permission system for another case. Therein lies Google's problem, as once anything is usable in public it does get used/abused. There are certain VM behaviours in compatibility mode which are like this, where outright bugs have to be preserved in later versions for the benefit of apps which aren't go…
I would actually like to know what apps want in /proc that they can't get through the API.
Gmail smartphone app hacked by researchers
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Re: Gmail smartphone app hacked by researchers
#12Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sounds to me like it detects the activity to activity transition (which on Android creates an Intent which is passed to the system and back via shared memory) and then does something else, i.e. display a fake password entry screen when the transition is detected. It sounds like the actual Intent contents remain secure, however, the creation of an Intent while a particular app is in the foreground and using a particul…
or just remove /proc access from apps, which is totally useless.
Also, /proc nor ptrace is "useless". Both are actually fundamental to several aspects of the underlying system that zygote runs on.
Re: Gmail smartphone app hacked by researchers
#13Earlier quoted context omitted.
or just remove /proc access from apps, which is totally useless.
Actually it's not, and it would break enough that they wouldn't be able to do that without complaints. See the entire permission system for another case. Therein lies Google's problem, as once anything is usable in public it does get used/abused. There are certain VM behaviours in compatibility mode which are like this, where outright bugs have to be preserved in later versions for the benefit of apps which aren't go…
1. https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/mast... line 218
Re: Gmail smartphone app hacked by researchers
#14Earlier quoted context omitted.
I would actually like to know what apps want in /proc that they can't get through the API.
Well... how do you suppose the API gets at all the things? (not everything is done across IPC/binder, much is in process)
The above makes sense if you want to assume that you need /proc at least at some permission level. If you don't (which I think you don't), then it should simply be unmounted in the sandbox.
IPC is the standard way to get out of the sandbox, and should be used also for whatever features the APIs need /proc for.