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Local IP discovery with HTML5 WebRTC: Security and privacy risk?

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Re: Local IP discovery with HTML5 WebRTC: Security and privacy risk?

#11

Post by computer »

lallysingh wrote: post #10

Well, it's a complicated answer, I think. Generally, it's not an additional risk over how screwed you generally are. If you're taking precautions against existing attacks, then yeah. Question is, can it be fixed? The WebRTC SDP's for getting a peer-to-peer connection, so the general case seems to need to share IP addresses.. But that's not really needed, if you're normally behind a NAT, you're going to be behind a NA…

It can be fixed for general cases (like advertisers or drive-by-exploits): make WebRTC click-to-play.

This also fixes the issue where any random site can use WebRTC to make your computer distribute peer to peer content of its choice (like bittorrent).

Re: Local IP discovery with HTML5 WebRTC: Security and privacy risk?

#12

Post by cynwoody »

adrr wrote: post #9
kzahel wrote: post #2

This is really scary that it can be used as a very reliable fingerprinting technique. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-05#sec... It doesn't seem like the issue is addressed in the webrtc draft.

I am under the assumption that most APs/Routers use 192.168.1.0/24 as the default network? I think it wouldn't be unique enough for use in fingerprinting.

Actually, the block in question is 192.168.0.0/16. But, yes, in my experience, the router is almost always at 192.168.0.1. So, your observation about fingerprinting usefulness is correct.

However, if a rogue script can exploit an XSS vulnerability, it's likely in a lot of cases the user has not set a password on the router's LAN admin interface. So, the script can run through a short list of guesses, get lucky, and poke a hole in the user's firewall from the inside.

This vulnerability exists independent of WebRTC. WebRTC just makes it easier to scope out more unusual LAN setups, such as the article's example involving a 10.0.0.0/8 network.

Bottom line: use passwords on your LAN even if it's just you and two or three computers. And, for good measure, pick an unusual subnet out of the 10.0.0.0/8 net.

Re: Local IP discovery with HTML5 WebRTC: Security and privacy risk?

#16

Post by simcop2387 »

cynwoody wrote: post #12
adrr wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am under the assumption that most APs/Routers use 192.168.1.0/24 as the default network? I think it wouldn't be unique enough for use in fingerprinting.

Actually, the block in question is 192.168.0.0/16. But, yes, in my experience, the router is almost always at 192.168.0.1. So, your observation about fingerprinting usefulness is correct. However, if a rogue script can exploit an XSS vulnerability, it's likely in a lot of cases the user has not set a password on the router's LAN admin interface. So, the script can run through a short list of guesses, get lucky, and p…

Or don't even go for 10/8 or 192.168.0.0/16, go straight to 172.16.0.0/12.
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