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Please remove StartCom Certification Authority root certificate

bugs.debian.org

11–20 of 48 posts

Re: Please remove StartCom Certification Authority root certificate

#12
Not getting involved in the politics of being charged for revocations/re-keying, however it's worth pointing out that Google Chrome (linux and windows, and Chromium) all seem to have the "Check for server certificate revocation" option disabled by default.

Re: Please remove StartCom Certification Authority root certificate

#13
Hats off to the Debian developer. I can not believe the report was handled so politely. This is one of the silliest bug reports I have seen. I can not think of what the possible thought process was that led to the formation and submission of this bug report.

  # dpkg-reconfigure -p low ca-certificates

Re: Please remove StartCom Certification Authority root certificate

#14

I don't think that "charging for services you said you would charge for" is anywhere near reason enough to revoke a root certificate. I would be very disappointed by Debian if they actually went through with this.

From the customer’s point of view there’s not much to complain about.

If you’re maintaining a CA trust store, it might be a little different. The CA can adopt any pricing structure they want, but the one they’ve chosen will lead some customers to not revoke their certificates, resulting in potentially compromised certificates being used in a way that could have been avoided.

This could definitely factor into your judgment of whether it’s a good idea to trust certificates signed by that CA.

Re: Please remove StartCom Certification Authority root certificate

#15
TL/DR from the Mozilla bugzilla (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=994033) There doesn't appear to be a definitive argument as to should they or should they not waive their revocation fee.

On the side of StartCom an extremly resonable point as to why they should not waive their fee:

> Every other certificate provider requires payment for certificates. StartCom is the one provider offering free certificates, which goes a long way to spreading TLS and https more broadly, and the complaint here is that they're daring to charge a fee to maintain their revocation list? Removing them over that would do more harm than good to security.

And the also very reasonable counter point:

> The problem is that thanks to Heartbleed we now have potentially leaked private keys (leaked due to circumstances outside of the control of anyone) and thus insecure sites. Now with StartSSL charging for every single revoked certificate they are encouraging people to "eh, the chance my key got leaked is so low, I'll just stay with my old certificate" thinking and behaviour. This is actively compromising the security of SSL and consumers (no one I know checks the SSL vendor on certificates of sites they visit if there's the lock icon and it says it is trustworthy). Therefor customers and site users expose themselves to potential security risks while the browser ensures them they are communicating securely with the website.

At the very least its refreshing to see that people aren't just jumping on the rage bandwagon of, "OMG you mean I have to pay for something that you said I'd have to pay for. You are evil".

It's nice to see some even handed analysis of the situation!

Re: Please remove StartCom Certification Authority root certificate

#17
post #7

Either this request is naive, or I am. As I understand it, not all StartCom certificates are necessarily vulnerable. I have a number of StartSSL certificates issued before 4/7 that, according to the HeartBleed checker here[1] are not vulnerable. Is it wrong for me to assume that the tool is correct, or is it wrong to assume that all StartCom certificates are necessarily vulnerable? [1] - http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/

What that tool says is irrelevant to the question of whether those certs have been compromised.

The risk is that before the vulnerability was patched, somebody used it to grab the private keys associated with the certs.

Re: Please remove StartCom Certification Authority root certificate

#18

Not getting involved in the politics of being charged for revocations/re-keying, however it's worth pointing out that Google Chrome (linux and windows, and Chromium) all seem to have the "Check for server certificate revocation" option disabled by default.

In my experience, enabling it causes strange behavior with some plugins and even Chrome itself at some times. If the CRL check fails, related secure connections will fail with no notification.

This led to a bit of problem with a proxy server at work. A filter update blocked the CRL link, and suddenly nobody in my office could sign into their Chrome browsers. You'd hit "log in", it would appear to work, but nothing happens. An error saying that CRL checks were at fault would have saved a great deal of time....

Re: Please remove StartCom Certification Authority root certificate

#19

So, if StartCom is removed from trusted CAs you will have to buy a new certificate and spend $$$, something you obviously want to avoid. That's stupid.

And worse, the Debian developers would be at fault.

This is a sticky situation, really. On one hand, StartCom's pricing structure is fairly upfront. On the other hand, extracting $25 from every customer because of a bug they have no control over is dick behavior of the highest order.

Ideally they'd put out a notice saying that they will offer a one-time rekey for free. Without getting into ethics, it's an entirely automated process and costs Startcom absolutely nothing.

Re: Please remove StartCom Certification Authority root certificate

#20
post #7

Either this request is naive, or I am. As I understand it, not all StartCom certificates are necessarily vulnerable. I have a number of StartSSL certificates issued before 4/7 that, according to the HeartBleed checker here[1] are not vulnerable. Is it wrong for me to assume that the tool is correct, or is it wrong to assume that all StartCom certificates are necessarily vulnerable? [1] - http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/

I don't think the certificates are vulnerable at all. Their private keys may have been stolen if people were using them with a vulnerable version of OpenSSL, but that has nothing to do with StartSSL certificates themselves.

That is exactly right and exactly why the bug report was insane.
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